Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Charness, Gary B, 1998. "Pre-Play Communications And Credibility: A Test Of Aumann'S Conjecture," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt01j786tj, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007.
"Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study,"
Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
- Rosemarie Nagel & Antonio Cabrales & Roc Armenter, 2002. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 601, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Baliga, Sandeep & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 450-468, August.
- Bohnet, Iris & Cooter, Robert, 2001. "Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt5h6970h8, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1203, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
More about this item
KeywordsCheap talk; coordination; credibility; experiment; Leex;
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:293. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://www.econ.upf.edu/ .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .