Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty
The present paper offers a racional choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world, ticket splitting emerges as a mechanism risk-averse voters use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature.
|Date of creation:||06 Nov 1998|
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|Note:||Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on PostScript; pages: 29; figures: included. Forthcoming in Public Choice|
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- Alberto Alesina & Howard Rosenthal, 1988. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," NBER Working Papers 2706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rosenthal, Howard & Alesina, Alberto, 1989. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," Scholarly Articles 4553031, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-41, November.
- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Zupan, Mark A, 1991. "An Economic Explanation for the Existence and Nature of Political Ticket Splitting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 343-69, October.
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