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Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty

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  • Mauricio Bugarin

    (University of Brasilia)

Abstract

The present paper offers a racional choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world, ticket splitting emerges as a mechanism risk-averse voters use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauricio Bugarin, 1998. "Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty," Game Theory and Information 9811001, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811001
    Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on PostScript; pages: 29; figures: included. Forthcoming in Public Choice
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    3. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:02:p:373-398_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Rosenthal, Howard & Alesina, Alberto, 1989. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," Scholarly Articles 4553031, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    6. repec:hrv:faseco:34222831 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Alberto Alesina & Howard Rosenthal, 1988. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," NBER Working Papers 2706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Zupan, Mark A, 1991. "An Economic Explanation for the Existence and Nature of Political Ticket Splitting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 343-369, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vote splitting; uncertainty; insurance;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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