Discrimination and job-uncertainty
In this paper I look at the possibility of encorporating group behaviour into a model of the labour market by showing that discrimination can be the result of competition between coalitions of workers and bosses for a scarce amount of jobs. Coalitions can form either on the basis of the productivity of the individual members or on the basis of a recognisable characteristic. If the probability of correctly assessing the productivity of individual workers decreases, coalition-formation on the basis of recognisable characteristics becomes relatively more rewarding than coalition forming on the basis of productivity. I thus identify the conditions under which each individual in the endogeneously defined group actively discriminates persons with different recognisable characteristics, independent of productivity.
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