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Discrimination and job-uncertainty

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  • Frijters, P.

Abstract

In this paper I look at the possibility of encorporating group behaviour into a model of the labour market by showing that discrimination can be the result of competition between coalitions of workers and bosses for a scarce amount of jobs. Coalitions can form either on the basis of the productivity of the individual members or on the basis of a recognisable characteristic. If the probability of correctly assessing the productivity of individual workers decreases, coalition-formation on the basis of recognisable characteristics becomes relatively more rewarding than coalition forming on the basis of productivity. I thus identify the conditions under which each individual in the endogeneously defined group actively discriminates persons with different recognisable characteristics, independent of productivity.
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Suggested Citation

  • Frijters, P., 1998. "Discrimination and job-uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 433-446, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:36:y:1998:i:4:p:433-446
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dale T. Mortensen, 1982. "The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bargaining Game," NBER Chapters,in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 233-258 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Kevin Lang, 1986. "A Language Theory of Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 363-382.
    3. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1990. "Male-Female Wage Differentials in Job Ladders," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(1), pages 106-123, January.
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    5. Gottfries, Nils & McCormick, Barry, 1995. "Discrimination and open unemployment in a segmented labour market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-15, January.
    6. Rosen, Asa, 1997. "An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1589-1613, August.
    7. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 13-29, June.
    8. Phelps, Edmund S, 1972. "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 659-661, September.
    9. Phelps, Charlotte D., 1988. "Caring and family income," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 83-98, July.
    10. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    11. Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn C, 1993. "Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1220-1240, December.
    12. Kenneth Arrow, 1971. "The Theory of Discrimination," Working Papers 403, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    13. Peter A. Diamond, 1982. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 217-227.
    14. Renes, Gusta & Ridder, Geert, 1995. "Are women overqualified," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 3-18, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antecol, Heather & Cobb-Clark, Deborah A., 2008. "Racial and ethnic discrimination in local consumer markets: Exploiting the army's procedures for matching personnel to duty locations," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 496-509, September.
    2. Antecol, Heather & Cobb-Clark, Deborah A., 2008. "Identity and racial harassment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 529-557, June.
    3. Paul Frijters, 2003. "Testing for Employee Discrimination using Matched Employer-Employee Data: Theory and Evidence," Paul Frijters Discussion Papers 2003-1, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
    4. Paul Frijters & Michael A. Shields & Stephen Wheatley Price & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2006. "Testing for Employee Discrimination in Britain using Matched Employer-Employee Data," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 8-2006, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    5. Johnston, David W. & Lordan, Grace, 2016. "Racial prejudice and labour market penalties during economic downturns," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 57-75.
    6. Frijters, Paul, 1999. "A three-factor search model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 319-324, September.
    7. Antecol, Heather & Cobb-Clark, Deborah A., 2010. "The effect of community-level socio-economic conditions on threatening racial encounters," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 517-529, November.
    8. Johnston, David W. & Lordan, Grace, 2014. "When work disappears: racial prejudice and recession labour market penalties," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56110, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Bart Hobijn & Carlos A. Medina-Durango, 2000. "Is Discrimination Due to a Coordination Failure?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1758, Econometric Society.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

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