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Discrimination and Employment Protection

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Åsa Rosén

    (stockholm University)

  • Steinar Holden

    (Oslo University)

Abstract

We study a search model with firing cost. We show that there exists an equilibrium with discriminatory hiring standards of worker only differing in an observable characteristic determining their type. Even though the firm can observe the workers' expected productivity at the hiring stage, it still may condition its hiring standard on group belonging, due to feedback effects of other firm' hiring standards. The model predicts higher unemployment rates, stricter hiring standards, longer tenure for discriminated workers and a positive relation between employment protection and relative unemployment rates for discriminated workers.

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File URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2009/paper_350.pdf
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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 350.

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Date of creation: 2009
Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:350
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA

Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General
  • J70 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - General

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Cited by:

  1. Barth, Erling & Bratsberg, Bernt & Raaum, Oddbjørn, 2012. "Immigrant wage profiles within and between establishments," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 541-556.
  2. Emiko Usui, 2015. "Occupational gender segregation in an equilibrium search model," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-14, December.

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