Racial Discrimination in Labor Markets with Posted Wage Offers
We analyze race discrimination in labor markets in which wage offers are posted. If employers with job vacancies receive multiple applicants, they choose the most qualified but may choose arbitrarily among equally qualified applicants. In the model, firms post wages, workers choose where to apply, and firms decide which workers to hire. Labor-market frictions greatly amplify racial disparities, so mild discriminatory tastes or small productivity differences can produce large wage differentials between the races. Compared with the nondiscriminatory equilibrium, the discriminatory equilibrium features lower net output, lower wages for both white and black workers and greater profits for firms.
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Volume (Year): 95 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kevin Lang & Michael Manove & William T. Dickens, 2005.
"Racial Discrimination in Labor Markets with Posted Wage Offers,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series
dp-145, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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