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Matching with interviews


  • Masters, Adrian


This paper explores how interviews affect the matching process when worker productivity is private information. Wages are determined by a single round of strategic bargaining after the worker is interviewed. The implications of this hiring process for the efficiency of matching and the incidence and severity of statistical discrimination are considered. The better are firms at identifying productive workers the worse the average quality of the unemployment pool so interviewing tends to slow down matching for every one. Multiple Pareto rankable equilibria are possible such that any social group in a "bad" equilibrium faces stricter hiring standards, longer spells of unemployment and lower welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Masters, Adrian, 2009. "Matching with interviews," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 938-954, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:33:y:2009:i:4:p:938-954

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
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    6. Malcomson, James M., 1999. "Individual employment contracts," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 35, pages 2291-2372 Elsevier.
    7. Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath & Avner Shaked, 2000. "Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 46-72, March.
    8. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    9. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, July.
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    11. David H. Autor & David Scarborough, 2008. "Does Job Testing Harm Minority Workers? Evidence from Retail Establishments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(1), pages 219-277.
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    Cited by:

    1. Masters, Adrian, 2014. "Statistical discrimination from composition effects in the market for low-skilled workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 72-80.
    2. Steinar Holden & Åsa Rosén, 2014. "Discrimination And Employment Protection," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(6), pages 1676-1699, December.
    3. Siegel, Ron & Ely, Jeffrey C., 2013. "Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.


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