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Search, Bargaining and Employer Discrimination

  • Rosen, A.

This paper analyses Becker's (1971) theory of employer discrimination within a search and wage-bargaining setting. Discriminatory firms pay workers who are discriminated against less, and apply stricter hiring-criteria to these workers. It is shown that the highest profits are realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Moreover, once ownership and control are separated, both highest profits and highest utility may be realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Thus, market forces, like entry and/or takeovers do not ensure that wage differentials due to employer discrimination will disappear.

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Paper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number 1998-13.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:uppaal:1998-13
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page:

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  1. Sasaki, Masaru, 1999. "An Equilibrium Search Model with Coworker Discrimination," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 377-407, April.
  2. Judith K. Hellerstein & David Neumark & Kenneth R. Troske, 1997. "Market Forces and Sex Discrimination," NBER Working Papers 6321, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Kenneth R Troske & Kimberly N Bayard & Judith Hellerstein & David Neumark, 1998. "New Evidence On Sex Segregation And Sex Differences In Wages From Matched Employee-Employer Data," Working Papers 98-18, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
  4. Black, Dan A, 1995. "Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search Model," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 309-33, April.
  5. Audra J. Bowlus & Zvi Eckstein, 1998. "Discrimination and Skill Differences in an Equilibrium Search Model," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9802, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  6. Rosen, Asa, 1997. "An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1589-1613, August.
  7. George J. Borjas & Stephen G. Bronars, 1988. "Consumer Discrimination and Self-Employment," NBER Working Papers 2627, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Erica L. Groshen, 1987. "The structure of the female/male wage differential: is it who you are, what you do, or where you work?," Working Paper 8708, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  9. Daron Acemoglu, 1998. "Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence," NBER Working Papers 6658, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Joni Hersch, 1991. "Equal Employment Opportunity Law and Firm Profitability," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 26(1), pages 139-153.
  11. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
  12. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1985. "Short-run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment Vacancies, and Real Wages," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 676-90, September.
  13. Sattinger, Michael, 1996. "Search and discrimination," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 143-167, September.
  14. Pissarides, C A, 1984. "Efficient Job Rejection," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 97-108, Supplemen.
  15. James F. Ragan & Carol Horton Tremblay, 1988. "Testing for Employee Discrimination by Race and Sex," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 23(1), pages 123-137.
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