Job Search Costs And Incentives
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More about this item
Keywordsjob search; moral hazard; labor market; unemployment insurance;
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-11-29 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-DGE-2013-11-29 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-HRM-2013-11-29 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-IAS-2013-11-29 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2013-11-29 (Labour Economics)
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