Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1998

• Chaudhuri, Ananish, 1998, "The ratchet principle in a principal agent game with unknown costs: an experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 37, issue 3, pages 291-304, November.
• Heifetz, Aviad & Polemarchakis, Heracles M., 1998, "Partial Revelation with Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 80, issue 1, pages 171-181, May.
• Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998, "Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 81, issue 1, pages 163-200, July.
• Cordoba, Jose M. & Hammond, Peter J., 1998, "Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 36, issue 3, pages 185-212, December.
• Alexander-Cook, Kim & Bernhardt, Dan & Roberts, Joanne, 1998, "Riding free on the signals of others," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 67, issue 1, pages 25-43, January.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1998, "Are there dynamic gains from a poor-area development program?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 67, issue 1, pages 65-85, January.
• van de Walle, Dominique, 1998, "Assessing the welfare impacts of public spending," World Development, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 3, pages 365-379, March.
• Levine, Ross & Zervos, Sara, 1998, "Capital Control Liberalization and Stock Market Development," World Development, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 7, pages 1169-1183, July.
• Dailami, Mansoor & Leipziger, Danny, 1998, "Infrastructure Project Finance and Capital Flows: A New Perspective," World Development, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 7, pages 1283-1298, July.
• Belianin Alexis, 1998, "Risk Attitudes and Choice under Uncertainty: Experimental Evidence from Russia," EERC Working Paper Series, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, number 98-01e, Sep.
• Maitreesh Ghatak & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1998, "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Working Papers, Economic Growth Center, Yale University, number 791, Oct.
• Brunnermeier, Markus, 1998, "Buy on rumours - sell on news: a manipulative trading strategy," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119135, Nov.
• Dow, James & Rahi, Rohit, 1998, "Informed trading, investment, and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119147, Apr.
• Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998, "A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 19356, Jul.
• Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. outside ownership," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 19360, Jan.
• Besley, Timothy & Pande, Rohini, 1998, "Read my lips : the political economy of information transmission," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 2169, Jul.
• J. M. Bourgeon, 1998, "Decentralized markets with informed sellers," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 98-27.
• F. Forges, 1998, "Le cœur d'une économie d'échange en information asymétrique," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 98-29.
• Coco, G., 1998, "On the Use of Collateral," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9805.
• Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1998, "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9809.
• Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1998, "Collateralized debt as the optimal contract," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, number 98-04.
• Rohit Rahi & James Dow, 1998, "Should Speculators be Taxed?," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp291, Apr.
• Rohit Rahi & James Dow, 1998, "Informed Trading, Investment, and Welfare," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp292, Apr.
• Markus K Brunnermeier, 1998, "Buy on Rumours - Sell on News: A Manipulative Trading Strategy," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp309, Nov.
• Snellman, K., 1998, "Rules Versus Discretion: Favouritism and the Use of Requirements of Formal Qualifications," Papers, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics, number 98-12.
• Kast, R. & Molkhou, V., 1998, "Asymetrie d'information et contrats bancaires: l'interet des "prets-tests"," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 98a12.
• Auriol, E., 1998, "Corruption in Procurement and Public Purchase," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 98a29.
• Reichlin, P. & Siconolfi, P., 1998, "Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle," Papers, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi, number 326.
• Neeman, Z. & Orosel, G.O., 1998, "Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics, number 92.
• Neeman, Z., 1998, "The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics, number 93.
• Neeman, Z., 1998, "The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics, number 95.
• Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel, 1998, "Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0092, Sep.
• Zvika Neeman, 1998, "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0093, Sep.
• Zvika Neeman, 1998, "The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0095, May.
• Breton, M. & St-Amour, P. & Vencatachellum, D., 1998, "Birds of a Feather: Teams as a Screening Mechanism," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, number 98-05.
• Spaeter, S., 1998, "The Principal-Agent Relationship: Two Distributions Satisfying MLRP and CDFC," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques., number 98-11.
• Dionne, G. & Spaeter, S., 1998, "Environmental Risk and Extended Liability: the Case of Green Technologies," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques., number 98-12.
• Boyer, M.M., 1998, "Poll Subsidy and Excise Tax," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques., number 98-13.
• Gagnepain, P. & Ivaldi, M., 1998, "Stochastic Frontiers and Asymmetric Information Models," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 98.503.
• Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1816.
• Luis Angel Medrano & Xavier Vives, 1998, "Strategic Behavior and Price Discovery," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1825.
• P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998, "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1857.
• Leppamaki, M., 1998, "Non-Monetary Collusion and Optimal Use of Information," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics, Department of Economics, number 437.
• Takalo, T. & Kultti, K., 1998, "Incomplete Contracting in a research Joint Venture: The Micronas Case," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics, Department of Economics, number 440.
• Gupta, M. & Lebrun, B., 1998, "A Simple Model of First Price Auction with Resale," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Energie, number 98-08.
• Breton, M. & St-Amour, P. & Vencatachellum, D., 1998, "Birds of a Feather : Teams as a Screening Mechanism," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique, number 9808.
• Olsen, T.E. & Osmundsen, P., 1998, "Strategic Tax Competition; Implications of National Ownership," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 11/98.
• Osmundsen, P., 1998, "Learning-by-Doing; Consequences for Incentive Design," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 12/98.
• Nomia, O., 1998, "Games with Incomplete Information," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 98.59.
• Francesca Cornelli & David D. Li, , "Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, number 17-98.
• Bond, E.W. & Gresik, T.A., 1998, "Incentive Compatible Information Transfer Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics, number 8-98-1.
• Bourgeon, J.M., 1998, "Decentralized Markets with Informed Sellers," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9827.
• Forges, F., 1998, "Le coeur d'une economie d'echange en information asymetrique," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9829.
• Morgan, J. & Stocken, P., 1998, "An Analysis of Stock Recommendations," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs, number 204.
• Acemoglu, D. & Zilibotti, F., 1998, "Information Accumulation in Development," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies, number 652.
• Razin, A. & Sadka, E. & Yuen, C.-W., 1998, "Do Debt Flows Crowd out Equity Flows or the Other Way Round?," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 17-98.
• Chen, Y. & Narasimhan, C. & Zhang, Z.J., 1998, "Consumer Information Heterogeneity and Competitive Strategies under Price-Matching Guarantees," Washington University, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University, number 98-03.
• Kerschbamer, R. & Maderner, N., 1998, "Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information," Papers, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy, number 9805.
• Ania, A.B. & Troger, T. & Wambach, A., 1998, "An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection," Papers, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy, number 9808.
• Ghatak, M. & Guinnane, T.W., 1998, "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Papers, Yale - Economic Growth Center, number 791.
• Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess, 1998, "Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-00759758, Jun.
• Ellingsen, Tore, 1998, "Payments in Kind," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 244, Jun, revised 10 Feb 2000.
• Bester, Helmut & Wärneryd, Karl, 1998, "Conflict Resolution Under Asymmetric Information," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 264, Sep.
• Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1998, "Information Accumulation in Development," Seminar Papers, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies, number 652, Oct.
• Patrick W. Schmitz & Dirk Sliwka, 1998, "Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, volume 15, pages 233-243.
• Khalil, Fahad & Parigi, Bruno M, 1998, "Loan Size as a Commitment Device," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 39, issue 1, pages 135-150, February.
• Tim Besley & Rohini Pande, 1998, "Read my lips: the political economy of information transmission," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies, number W98/13, Oct.
• Rudolf KERSCHBAMER & Nina MADERNER, 1998, "Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics, number vie9805, Oct.
• Clarke, George R. & Cull, Robert, 1998, "Why privatize? : the case of Argentina's public provincial banks," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1972, Sep.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1998, "Behavioral responses to risk in rural China," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1978, Sep.
• Hentschel, Jesko & Lanjouw, Peter, 1998, "Household welfare measurement and the pricing of basic services," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2006, Nov.
• Angelina Keil, 1998, "Wirtschaftschronik. III. Quartal 1998," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 71, issue 10, pages 661-663, October.
• Angelina Keil, 1998, "Wirtschaftschronik. IV. Quartal 1997," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 71, issue 1, pages 23-26, January.
• Angelina Keil, 1998, "Wirtschaftschronik. I. Quartal 1998," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 71, issue 4, pages 229-231, April.
• Angelina Keil, 1998, "Wirtschaftschronik. II. Quartal 1998," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 71, issue 7, pages 457-460, July.
• Jose M. Cordoba & Peter J. Hammond, 1998, "Asymptotically Strategy-Proof Walrasian Exchange," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics, number 98005, Feb.
• Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998, "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9805001, May, revised 26 Jul 1999.
• V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998, "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9809004, Sep.
• Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, 1998, "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9811002, Nov.
• P. K. Monteiro & J. L. Moraga, 1998, "``We sold a million copies''-The role of advertising past sales," Industrial Organization, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9812001, Dec.
• Feltovich, N. & Harbaugh, R. & To, T., 1998, "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Counter signaling," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 518.
• Dezsö Szalay, 1998, "Financial Contracting, R&D and Growth," GK working paper series, Post Graduate Programme "Allocation on Financial Markets", University of Mannheim, number 1999-03, Oct, revised 08 Dec 1999.
• Hellwig, Martin & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998, "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion, Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 98-06, May.
• Hellwig, Martin, 1998, "Risk Aversion and Incentive Compatibility with Ex Post Information Asymmetry," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 98-38, Nov.
• Sander, Birgit, 1998, "Strategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetz," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 901.
• Föllmer, Hans & Wu, Ching-tang & Yor, Marc, 1998, "Canonical decomposition of linear transformations of two independent Brownian motions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,61.
• Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut & Peleg, Bezalel, 1998, "Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,72.
• Neff, Cornelia, 1998, "Innovation under financial restrictions," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics, number 129.
• Bräuer, Wolfgang, 1998, "Electoral Competition under Media Influence," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 98-19.
• Bertrand Villeneuve, 1998, "Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, volume 49, issue 3, pages 821-829.
• James Bergin, 1998, "Common Knowledge With Monotone Statistics," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 974, Sep.
• Robert Townsend & Rolf Mueller, 1998, "Mechanism Design and Village Economies: From Credit, to Tenancy, to Cropping Groups," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 1, issue 1, pages 119-172, January, DOI: 10.1006/redy.1997.0005.
• Stephen D. Williamson, 1998, "Discount Window Lending and Deposit Insurance," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 1, issue 1, pages 246-275, January, DOI: 10.1006/redy.1997.0002.
• Youngjae Lim & Robert Townsend, 1998, "General Equilibrium Models of Financial Systems: Theory and Measurement in Village Economies," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 1, issue 1, pages 59-118, January, DOI: 10.1006/redy.1997.0003.
• Georges Dionne & Sandrine Spaeter, 1998, "Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies," Working Papers, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, number 98-12, Aug.
• Hyun Song Shin, 1998, "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, volume 29, issue 2, pages 378-405, Summer.
• Péter Esõ, 1998, "Farkas Törvény az Árveréselméletben," Rajk László Szakkollégium Working Papers, Rajk László College, number 1, Mar.
• Thomas J. Prusa & Dobrin Kolev, 1998, "Tariff Policy for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 199705, Jun.
• Kwang Soo Cheong, 1998, "Corporate Income Taxation and Signaling," Public Finance Review, , volume 26, issue 5, pages 480-502, September, DOI: 10.1177/109114219802600504.
• Victor V. Claar, 1998, "An Incentive-Compatibility Approach To the Problem of Monitoring a Bureau," Public Finance Review, , volume 26, issue 6, pages 599-610, November, DOI: 10.1177/109114219802600605.
• Yaw Nyarko, 1998, "Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 3, pages 643-655.
• James A. Dearden, 1998, "Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 189-198.
• Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998, "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 2, pages 227-258.
• Steven R. Williams & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 1998, "The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 2, pages 393-421.
• Hillel Rapoport & Frederic Docquier, 1998, "Are migrant minorities strategically self-selected?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, volume 11, issue 4, pages 579-588.
• Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & Shyam Sunder, 1998, "Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 3, issue 1, pages 7-34, March, DOI: 10.1023/A:1009631714430.
• John Duggan, 1998, "An extensive form solution to the adverse selection problem in principal/multi-agent environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 2, pages 167-191.
• C. Choe, 1998, "A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 3, pages 237-255.
• Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 1998, "On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 4, pages 303-328.
• Rustichini, A., 1998, "Minimizing Regret : The General Case," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-41.
• Prat, A., 1998, "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-123.
• Palomino, F.A. & Prat, A., 1998, "Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-108.
• Rigotti, L., 1998, "Imprecise Beliefs in a Principal Agent Model," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-128.
• Suijs, J.P.M. & De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Borm, P.E.M., 1998, "Optimal Design of Pension Funds : A Mission Impossible," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-25.
• Prat, A., 1998, "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 30b6424e-efe1-48c7-9709-7.
• Palomino, F.A. & Prat, A., 1998, "Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 3da5cec4-4ab5-495a-8786-3.
• Suijs, J.P.M. & De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Borm, P.E.M., 1998, "Optimal Design of Pension Funds : A Mission Impossible," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number ccc7c4fa-fdf8-4276-8d5c-6.
• Hege, U. & Feess, E., 1998, "Efficient liability rules for multi-party accidents with moral hazard," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number e216300c-126c-4e48-ad1f-2.
• Matthew Shum, 1998, "The Econometrics Of English Auctions," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mshum-98-02, Sep.
• Frédéric Docquier & Hillel Rapoport, 1998, "Are migrant minorities strategically self-selected?," ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2013/230712.
• Gary Charness & Nuno Garoupa, 1998, "Reputation and honesty in a market for information," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 326, Sep.
• Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli, 1998, "Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 345, Jun.
• Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi & Danilo Guaitoli, 1998, "A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 381, Dec.
• Claude Crampes & Corinne Langinier, 1998, "Information Disclosure in the REnewal of Patent," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 49-50, pages 265-288.
• Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998, "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 3, pages 587-597, June.
• Karp, Larry S., 1998, "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," CUDARE Working Papers, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, number 25100, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25100.
• Feltovich, Nick & Harbaugh, Rick & To, Ted, , "Too Cool For School? A Theory Of Countersignaling," Economic Research Papers, University of Warwick - Department of Economics, number 268800, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268800.
• Jelovac, I. & Macho-Stadler, I., 1998, "Comparing Organizational Structures in Health Services," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 412.98.
• Davila, J., 1998, "Overlapping Generations Economies and Symmetrical Economies under Extrinsic Uncertainty," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 416.98.
• Alejandro Esteller More, 1998, "A model of regional equalisation transfers under asymmetric information with reference to the spanish regional financing system," Working Papers in Economics, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia, number 26.
• Pietro Reichlin & Paolo Siconolfi, 1998, "Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 326, Feb.
• Gigler, F & Hemmer, T, 1998, "On the frequency, quality, and informational role of mandatory financial reports," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 36, issue , pages 117-147, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24913.
• Dye, RA, 1998, "Discussion of on the frequency, quality, and informational role of mandatory financial reports," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 36, issue , pages 149-160, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24913.
• Max Blouin & Roberto Serrano, 1998, "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 98-5, revised 10 Aug 1998.
• Karp, Larry, 1998, "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, number qt4z62b52k, Mar.
• Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 346, Jan.
• Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande, 1998, "Read My Lips: The Political Economy of Information Transmission," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 355, Jul.
• Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998, "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 356, Jul.
• Gian Luca Clementi & Hugo Hopenhayn, , "A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2002-E9.
• d’ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1998, "Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998010, Jan.
• CALCAGNO, Riccardo & LOVO, Stefano M., 1998, "Bid-ask price competition with asymmetric information between market makers," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998016, Feb.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998017, Feb.

1997

• Chen, Yongmin & Wang, Ruqu, 1997, "Learning buyers' valuation distribution in posted-price selling," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273387, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273387.
• Rocher, F. & Vila, X., 1997, "A Note on Agent Based Imperfect Competition," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 398.97.
• Olivella, P. & Pastor, M., 1997, "Cost Reducing Strategies," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 402.97.
• Tore Nilssen, 1997, "On the Consistency of Merger Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 45, issue 1, pages 89-100, March, DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00036.
• Kirschenheiter, M, 1997, "Information quality and correlated signals," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 35, issue 1, pages 43-59, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24914.
• Amir, E & Ziv, A, 1997, "Recognition, disclosure, or delay: Timing the adoption of SFAS no 106," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 35, issue 1, pages 61-81, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24914.
• Coller, M & Yohn, TL, 1997, "Management forecasts and information asymmetry: An examination of bid-ask spreads," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 35, issue 2, pages 181-191, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24913.
• Chong-en Bai & Yijang Wang, 1997, "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why is Good Money Thrown after Bad?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics, number 347., Jan.
• Marcel Boyer, 1997, "L'économie des organisations : Mythes et réalités," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 97s-02, Jan.
• Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997, "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 97s-29, Jun.
• PODDAR, Sougata, 1997, "Capacity and entry deterrence under asymmetric information on demand," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997009, Jan.
• GHATAK, Maithreesh & MORELLI, Massimo & SJÖSTRÖM, Tomas, 1997, "Moral hazard and overlapping generations with endogenous occupational choice," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997028, Apr.
• ALBANO, Gian Luigi & LIZZERI, Alessandro, 1997, "A monopolistic market for certification," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997037, May.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997, "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997077, Oct.
• Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, 1997, "Taxes and employment subsidies in an optimal redistribution program," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange), CEPREMAP, number 9709.
• Suarez, Javier & Sussman, Oren, 1997, "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1604, Mar.
• Fingleton, John & Waldron, Patrick, 1997, "Optimal Determination of Bookmakers' Betting Odds: Theory and Tests," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1623, Apr.
• Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni, 1997, "Excess Capacity as an Incentive Device," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1625, May.
• Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1997, "Setting Standards: Information Accumulation in Development," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1641, May.
• Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 1997, "Bank Solvency, Market Structure, and Monitoring Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1665, Jun.
• Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1997, "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1687, Aug.
• Shin, Hyun Song, 1997, "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1722, Oct.
• Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 1997, "Can Competition in the Credit Market be Excessive?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1725, Oct.
• Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 73, issue 1, pages 118-156, March.
• Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, pages 388-406, August.
• Suarez, Javier & Sussman, Oren, 1997, "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 76, issue 1, pages 47-71, September.
• Bhattacharya, Utpal & Weller, Paul, 1997, "The advantage to hiding one's hand: Speculation and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 39, issue 2, pages 251-277, July.
• Ng, Francis & Yeats, Alexander, 1997, "Open economies work better! did Africa's protectionist policies cause its marginalization in world trade?," World Development, Elsevier, volume 25, issue 6, pages 889-904, June.
• Nier, Erlend, 1997, "Optimal managerial remuneration and firm-level diversification," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119172, Jul.
• Marín, José & Rahi, Rohit, 1997, "Speculative securities," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119175, Apr.
• L. Caron & G. Dionne, 1997, "Insurance fraud estimation : more evidence from the Quebec automobile insurance industry," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 97-21.
• S. Marette, 1997, "Intermédiation et affichage des prix dans un contexte d'anti-sélection," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 97-32.
• Bala, V. & Goyal, S., 1997, "Self-Organization in Communication Networks," Econometric Institute Research Papers, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute, number EI 9713-/A, Jan.
• Dow, J & Rahi, R, 1997, "Informed Trading, Investment, and Welfare," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco97/03.
• Labory, S, 1997, "Signalling Aspects of Managers' Incentives," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco97/04.
• Gonzalez de Lara, Y, 1997, "Changes in Information and Optimal Debt Contracts. The Sea Loan," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco97/06.
• Dow, J. & Rahi, R., 1997, "Should Speculators be Taxed?," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco97/21.
• Coco, Guiseppe, 1997, "Collateral, Heterogeneity in Risk Attitude and the Credit Market Equilibrium," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9702.
• Coco, G., 1997, "Credit Rationing and the Welfare Gain from Usury Laws," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9715.
• Takatoshi Ito & Richard K. Lyons & Michael Melvin, 1997, "Is there private information in the FX market? the Tokyo experiment," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, number 97-04.
• Gregory R. Duffee & Chunsheng Zhou, 1997, "Credit derivatives in banking: useful tools for managing risk?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 1997-13.
• Rohit Rahi & José Marín, 1997, "Speculative Securities," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp268, Jul.
• d'Aspremont, C & Cremer, J & Gerard-Varet, L-A, 1997, "Unique Implementation in Auctions and in Public Goods Problems," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a15.
• Henriet, D., 1997, "The Value of Information in Health Insurance: A Theoretical Approach," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a38.
• Vagstad, S., 1997, "Centralized vs. Decentralized Procurement: Does Dispersed Information Call for Decentralized Decision-Making," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 1497.
• Deborah Minehart & Zvika Neeman, 1997, "Termination and Coordination in Partnerships," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0083, Mar.