Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2000

• Xavier Vila & Francesc Rocher, 2000, "A Note On Agent-Based Imperfect Competition," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000, Society for Computational Economics, number 278, Jul.
• Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000, "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 35, Mar.
• Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000, "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 36, Mar.
• Annamaria Menichini, 2000, "Third parties as an incentive to comply," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 41, May, revised 01 Jan 2006.
• Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2000, "Credibility and Commitment of Monetary Policy in Open Economies," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 47, Sep.
• Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2000, "Managerial Compensation Schemes with Informed Principals," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), volume 136, issue 4, pages 499-512, December.
• Hans Gersbach, 2000, "Rush, delay or money burning: Informational biases in policy decisions," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 1, issue 2, pages 137-155, July.
• Roland Strausz, 2000, "Regulation in a political economy: explaining limited commitment and the ratchet effect," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 1, issue 3, pages 181-197, December.
• Roberto Burguet & Xavier Vives, 2000, "Social learning and costly information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 15, issue 1, pages 185-205.
• Bruno Jullien & Georges Dionne & Bernard Caillaud, 2000, "Corporate insurance with optimal financial contracting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 16, issue 1, pages 77-105.
• Giulio Seccia, 2000, "Informational efficiency properties of rational expectations equilibria in non-convex economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 16, issue 2, pages 323-332.
• Leonard J. Mirman & Neelam Jain, 2000, "Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 16, issue 2, pages 333-353.
• Aldo Rustichini & Anne P. Villamil, 2000, "Intertemporal pricing in laboratory posted offer markets with differential information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 16, issue 3, pages 613-637.
• Oscar Volij, 2000, "Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 29, issue 1, pages 63-79.
• Petter Osmundsen & Guttorm Schjelderup & Kåre Petter Hagen, 2000, "Personal income taxation under mobility, exogenous and endogenous welfare weights, and asymmetric information," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, volume 13, issue 4, pages 623-637.
• Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet, 2000, "original papers : Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 5, issue 1, pages 1-21.
• Peter S. Faynzilberg & Praveen Kumar, 2000, "original papers : On the generalized principal-agent problem: Decomposition and existence results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 5, issue 1, pages 23-58.
• Domenico Menicucci, 2000, "original papers: On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 5, issue 1, pages 59-70.
• Bhaskar Dutta & Salvador BarberÁ, 2000, "original papers : Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 5, issue 2, pages 111-127.
• Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000, "original papers : A strategic analysis of network reliability," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 5, issue 3, pages 205-228.
• Walter Garcia-Fontes & Hugo Hopenhayn, 2000, "Entry restrictions and the determination of quality," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, volume 2, issue 2, pages 105-127.
• Luis Cabral, 2000, "Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 00-07.
• Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2010, "Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions," Working Papers, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee, number 10.01, Jul.
• Maarten C.W. Janssen & Vladimir Karamychev, 2000, "Cycles and Multiple Equilibria in the Market for Durable Lemons," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 00-025/1, Apr.
• Maarten C.W. Janssen, 2000, "Catching Hipo's: Screening, Wages and Unemployment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 00-028/1, Apr.
• Maarten C.W. Janssen & Vladimir Karamychev, 2000, "Continuous Time Trading in Markets with Adverse Selection," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 00-109/1, Dec.
• Pouyet, J. & Verouden, V.C.H.M., 2000, "Cartel Formation under Incomplete Information : on the Requirements of Collusion-Proofness," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2000-01.
• Lockwood, Ben, 2000, "Production Externalities and Two-way Distortion in Principal-multi-agent Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 92, issue 1, pages 142-166, May.
• Arya, Anil & Glover, Jonathan & Rajan, Uday, 2000, "Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 93, issue 1, pages 87-109, July.
• Polemarchakis, H. M. & Seccia, G., 2000, "A Role for Monetary Policy when Prices Reveal Information: An Example," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 95, issue 1, pages 107-115, November.
• Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman & Beck, Thorsten, 2000, "Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 46, issue 1, pages 31-77, August.
• Lokshin, Michael & Harris, Kathleen Mullan & Popkin, Barry M., 2000, "Single Mothers in Russia: Household Strategies for Coping with Poverty," World Development, Elsevier, volume 28, issue 12, pages 2183-2198, December.
• Bandiera, Oriana, 2000, "On the structure of tenancy contracts: theory and evidence from 19th century rural Sicily," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 3546, Jan.
• Levy, Gilat, 2000, "Strategic consultation in the presence of career concerns," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 3627, Nov.
• Dridi, Ramdan & Germain, Laurent, 2000, "Noise and competition in strategic oligopoly," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 6862, Jun.
• Laurence Whitehead, 2000, "A política da especialização na América Latina: antecedentes e atualidades," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, FGV EAESP, volume 20, issue 2, pages 212-224, April, DOI: 10.1590/0101-31572000-1067.
• E. Auriol & R. Gary-Bobo, 2000, "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 2000-01.
• M. Fleurbaey & R. J. Gary-Bobo & D. Maguain, 2000, "Education, Distributive Justice, and Adverse Selection," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 2000-14.
• de Lara, Y.G., 2000, "Risk-Sharing, Enforceability, Information and Capital Structure," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco2000/5.
• De Meza, D. & Webb, D.C., 2000, "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Market," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 0007.
• Bijapur, M., 2000, "Borrower and Lender Reputation Effects: A New Theory of Financial Intermediation," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 0018.
• Bijapur, M., 2000, "The Dynamics of Firms' Credit Ratings," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 0019.
• Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, 2000, "A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE), EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), number 390, Jul.
• Hugo A. Hopenhayn & Gerard Llobet & Matthew F. Mitchell, 2000, "Rewarding sequential innovators: prizes, patents and buyouts," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, number 273, DOI: 10.21034/sr.273.
• Olivier Renault & Jean-Luc Prigent & Olivier Scaillet, 2000, "An Autoregressive Conditional Binomial Option Pricing Model," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp364, Nov.
• Gerard-Varet, L.-A., 2000, "Principal-agent," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 00c01.
• Sbracia, M. & Zaghini, A., 2000, "Expectations and Information in Second Generation Currency Crises Models," Papers, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi, number 391.
• Vagstad, S., 2000, "Centralized vs. Decentralized procurement: does Dispersed Information Call for Decentralized Decision-Making?," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 211.
• Kjerstad, E. & Vagstad, S., 2000, "Procurement Auctions with Entry of Bidders," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 215.
• Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel, 2000, "Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development, number 100, Jan.
• Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000, "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences, number 99-00-11.
• Glazer, A., 2000, "Optimal Term Length when Misinformation Increases with Experience," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences, number 99-00-25.
• Fernandes, A., 2000, "Altruism with Endogenous Labor Supply," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-, number 0002.
• Llobet, G. & Hopenhayn, H. & Mitchell, M., 2000, "Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-, number 0012.
• Rai, A.S., 2000, "Beat a Cheat: Hotlines to Taget the Poor," Papers, Chicago - Graduate School of Business, number 22.
• Raub, S. & Ruling, C.-C., 2000, "Fashion in the Management of Knowledge," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 2000.10.
• Buchel, B. & Probst, G., 2000, "From Organizational Learning to Knowledge Management," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 2000.11.
• Coestier, B., 2000, "Dynamic Financial Contract under Extended Liability," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques., number 00-08.
• Decamps, J.-P. & Mariotti, T., 2000, "Irreversible Investment and Learning Expternalities," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 00-534.
• Boldron, F. & Hariton, C., 2000, "Rent Extraction by an Unregulated essential Facility," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 00-538.
• Zantman, W., 2000, "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 00-540.
• Kanniainen, V. & Keuschnigg, C., 2000, "The Optimal Portfolio of Start-up Firms in Venture Capital Finance," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics, Department of Economics, number 486.
• Jensen, S., 2000, "Price Discrimination and Three Part Tariffs in a Duopoly," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 3/2000.
• Cabral, L.M.B., 2000, "Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-, number 00-07.
• Rapoport, B., 2000, "Why do African Households give Hospitality to Relatives?," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 2000.112.
• Rapoport, B., 2000, "Consumption Patterns in Extended Families : The Role of Guests in African Economies," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 2000.86.
• Ghatak, M. & Morelli, M. & Sjostrom, T., 2000, "Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics, number 1-00-1.
• Ben-Porath, E., 2000, "Cheap Talking in Games with Incomplete Information," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 2000-8.
• Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2000, "Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: 'Whitewashes' and 'Coverups'," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~01-01-03, Nov, revised 01 Jul 2001.
• Denis Maguain, 2000, "Education, Inequality of Opportunity Aversion, Multi-Product, and Adverse Selection
  [Education, aversion sociale pour l'inégalité des chances, multi-production et anti-sélection]," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05110939, Jan.
• Frisell, Lars, 2000, "Taking Advice from Imperfectly Informed Lobbyists: When to Match Hawks with Hawks," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 355, Feb.
• Wärneryd, Karl, 2000, "Information in Conflicts," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 388, Jun.
• Segendorff, Björn, 2000, "A Signalling Theory of Scapegoats," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 406, May.
• Segendorff, Björn, 2000, "Scapegoats and Transparency in Organizations," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 407, Jun.
• Vislie,J., 2000, "Environmental regulation under asymmetric information with type-dependent outside option," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 18/2000.
• Hoel,M. & Iversen,T., 2000, "Genetic testing when there is a mix of public and private health insurance," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 31/2000.
• Lund,D. & Nilssen,T., 2000, "Cream skimming, dregs skimming, and pooling : on the dynamics of competitive screening," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 39/2000.
• Kim, Jaehong, 2000, "Incentive Monopoly Regulation with Entry," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a399, Nov.
• Kim, Iljoong & Kim, Jaehong, 2000, "Litigation Selection as a Signal under Asymmetric Information: A Two-Type Model with Alternating Bargaining Offers," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a400, Dec.
• Kim, Iljoong & Kim, Jaehong, 2000, "Lawsuit as a Signaling Game under Asymmetric Information: A Continuum Types Model," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a401, Dec.

1999

• Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999, "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 88, issue 1, pages 119-160, September.
• Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999, "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 74, issue 3, pages 395-430, December.
• Clarke, George R. G. & Cull, Robert, 1999, "Why Privatize? The Case of Argentina's Public Provincial Banks," World Development, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 5, pages 865-886, May.
• Nier, Erlend, 1999, "Equity finance, adverse selection and product market competition," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119115, Sep.
• José Tavares de Araújo Jr., 1999, "Concorrência schumpeteriana e suas implicações políticas: o caso latino-americano," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, FGV EAESP, volume 19, issue 4, pages 569-580, October, DOI: 10.1590/0101-31571999-1025.
• F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1999, "A note on the incentive compatible core," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-02.
• F. Forges & A. Heifetz & E. Minelli, 1999, "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-06.
• J.-C. Bureau & E. Gozlan & S. Marette, 1999, "Quality signaling and international trade in food products," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-13.
• T. Jaaidane, 1999, "Surveys and incentives : A principal-agent-users model," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-14.
• T. Jaaidane, 1999, "Contrôle de qualité et sondages : Le recours aux usagers dans la gestion de services publics avec exclusion," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-15.
• G. Chemla, 1999, "L'impact de la négociation et des prises de contrôle sur l'ampleur de l 'effet de Cliquet," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-19.
• B. Bassan & O. Gossner & M. Scarsini & S. Zamir., 1999, "A class of games with positive value of information," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-32.
• G. Dionne & C. Fluet, 1999, "Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-36.
• Battigalli, P. & Siniscalchi, M., 1999, "Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco99/15.
• Battigalli, P., 1999, "Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco99/17.
• Hindriks, J., 1999, "Income Tax Compliance: the No-Commitment Game," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9919.
• David Cooper & John Kagel & Qing Liang Gu & Wei Lo, 1999, "Gaming against managers in incentive systems: Experimental results with chinese students and chinese managers," Artefactual Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00038.
• Andrea Bigano, 1999, "Environmental Dumping, Transboundary Pollution and Asymmetric Information. Some Insights for the Environmental Regulation of the European Electricity Market," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 1999.36, Mar.
• Dan Anderberg, 1999, "Adverse selection, competition, and linear self-insurance," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, volume 12, issue 1, pages 3-15, Spring.
• Menezes, Flavio Marques & Monteiro, P. K., 1999, "Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE), EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), number 360, Oct.
• Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka & Chi-Wa Yuen, 1999, "Excessive FDI flows under asymmetric information," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue sep.
• Yvan Lengwiler & Athanasios Orphanides, 1999, "Optimal discretion," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 1999-42.
• Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 1999, "Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: a model of the credit channel," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, number 129.
• Erlend Nier, 1999, "Equity Finance, Adverse Selection and Product Market Competition," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp333, Aug.
• Kast, R. & Lapied, A., 1999, "Precautionary Savings in Incomplete Financial Markets," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 99a14.
• Menezes, F., 1999, "Auctions of Identical Objects with Single-Unit Demands: a Survey," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 363.
• Olsen, T.E. & Torsvik, G., 1999, "Information, Incentives and Organizations; some Intertemporal Aspects," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 1799.
• Olsen, T.E. & Osmundsen, P., 1999, "Common Agency with Outside Options; the Case of International Taxation of an MNE," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 1999.
• Erbenova, M. & Vagstad, S., 1999, "Investors Facing Opportunistic Governments: Is it Really Good to "Know the Market" Before Investing?," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 201.
• Laurent, P. & Teiletche, J., 1999, "Coexistence de structures d'echange differenciees: justifications theoriques et applications au marche des changes," Papers, Caisse des Depots et Consignations - Cahiers de recherche, number 1999-12/fi.
• De Vany, A. & Lee, C., 1999, "Information Cascades in Multi-Agent Models," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences, number 99-00-05.
• Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1999, "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-, number 9911.
• Dionne, G. & Fluet, C., 1999, "Full Pooling in Multi-Period Contracting with Adverse Selection and Noncommitment," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques., number 99-04.
• Besfamille, M., 1999, "Central Funding of Local Public Works," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 99.513.
• Laffont, J.-J., 1999, "Political Economy, Information and Incentives," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 99.516.
• Gabillon, E. & Martimort, D., 1999, "The Benefits of Central Bank's Political Independence," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 99.528.
• Zantiman, W., 1999, "Constitutional Design and Regional Favoritism," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 99.529.
• Xu, X., 1999, "The SIR Methods: A Superiority and Inferiority Ranking Method for Multiple Criteria Decision Making," Papers, Laval - Faculte des sciences de administration, number 99-003.
• Xu, X. & Martel, J.M.l Lamond, B.F., 1999, "A Multicriterion Ranking Procedure Based on Distance Between Partial Preorders," Papers, Laval - Faculte des sciences de administration, number 99-005.
• Gonzalez, P., 1999, "Specific Investment, Absence of Commitment and Observability," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Energie, number 99-03.
• Lefebvre, I., 1999, "A Quasi Fixed-Point Theorem for a Product of u.s.c. or o.l.s. Correspondences with an Economic Application," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1999-62.
• Refait, C., 1999, "Liquidation ou redressement des entreprises: decision de la banque et impact sur la probabilite de faillite," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1999.100.
• Lefebvre, I., 1999, "A General Nonemptiness Result of the Core of a Production Economy with Asymmetric Information," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1999.61.
• Davila, J., 1999, "The Connection Between Correlated and Sunspot Equilibria Revisited," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1999.78.
• Armando Gomes, , "Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs, and Dynamic Trading," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, number 04-99.
• Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999, "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 99-06.
• Bureau, J.-C. & Gozlan, E. & Marette, S., 1999, "Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 99-13.
• Jaaidane, T., 1999, "Surveys anmd Incentives: a Principal-Agent-Users Model," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 99-14.
• Jaaidane, T., 1999, "Controle de qualite et sondages: le recours aux usagers dans la gestion de services publics avec exclusion," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 99-15.
• Chemla, G., 1999, "L'impact de la negociation et des prises de controle sur l'ampleur de l'effet de Cliquet," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 99-19.
• Touze, V., 1999, "Insurance, Prevention and Macroeconomics," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 99-25.
• Bassan, B. & Gossner, O. & Scarsini, M. & Zamir, S., 1999, "A Class of Games with Positive Value of Information," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 99-32.
• Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999, "A Model of Expertise," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs, number 206.
• Hvide, H.K., 1999, "Signalling and Self-Insight in the Job Market," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 2-99.
• Razin, A. & Sadka, E. & Yuen, C.-W., 1999, "Excessive FDI Flows under Asymmetric Information," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 27-99.
• Kwang Soo Cheong, 1999, "Asymmetric Information, Capital and Ownership Structures and Corporate Income Taxation," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 199904.
• Catherine Refait-Alexandre, 1999, "Liquidation ou redressement des entreprises : décision de la banque et impact sur la probabilité de faillite," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number halshs-03616715, Jan.
• Catherine Refait-Alexandre, 1999, "Liquidation ou redressement des entreprises : décision de la banque et impact sur la probabilité de faillite," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03616715, Jan.
• Alessandro Citanna & Archishman Chakraborty, 1999, "Occupational Choice, Incentives and Wealth Distribution," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00599913.
• Alessandro Citanna & Archishman Chakraborty, 1999, "Moral Hazard, Aggregate Risk and Nominal, Linear Financial Contracts," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00599915.
• Enrico Minelli & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1999, "Nash-walras Equilibria of a Large Economy," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00601580.
• Holm, Håkan, 1999, "The Demand for Information Services and the Market Structure," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 1999:008, Sep.
• Olsson, Christina, 1999, "Essays in the Economics of Dental Insurance and Dental Health," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 494, Jan.
• Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 1999, "Fiscal Externalities and Asymmetric Information in an Economic Federation," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 516, Oct.
• Canegallo, Claudia, 1999, "Funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in presenza di informazione asimmetrica. Una rassegna della letteratura," POLIS Working Papers, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS, number 8, Nov.
• Gregory R. Duffee and Chunsheng Zhou., 1999, "Credit Derivatives in Banking: Useful Tools for Managing Risk?," Research Program in Finance Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley, number RPF-289, Nov.
• Sophia Delipalla & Owen O'Donnell, 1999, "The Political Economy of a Publicly Provided Private Good with Adverse Selection," Studies in Economics, School of Economics, University of Kent, number 9911, Oct.
• Diego Rodríguez, 1999, "Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 352, Jan.
• Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1999, "Endogenous information structures," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 386, Apr.
• Matthew Ellman & Leonard Wantchekon, 1999, "Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 457, Aug.
• Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr., Gerard & Levine, Ross, 1999, "Financial regulation and performance : cross-country evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2037, Jan.
• Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 1999, "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2041, Jan.
• Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman & Beck, Thorsten, 1999, "ɇ‘Èž ĸ­Ä»‹Ä¸Žç» Ƶžå¢Žé•¿Ï¼Šå› Æžœå…³Ç³»Ä¸Žåžÿå›," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2059, Feb.
• Ravallion, Martin, 1999, "Is more targeting consistent with less spending?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2079, Mar.
• Basu, Kaushik & Bell, Clive & Bose, Pinaki, 1999, "Interlinkage, limited liability, and strategic interaction," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2134, Jun.
• Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, 1999, "Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," CSGR Working papers series, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick, number 35/99, Jun.
• Irena Grosfeld & Claudia Senik-Leygonie & Thierry Verdier & Stanislav Kolenikov & Elena Paltseva, 1999, "Dynamism and Inertia on the Russian Labour Market: A Model of Segmentation," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan, number 246, Apr.
• Yasuyuki Sawada, 1999, "Community Participation, Teacher Effort, and Educational Outcome: The Case of El Salvador's EDUCO Program," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan, number 307, Nov.
• Angelina Keil, 1999, "Wirtschaftschronik. III. Quartal 1999," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 72, issue 10, pages 681-682, October.
• Angelina Keil, 1999, "Wirtschaftschronik. IV. Quartal 1998," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 72, issue 1, pages 23-26, January.
• Michael Peneder & Michael Pfaffermayr, 1999, "Selbstfinanzierungskraft und Kapitalausstattung im internationalen Vergleich. Cash-flow und Eigenkapital der österreichischen Sachgütererzeugung im Jahr 1998," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 72, issue 3, pages 177-186, March.
• Angelina Keil, 1999, "Wirtschaftschronik. I. Quartal 1999," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 72, issue 4, pages 245-248, April.
• Angelina Keil, 1999, "Wirtschaftschronik. II. Quartal 1999," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 72, issue 7, pages 467-469, July.
• Nicolaj Siggelkow, 1999, "Expense Shifting: An Empirical Study of Agency Costs in the Mutual Fund Industry," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania, number 99-09, Jan.
• P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 1999, "Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction," Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University, number 99f3, Apr.
• I. Hendel & A. Lizzeri, 1999, "The Role of Leasing under Adverse Selection," Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University, number 99f7, Oct.
• Patrick Bajari & Steven Tadelis, 1999, "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics, number 99029, Nov.
• Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999, "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9902003, Feb.
• Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sorensen, 1999, "Professional Advice," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9906003, Jun.
• Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Flavio Menezes, 1999, "Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9901002, Jan, revised 03 Feb 1999.
• Lockwood, B., 1999, "Production Externalities and Two-Way Distortion in Principal-Multi-Agent Problems," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 527.
• Szalay, Dezsö, 1999, "Financial Contracting, R&D and Growth," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 00-28, Dec.
• Inderst, Roman & Müller, Holger M., 1999, "Competitive Search Markets with Adverse Selection," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 99-52, Mar.
• Inderst, Roman & Müller, Holger M., 1999, "Why Peaches Must Circulate Longer than Lemons," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 99-59, Apr.
• Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999, "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 99-75, Jul.
• Antonio Bernardo & Eric L. Talley & Ivo Welch, 1999, "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management, number ysm118, May.
• Jonathan C. Glover & Anil Arya & Shyam NMI Sunder, 1999, "Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle," Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management, number ysm120, Aug.
• Schneider, Urs, 1999, "Ärztliche Leistung und Compliance des Patienten: Der Fall des Double Moral Hazard," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics, number 07/1999.
• Lorz, Jens Oliver, 1999, "The political economy of intra- and intergenerational redistribution with asymmetric information," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 904.
• Bickenbach, Frank, 1999, "Regulierung und Wettbewerb im Bereich der Netzinfrastrukturen: Begründung, Regeln und Institutionen," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 910.
• Lorz, Jens Oliver, 1999, "Intergenerational redistribution with asymmetric information: The case of non-observable savings," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 918.
• Buch, Claudia M., 1999, "Capital Market Integration in Euroland - The Role of Banks," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 932.
• Lorz, Jens Oliver, 1999, "Social security and redistribution within generations in an overlapping generations model," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 957.
• Anderhub, Vital & Königstein, Manfred & Kübler, Dorothea, 1999, "Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets: Experimental evidence on firm-specific investment," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1999,43.
• Hornig, Stephan O., 1999, "Informationsaustausch und trotzdem Wettbewerb? Unternehmensverhalten bei Nachfrageunsicherheit," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics, number 160.
• Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 1999, "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2060, Jan.
• Palomino, Frédéric & Prat, Andrea, 1999, "Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2066, Feb.
• Prat, Andrea, 1999, "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2152, May.
• Jappelli, Tullio & Pagano, Marco, 1999, "Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2184, Jun.
• Wambach, Achim, 1999, "Renegotiation Before Contract Execution," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2189, Jul.
• Grosfeld, Irena & Kolenikov, Stanislav & Paltseva, Elena & Sénik-Leygonie, Claudia & Verdier, Thierry, 1999, "Dynamism and Inertia on the Russian Labour Market: A Model of Segmentation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2224, Sep.
• Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Nicodano, Giovanna, 1999, "Insider Trading, Investment and Liquidity," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2251, Oct.
• Inderst, Roman & Wambach, Achim, 1999, "Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Capacity Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2269, Oct.