Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2021

• Carpio, Ronaldo & Guo, Meixin & Liu, Yuan & Pyun, Ju Hyun, 2021, "Wealth heterogeneity, information acquisition and equity home bias: Evidence from U.S. household surveys of consumer finance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106100.
• Nitani, Miwako & Legendre, Nicolas, 2021, "Cooperative lenders and the performance of small business loans," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106125.
• Broer, Tobias & Kero, Afroditi, 2021, "Collateralization and asset price bubbles when investors disagree about risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106137.
• Ruiz-Buforn, Alba & Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Morone, Andrea & Alfarano, Simone, 2021, "Overweighting of public information in financial markets: A lesson from the lab," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106298.
• Choi, Sanghak & Jung, Hail, 2021, "Does early-life war exposure of a CEO enhance corporate information transparency?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 198-208, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2021.07.019.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, pages 100-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.038.
• Weinschenk, Philipp, 2021, "On the benefits of time-inconsistent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, pages 185-195, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.035.
• Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2021, "How do sellers benefit from Buy-It-Now prices in eBay auctions?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 189-205, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.015.
• Momsen, Katharina, 2021, "Recommendations in credence goods markets with horizontal product differentiation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 19-38, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.018.
• Clark, Derek J. & Kundu, Tapas, 2021, "Competitive balance: Information disclosure and discrimination in an asymmetric contest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, pages 178-198, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.01.034.
• Cameron, Alistair & Oak, Mandar & Shan, Yaping, 2021, "Peer monitoring and Islamic microfinance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, pages 337-358, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.001.
• Janas, Moritz & Oljemark, Emilia, 2021, "Trust and reputation under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, pages 97-124, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.023.
• Park, Youngseok & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Rud, Olga A. & Grossman, Philip J., 2021, "An endogenous-timing conflict game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, pages 592-607, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.026.
• Tan, Teck Yong, 2021, "Assignment under task dependent private information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, pages 632-645, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.015.
• Heinsalu, Sander, 2021, "Promotion of (interaction) abstinence increases infection prevalence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, pages 94-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.03.013.
• Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom, 2021, "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, pages 448-469, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001.
• Bental, Benjamin & Kragl, Jenny, 2021, "Inequality and incentives with societal other-regarding preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, pages 1298-1324, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.05.024.
• Fries, Tilman & Gneezy, Uri & Kajackaite, Agne & Parra, Daniel, 2021, "Observability and lying," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, pages 132-149, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038.
• De Geest, Lawrence R. & Kingsley, David C., 2021, "Norm enforcement with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, pages 403-430, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.05.035.
• Brandts, Jordi & Corgnet, Brice & Hernán-González, Roberto & Ortiz, José Mª & Solà, Carles, 2021, "Watching or not watching? Access to information and the incentive effects of firing threats," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, pages 672-685, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.019.
• Lim, Wooyoung & Xiong, Siyang, 2021, "Does jump bidding increase sellers’ revenue? Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, pages 84-110, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.026.
• Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele & Ogawa, Kazuhito, 2021, "Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, pages 366-389, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.038.
• Zhou, Tong, 2021, "Ambiguity, asset illiquidity, and price variability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, pages 280-292, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.08.034.
• Helland, Leif & Iachan, Felipe S. & Juelsrud, Ragnar E. & Nenov, Plamen T., 2021, "Information quality and regime change: Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, pages 538-554, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.08.036.
• Kräkel, Matthias, 2021, "On the delegation of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, pages 965-981, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.033.
• Bhalla, Manaswini & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Souvik, 2021, "Social reform as a path to political leadership: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, pages 982-1010, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.043.

2020

• Lopes Moreira da Veiga, María Helena & Peeters, Ronald & Vorstaz, Marc, 2022, "An experimental analysis of contagion in financial markets," DES - Working Papers. Statistics and Econometrics. WS, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística, number 31230, Oct.
• Sen Geng & Menglong Guan, 2020, "Design Your Trustworthiness," GRU Working Paper Series, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit, number GRU_2020_019, Jul.
• Kai Hao Yang, 2020, "Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and its Consequences," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2258, Oct.
• Fei Li & Jidong Zhou, 2020, "A Model of Crisis Management," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2266, Dec.
• Fei Li & Jidong Zhou, 2020, "A Model of Crisis Management," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2266R, Dec, revised Apr 2022.
• Shan Huang & Martin Salm, 2020, "Unisex-Regelung verringerte Geschlechterlücke beim Wechsel zur privaten Krankenversicherung," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 87, issue 44, pages 829-835.
• Esmir Demaj & Vilma Manjani, 2020, "Information Asymmetry and Its Implications in Online Purchasing Behaviour : A Country Case Study," Journal of Innovative Business and Management, DOBA Faculty, volume 12, issue 1, pages 72-82, DOI: 10.32015/JIBM/2020-12-1-9.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109, Dec.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109r, Dec, revised May 2021.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109rr, Dec, revised Oct 2021.
• Kenju Kamei & Thomas Markussen, 2020, "Free Riding and Workplace Democracy – Heterogeneous Task Preferences and Sorting," Department of Economics Working Papers, Durham University, Department of Economics, number 2020_01, Jan.
• Chen, Daniel & Duffie, Darrell, 2020, "Market Fragmentation," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3854, Feb.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Castro, Francisco & Weintraub, Gabriel, 2020, "Uniform Pricing versus Third-Degree Price Discrimination," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3860, Feb.
• Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2020, "The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Impeperfect Information," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3885, Jul.
• Tarek Tawfik Yousef Alkhateeb & Haider Mahmood, 2020, "Oil Price and Capital Formation Nexus in GCC Countries: Asymmetry Analyses," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, volume 10, issue 6, pages 146-151.
• Zanin, Luca, 2020, "Combining multiple probability predictions in the presence of class imbalance to discriminate between potential bad and good borrowers in the peer-to-peer lending market," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, volume 25, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2020.100272.
• Balafoutas, Loukas & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2020, "Credence goods in the literature: What the past fifteen years have taught us about fraud, incentives, and the role of institutions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, volume 26, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2020.100285.
• Delis, Manthos D. & Iosifidi, Maria & Kokas, Sotirios & Xefteris, Dimitrios & Ongena, Steven, 2020, "Enforcement actions on banks and the structure of loan syndicates," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101527.
• Galema, Rients, 2020, "Credit rationing in P2P lending to SMEs: Do lender-borrower relationships matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 65, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101742.
• Gunnsteinsson, Snaebjorn, 2020, "Experimental identification of asymmetric information: Evidence on crop insurance in the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.102414.
• Guo, Jang-Ting & Hung, Fu-Sheng, 2020, "Tax evasion and financial development under asymmetric information in credit markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102463.
• Asako, Yasushi & Funaki, Yukihiko & Ueda, Kozo & Uto, Nobuyuki, 2020, "(A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103744.
• Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2020, "Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103794.
• Lappi, Pauli, 2020, "On optimal extraction under asymmetric information over reclamation costs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2020.103987.
• Ouzan, Samuel, 2020, "Loss aversion and market crashes," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 70-86, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2020.06.015.
• Birulin, Oleksii & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2020, "The evolving nature of the college wage premium," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 93, issue C, pages 474-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2020.09.001.
• Yang, Shanxiang & Liu, Zhechen & Wang, Xinjie, 2020, "News sentiment, credit spreads, and information asymmetry," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2020.101179.
• Zhou, Deqing & Wang, Wenjie, 2020, "Insider, outsider and information heterogeneity," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2020.101193.
• Chen, Bo & Ma, Lijun & Zhu, Zhaobo & Zhou, Yu, 2020, "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108805.
• Cao, Xiaoyong & Hsueh, Shao-Chieh & Wang, Wei, 2020, "On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108918.
• Pan, Lijun & Peng, Linyu & Zhou, Yu, 2020, "An assignment model with local constraints: Competitive equilibrium and ascending auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108905.
• Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020, "Maximal miscommunication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108962.
• Yoon, Kiho, 2020, "Implementability with contingent contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108966.
• Beauchamp, Andrew & Wagner, Mathis, 2020, "Is there adverse selection in the U.S. social security system?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108995.
• Ford, Weixing & Lian, Zeng & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie, 2020, "Information sharing in a contest game with group identity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109000.
• Gao, Hong & Xu, Haibo, 2020, "Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109108.
• Chen, Bo, 2020, "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109122.
• Cohen, Din & Sela, Aner, 2020, "Common-value group contests with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109164.
• Klümper, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2020, "Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109171.
• Dell’Era, Michele, 2020, "Talking to influence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109190.
• Chillemi, Ottorino & Galavotti, Stefano & Gui, Benedetto, 2020, "Optimal contracts with contingent allocation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109202.
• Friehe, Tim & Pham, Cat Lam, 2020, "Settling with salience-biased defendants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109235.
• Liu, Bin & Liu, Dongri & Lu, Jingfeng, 2020, "Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109251.
• Gai, Prasanna & Lou, Edmund & Wu, Sherry X., 2020, "Targeted disclosure and monetary policy flexibility: A simple model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 194, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109371.
• Filomeni, Stefano & Udell, Gregory F. & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2020, "Communication frictions in banking organizations: Evidence from credit score lending," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 195, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109412.
• Dogan, Mustafa & Uyanik, Metin, 2020, "Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 195, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109437.
• Choi, Jin Hyuk & Han, Kookyoung, 2020, "Optimal contract for outsourcing information acquisition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 195, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109443.
• Annan, Francis, 2020, "Does bundling induce adverse selection in insurance?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109588.
• Distefano, Rosaria & Di Fede, Gianfranco & Reito, Francesco, 2020, "Consumer credit under asymmetric information: The wrong types apply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109613.
• Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2020, "Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109615.
• Lahkar, Ratul & Mukherjee, Saptarshi, 2020, "Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109616.
• Karaivanov, Alexander & Xing, Xiaochuan & Xue, Yi, 2020, "Bogus joint liability groups in microfinance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103353.
• Li, Anqi & Xing, Yiqing, 2020, "Intermediated implementation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103387.
• Keane, Michael P. & McCormick, Barry & Popławska, Gosia, 2020, "Health care spending in the US vs UK: The roles of medical education costs, malpractice risk and defensive medicine," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103401.
• De Chiara, Alessandro, 2020, "Precontractual investment and modes of procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103404.
• Liu, Shuo & Pei, Harry, 2020, "Monotone equilibria in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103408.
• Wang, Jian & Iversen, Tor & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Godager, Geir, 2020, "Are patient-regarding preferences stable? Evidence from a laboratory experiment with physicians and medical students from different countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103411.
• Deutscher, Christian & Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver & DeVaro, Jed, 2020, "Firm choice and career success - theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103470.
• Fiocco, Raffaele & Guo, Dongyu, 2020, "Regulatory risk, vertical integration, and upstream investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103514.
• Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020, "Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103559.
• Feess, Eberhard & Grund, Christian & Walzl, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2020, "Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 280, issue 3, pages 1108-1121, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.08.013.
• Konrad, Kai A., 2020, "Attacking and defending multiple valuable secrets in a big data world," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 280, issue 3, pages 1122-1129, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.07.064.
• Wang, Hong, 2020, "Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 283, issue 3, pages 1124-1135, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.053.
• Giraudet, Louis-Gaëtan, 2020, "Energy efficiency as a credence good: A review of informational barriers to energy savings in the building sector," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104698.
• Cummins, Mark & Mac an Bhaird, Ciarán & Rosati, Pierangleo & Lynn, Theo, 2020, "Institutional investment in online business lending markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 71, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101542.
• Zhou, Deqing, 2020, "Strategic trading with transaction cost in the long run," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 32, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2018.12.035.
• Kemper, Kristopher J., 2020, "Financial adjustments and credit rating changes," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 33, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2019.06.011.
• Klusak, Patrycja & Thornton, John & Uymaz, Yurtsev, 2020, "Do personal connections improve sovereign credit ratings?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 33, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2019.05.012.
• Gong, Yaxian, 2020, "Credit default swap and two-sided moral hazard," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 34, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2019.08.002.
• Beyhaghi, Mehdi & Firoozi, Fathali & Jalilvand, Abol & Samarbakhsh, Laleh, 2020, "Components of credit rationing," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100762.
• Ziegler, Gabriel & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2020, "Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 197-215, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.001.
• Margaria, Chiara, 2020, "Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 234-250, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.006.
• Noussair, Charles N. & Seres, Gyula, 2020, "The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 267-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.002.
• Guarino, Pierfrancesco, 2020, "An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 257-288, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.006.
• Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Corrao, Roberto & Sanna, Federico, 2020, "Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 28-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.005.
• Chaturvedi, Rakesh, 2020, "Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 325-335, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.011.
• Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020, "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 434-457, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.006.
• Doni, Nicola & Menicucci, Domenico, 2020, "On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017)," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 58-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.002.
• Negrelli, Sara, 2020, "Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 67-85, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.007.
• Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif, 2020, "Starting small to communicate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 265-296, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.001.
• Zhang, Qiaoxi, 2020, "Vagueness in multidimensional proposals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 307-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.003.
• Li, Ying Xue & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2020, "Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 329-367, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.004.
• Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N., 2020, "Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 453-481, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.
• Michaeli, Moti, 2020, "Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 90-107, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.002.
• Mookherjee, Dilip & Motta, Alberto & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2020, "Consulting collusive experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 290-317, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.011.
• Leister, C. Matthew, 2020, "Information acquisition and welfare in network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 453-475, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.006.
• Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2020, "Reputation and news suppression in the media industry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 240-271, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.008.
• Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori, 2020, "Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 288-294, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.009.
• Feldman, Michal & Fu, Hu & Gravin, Nick & Lucier, Brendan, 2020, "Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 327-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.009.
• Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2020, "Cheap talk with coarse understanding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 105-121, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.015.
• Levy, Yehuda John & Veiga, Andre, 2020, "On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 140-168, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.016.
• Shafer, Rachel C., 2020, "Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 281-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.010.
• Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Mu'alem, Ahuva, 2020, "Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 386-405, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.014.
• Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel, 2020, "Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 534-553, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.008.
• Boonmanunt, Suparee & Kajackaite, Agne & Meier, Stephan, 2020, "Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 569-578, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.009.
• Sundararajan, Mukund & Yan, Qiqi, 2020, "Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 644-658, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.005.
• Peng-Ju Su, Alice, 2020, "Information advantage and minimum wage," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100851.
• Aryal, Gaurab & Gabrielli, Maria F., 2020, "An empirical analysis of competitive nonlinear pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 68, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102538.
• Burani, Nadia & Mantovani, Andrea, 2020, "Non-linear pricing and conscious consumption," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 68, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102549.
• Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2020, "Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.06.003.
• Birulin, Oleksii, 2020, "Optimality of simple procurement auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102610.
• Li, Yanhai, 2020, "Optimal reserve prices in sealed-bid auctions with reference effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 71, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102624.
• Heinsalu, Sander, 2020, "Investing to access an adverse selection market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102660.
• Hellwig, Michael & Schober, Dominik & Cabral, Luís, 2020, "Low-powered vs high-powered incentives: Evidence from German electricity networks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 73, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102587.
• Calzolari, Giacomo & Denicolò, Vincenzo, 2020, "Loyalty discounts and price-cost tests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 73, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102589.
• Farolfi, Stefano & Erdlenbruch, Katrin, 2020, "A classroom experimental game to improve the understanding of asymmetric common-pool resource dilemmas in irrigation water management," International Review of Economics Education, Elsevier, volume 35, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.iree.2020.100199.
• Ayouni, Mehdi & Friehe, Tim & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2020, "Opting for the English rule: On the contractual re-allocation of legal fees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105928.
• Bonsall, Samuel B. & Green, Jeremiah & Muller, Karl A., 2020, "Market uncertainty and the importance of media coverage at earnings announcements," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 69, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101264.
• Blankespoor, Elizabeth & deHaan, Ed & Marinovic, Iván, 2020, "Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 70, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101344.
• Xue, Xiaolin & Zhang, Junrui & Yu, Yangxin, 2020, "Distracted passive institutional shareholders and firm transparency," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 347-359, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.01.033.
• Hong, Jieying, 2020, "The financing of alliance entrepreneurship," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, volume 35, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2018.12.002.
• Makofske, Matthew Philip, 2020, "Mandatory disclosure, letter-grade systems, and corruption: The case of Los Angeles County restaurant inspections," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 292-313, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.02.022.
• Dang, Canh Thien & Owens, Trudy, 2020, "Does transparency come at the cost of charitable services? Evidence from investigating British charities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 314-343, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.02.020.
• Quement, Mark T. Le & Marcin, Isabel, 2020, "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 449-468, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.020.
• Yu, Pei Cheng, 2020, "Seemingly exploitative contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 299-320, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.019.
• Hu, Youxin & Kagel, John & Yang, Huanxing & Zhang, Lan, 2020, "The effects of pre-play communication in a coordination game with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 403-415, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.04.003.
• Li, Zhimin & Ligon, Ethan, 2020, "Inferring informal risk-sharing regimes: Evidence from rural Tanzania," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 941-955, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.002.
• Gneezy, Uri & Kajackaite, Agne, 2020, "Externalities, stakes, and lying," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 629-643, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.020.
• Chiappinelli, Olga, 2020, "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 116-140, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.044.
• Nguyen, Huy X., 2020, "Pretending volunteers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 261-278, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.048.
• Barigozzi, Francesca & Manna, Ester, 2020, "Envy in mission-oriented organisations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 395-424, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.011.
• Stepanov, Sergey, 2020, "Biased performance evaluation in a model of career concerns: incentives versus ex-post optimality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 589-607, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.024.
• Alan, Sule & Ertac, Seda & Gumren, Mert, 2020, "Cheating and incentives in a performance context: Evidence from a field experiment on children," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 681-701, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.015.
• Michler, Jeffrey D. & Wu, Steven Y., 2020, "Governance and contract choice: Theory and evidence from groundwater irrigation markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, pages 129-147, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.031.
• Jain, Prachi, 2020, "Imperfect monitoring and informal insurance: The role of social ties," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, pages 241-256, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.028.
• Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Lehmann, Martin, 2020, "Balancing the desire for privacy against the desire to hedge risk," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, pages 608-620, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.007.
• Belay, Dagim G. & Jensen, Jørgen D., 2020, "‘The scarlet letters’: Information disclosure and self-regulation: Evidence from antibiotic use in Denmark," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2020.102385.
• Bent Jesper Christensen & Juan Carlos Parra-Alvarez & Rafael Serrano, 2020, "Optimal control of investment, premium and deductible for a non-life insurance company," CREATES Research Papers, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, number 2020-11, Oct.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020, "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Working Papers, New Economic School (NES), number w0256, Feb.
• Christine Ho & Nicola Pavoni, 2020, "Efficient Child Care Subsidies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 1, pages 162-199, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170581.
• Deepal Basak & Zhen Zhou, 2020, "Diffusing Coordination Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 1, pages 271-297, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171034.
• Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2020, "Bargaining and News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 2, pages 428-474, February, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181316.
• Zhen Huo & Marcelo Pedroni, 2020, "A Single-Judge Solution to Beauty Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 2, pages 526-568, February, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170519.
• Anna Sanktjohanser, 2020, "Endogenous Monitoring in a Partnership Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 3, pages 776-796, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161491.
• Jesper Rüdiger & Adrien Vigier, 2020, "Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 4, pages 1145-1176, April, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170690.
• Alexander M. Jakobsen, 2020, "A Model of Complex Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 5, pages 1243-1273, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190283.
• George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2020, "Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 5, pages 1464-1501, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190080.
• Archishman Chakraborty & Parikshit Ghosh & Jaideep Roy, 2020, "Expert-Captured Democracies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 6, pages 1713-1751, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181396.
• Qingmin Liu, 2020, "Stability and Bayesian Consistency in Two-Sided Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 8, pages 2625-2666, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181186.
• Doron Ravid, 2020, "Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 9, pages 2948-2963, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170620.
• Jean-Paul L'Huillier, 2020, "Consumer Imperfect Information and Endogenous Price Rigidity," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 2, pages 94-123, April, DOI: 10.1257/mac.20170203.
• Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2020, "Promotion Signaling and Human Capital Investments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 1, pages 125-155, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180285.
• Frances Xu Lee & Wing Suen, 2020, "Credibility of Crime Allegations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 1, pages 220-259, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180231.
• Marina Halac & Ilan Kremer, 2020, "Experimenting with Career Concerns," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 1, pages 260-288, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170411.
• Jen-Wen Chang, 2020, "The Economics of Crowdfunding," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 2, pages 257-280, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170183.
• S. Nageeb Ali & Roland Bénabou, 2020, "Image versus Information: Changing Societal Norms and Optimal Privacy," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 116-164, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180052.
• Helene Mass & Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2020, "Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 189-245, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160250.
• Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2020, "Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 4, pages 144-169, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180107.
• Eeva Mauring, 2020, "Informational Cycles in Search Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 4, pages 170-192, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180129.
• Jean-Michel Benkert & Igor Letina, 2020, "Designing Dynamic Research Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 4, pages 270-289, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180263.
• Dan Cao & Roger Lagunoff, 2020, "Optimal Collateralized Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 4, pages 45-74, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170179.
• Francisco Silva, 2020, "The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 4, pages 99-113, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180038.
• Daron Acemoglu & Leopoldo Fergusson & James Robinson & Dario Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2020, "The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 1-43, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180168.
• M. Martin Boyer & Philippe De Donder & Claude Fluet & Marie-Louise Leroux & Pierre-Carl Michaud, 2020, "Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 134-169, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180227.
• Elliot Lipnowski & Laurent Mathevet & Dong Wei, 2020, "Attention Management," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 2, issue 1, pages 17-32, March, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20190165.
• Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2020, "Optimal Quality Certification," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 2, issue 2, pages 161-176, June, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20190387.
• Jacob D. Leshno & Philipp Strack, 2020, "Bitcoin: An Axiomatic Approach and an Impossibility Theorem," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 2, issue 3, pages 269-286, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20190494.
• Amanda Agan & Bo Cowgill & Laura Katherine Gee, 2020, "Do Workers Comply with Salary History Bans? A Survey on Voluntary Disclosure, Adverse Selection, and Unraveling," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 110, pages 215-219, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20201123.
• Susan C. Athey & Kevin A. Bryan & Joshua S. Gans, 2020, "The Allocation of Decision Authority to Human and Artificial Intelligence," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 110, pages 80-84, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20201034.
• David K. Levine, 2020, "Radical Markets by Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 58, issue 2, pages 471-487, June, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20191533.
• John V. C. Nye, 2020, "The Limits of the Commune: A Review of The Mystery of the Kibbutz," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 58, issue 2, pages 488-497, June, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20191523.
• Buso, Marco & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, , "Do Exit Options Increase the Value-For-Money of Public-Private Partnerships?," 2030 Agenda, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 305206, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.305206.
• Mérel, Pierre & Ortiz-Bobea, Ariel & Paroissien, Emmanuel, 2020, "How Big is the “Lemons” Problem? Historical Evidence from French Wines," Working Papers, Institut National de la recherche Agronomique (INRA), Departement Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement (SAE2), number 302485, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.302485.
• Marie Christine Apedo-Amah & Habiba Djebbari & Roberta Ziparo, 2020, "Communication and production in the family farm: Theory and evidence from rural Togo," AMSE Working Papers, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, number 1937, Jan, revised Mar 2025.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2020, "I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions," AMSE Working Papers, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, number 2044, Dec.
• Frédéric Deroïan & Philippine Escudie, 2025, "Addiction in networks," AMSE Working Papers, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, number 2506, Mar.
• Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020, "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich, number 06, Oct.
• Felix Bierbrauer & Pierre Boyer & Emanuel Hansen, 2020, "Pareto-improving tax reforms and the Earned Income Tax Credit," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 001, Jun.
• Parampreet Christopher Bindra & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Daniel Neururer & Matthias Sutter, 2020, "Reveal it or conceal it: On the value of second opinions in a low-entry-barriers credence goods market," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 004, Jun.
• Oliver Rehbein & Simon Rother, 2020, "The Role of Social Networks in Bank Lending," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 033, Oct.
• Felix Bierbrauer & Mattias Polborn, 2020, "Competitive gerrymandering and the popular vote," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 034, Oct.
• Loukas Balafoutas & Helena Fornwagner & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter & Maryna Tverdostup, 2020, "Diagnostic Uncertainty and Insurance Coverage in Credence Goods Markets," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 038, Nov.
• Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2020, "Limited Awareness and Financial Intermediation," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 043, Dec.
• Yuliyan Mitkov, 2020, "A Theory of Debt Maturity and Innovation," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 050, Dec.