Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2021

• Marco Angrisani & Antonio Guarino & Philippe Jehiel & Toru Kitagawa, 2021, "Information Redundancy Neglect versus Overconfidence: A Social Learning Experiment," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03325779, Aug, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180394.
• Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2022, "Jury Theorems," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03443155.
• Victor Stephane, 2021, "Hiding behind the veil of ashes: Social capital in the wake of natural disasters," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03462364, Sep, DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105518.
• Bruno Jullien & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2021, "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03476144, Mar, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100880.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Thomas Trégouët, 2021, "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number hal-03328387, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102791.
• Philippe Jehiel, 2021, "Communication with forgetful liars," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03229984, DOI: 10.3982/te4154.
• Francis Bloch & Matthew Olckers, 2021, "Friend-Based Ranking in Practice," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03230056, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20211060.
• Marco Angrisani & Antonio Guarino & Philippe Jehiel & Toru Kitagawa, 2021, "Information Redundancy Neglect versus Overconfidence: A Social Learning Experiment," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03325779, Aug, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180394.
• Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022, "Informed Information Design," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03107866, Nov.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2021, "Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03151009, Feb.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2021, "Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main), HAL, number halshs-03151009, Feb.
• Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024, "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03099678, Mar, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822.
• Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2021, "Keeping the agents in the dark : private disclosures in competing mechanisms," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03266804.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2021, "Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03485384, Dec, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190189.
• Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2021, "Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04159724.
• Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022, "Informed Information Design," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03107866, Nov.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2021, "Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03151009, Feb.
• Zsolt Bihary & Péter Csóka & Péter Kerényi & Alexander Szimayer, 2021, "Self-respecting worker in the gig economy: A dynamic principal-agent model," KRTK-KTI WORKING PAPERS, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, number 2129, Jun.
• Tangerås, Thomas & Gick, Wolfgang, 2021, "Contracting with Endogenously Incomplete Commitment: Escape Clauses," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1390, May.
• Bastani, Spencer & Blumkin, Tomer & Micheletto, Luca, 2021, "Optimal Redistribution in the Presence of Signaling," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1413, Nov.
• Jehiel, Philippe & Mohlin, Erik, 2021, "Cycling and Categorical Learning in Decentralized Adverse Selection Economies," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2021:11, Sep.
• Nyborg, Karine, 2021, "A perfectly competitive economy is an economy without welfare relevant endogenous learning," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 2/2021, May.
• Godager, Geir & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Li, Jing Jing & Wang, Jian & Yang, Fan, 2021, "Does gender affect medical decisions? Results from a behavioral experiment with physicians and medical students," HERO Online Working Paper Series, University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme, number 2021:1, Feb.
• Aronsson, Thomas & Bastani, Spencer & Tayibov, Khayyam, 2021, "Social Exclusion and Optimal Redistribution," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1004, Nov.
• Kim, Jin Yeub, 2021, "When Does Terrorism Occur: Game-Theoretic Analysis and Offense-Defense Balance," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, volume 62, issue 2, pages 59-73, December, DOI: 10.15057/hje.2021003.
• Johannes Abeler & Armin Falk & Fabian Kosse, 2021, "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," Working Papers, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group, number 2021-021, Apr.
• Pushkar Maitra & Sandip Mitra & Dilip Mookherjee & Sujata Visaria, 2021, "Evaluating the Distributive Effects of a Development Intervention," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series, HKUST Center for Economic Policy, number 202106, Apr.
• Agranov Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021, "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 273, Jan.
• Mark Braverman & Sylvain Chassang, 2021, "Data-Driven Incentive Alignment in Capitation Schemes," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 282, Feb.
• Yuhei Miyauchi & Kentaro Nakajima & Stephen J. Redding, 2021, "Consumption Access and Agglomeration: Evidence from Smartphone Data," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 287, Jun.
• Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2021, "Renegotiation and Dynamic Inconsistency: Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2021-58, Feb.
• Ran Eilat & Kfir Eliaz Eliaz & Xiaosheng Mu, 2021, "Bayesian Privacy," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2021-65, Jan.
• Marina Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021, "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2021-74, Jan.
• Antoine L. Noël & Amy Hongfei Sun, 2021, "Information Transparency of Firm Financing," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1459, Nov.
• Jonas Hedlund & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Carlos Oyarzún, 2021, "Contagion Management through Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 651, Dec.
• Fries, Tilman, 2021, "Signaling Motives in Lying Games," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 269, Jan.
• Abeler, Johannes & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian, 2021, "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 282, May.
• Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2021, "Signaling versus Auditing," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 286, Oct.
• Abeler, Johannes & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian, 2021, "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 296, Nov.
• Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2021, "Optimal Non-Linear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 301, Nov.
• Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2021, "Aiding Applicants: Leveling the Playing Field within the Immediate Acceptance Mechanism," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 303, Nov.
• Deversi, Marvin & Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2021, "Spin Doctors: An Experiment on Vague Disclosure," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 304, Dec.
• Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2021, "Cursed Consumers and the Effectiveness of Consumer Protection Policies," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 305, Dec.
• Wang, Banban & Pizer, William & Munnings, Clayton, 2021, "Price Limits in a Tradable Performance Standard," RFF Working Paper Series, Resources for the Future, number 21-05, Feb.
• Shurojit Chatterji & Peng Liu, 2021, "On the Decomposability of Fractional Allocations," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 3-2021, Apr.
• Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2021, "Efficient Bilateral Trade via Two-Stage Mechanisms under One- Sided Asymmetric Information," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 8-2021, Aug.
• Abdul RASHID & Farah WAHEED, 2021, "Forward-Backward-Looking Monetary Policy Rules: Derivation and Empirics," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, volume 0, issue 1, pages 71-92, December.
• Guillaume Pommey, 2021, "Partnership Dissolution with Cash-Constrained Agents," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 514, Oct, revised 10 Oct 2021.
• Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2021, "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 519, Oct, revised 21 Oct 2021.
• Daniela Di Cagno & Lorenzo Ferrari & Werner Güth & Vittorio Larocca, 2021, "Transparent Dealing instead of Insider Haggling - Experimentally Analyzing an Institutional Choice for Repeated Trade," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 523, Nov, revised 18 Feb 2023.
• Bruno Lanz & Evert Reins, 2021, "Asymmetric Information on the Market for Energy Efficiency: Insights from the Credence Goods Literature," The Energy Journal, , volume 42, issue 4, pages 91-110, July, DOI: 10.5547/01956574.42.4.blan.
• Franz Ostrizek & Elia Sartori, 2021, "Screening while Controlling an Externality," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 605, Feb.
• Jérôme Mathis & Marcello Puca & Simone M. Sepe, 2021, "Deliberative Institutions and Optimality," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 614, May, revised 09 Jun 2021.
• R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2021, "An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, number 21-A001, Jul.
• R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2021, "Iterative Monotonicity Is Equivalent To Strict Group Monotonicity : A Direct Proof," IEAS Working Paper : academic research, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, number 21-A003, Jul.
• R Jain & M Lombardi, 2021, "On the Relationship between Robust and Rationalizable Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, number 21-A004, Nov.
• Beni Kouevi Gath, 2021, "Credit Information Sharing and Bank Stability: Evidence from SSA Countries," Working Papers CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 21-009, Jul.
• Luis V. M. Freitas & Wilfredo L. Maldonado, 2021, "Quadratic Funding with Incomplete Information," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2021_24, Sep.
• Øivind Schøyen, 2021, "What limits the efficacy of coercion?," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), volume 15, issue 2, pages 267-318, May, DOI: 10.1007/s11698-020-00207-0.
• Arianna Dal Forno & Ugo Merlone, 2021, "Envy effects on conflict dynamics in supervised work groups," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 44, issue 2, pages 755-779, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-021-00331-0.
• Matthew J. Baker & Kurtis J. Swope, 2021, "Sharing, gift-giving, and optimal resource use in hunter-gatherer society," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 22, issue 2, pages 119-138, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10101-021-00254-x.
• Jacopo Arpetti & Marco Delmastro, 2021, "The privacy paradox: a challenge to decision theory?," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 48, issue 4, pages 505-525, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-021-00192-z.
• Alfred Galichon, 2021, "Fritz John’s equation in mechanism design," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-5, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-020-00195-4.
• Teddy Mekonnen, 2021, "Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 1, pages 119-142, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00201-3.
• Erya Yang, 2021, "Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 2, pages 269-293, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00211-1.
• Shuli Brammli-Greenberg & Ira Yaari & Elad Daniels & Ariella Adijes-Toren, 2021, "How Managed Entry Agreements can improve allocation in the public health system: a mechanism design approach," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), volume 22, issue 5, pages 699-709, July, DOI: 10.1007/s10198-021-01284-2.
• Christian Hackober & Carolin Bock, 2021, "Which investors’ characteristics are beneficial for initial coin offerings? Evidence from blockchain technology-based firms," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, volume 91, issue 8, pages 1085-1124, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11573-021-01029-w.
• Donald F. Vitaliano, 2021, "Information asymmetry in fire insurance: a frontier approach," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, volume 45, issue 4, pages 764-773, October, DOI: 10.1007/s12197-021-09547-7.
• Chien-Yuan Sher & Nai-Wei Chen & Yu-Hsi Liu & Ryan H. Murphy, 2021, "The impact of soil-liquefaction information disclosures on housing prices: evidence from Kaohsiung, Taiwan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 72, issue 2, pages 217-241, April, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-020-00048-6.
• Demian Macedo & Victor Troster, 2021, "Liquidity shocks and interbank market failures: the role of deposit flights, non-performing loans, and competition," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 16, issue 4, pages 705-746, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-021-00326-5.
• Immanuel Bomze & Werner Schachinger & Jörgen Weibull, 2021, "Does moral play equilibrate?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 1, pages 305-315, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01246-4.
• Sander Heinsalu, 2021, "Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 1, pages 317-339, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01247-3.
• Guilherme Carmona, 2021, "On the optimality of monetary trading," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 3, pages 1121-1160, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01219-2.
• Peter J. Hammond & Lei Qiao & Yeneng Sun, 2021, "Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 3, pages 1161-1187, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01318-5.
• Ori Haimanko, 2021, "Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 3, pages 1231-1258, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01358-5.
• Gino Loyola, 2021, "Effects of competition in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 4, pages 1527-1567, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01347-8.
• Zhifeng Cai & Feng Dong, 2021, "A Model of Secular Migration from Centralized to Decentralized Trade," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 1, pages 201-244, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01280-2.
• Dawen Meng & Guoqiang Tian, 2021, "The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 1, pages 337-375, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01283-z.
• Artyom Jelnov & Yair Tauman & Chang Zhao, 2021, "Stag Hunt with unknown outside options," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 1, pages 303-335, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01286-w.
• Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2021, "Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 2, pages 579-614, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01300-1.
• Sambuddha Ghosh & Yan Long & Manipushpak Mitra, 2021, "Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 2, pages 671-700, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01308-7.
• Maxim Ivanov, 2021, "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 955-1000, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01277-x.
• Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021, "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 909-953, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01299-5.
• Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021, "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 723-742, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01339-0.
• Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021, "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 869-908, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01346-9.
• Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2021, "Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 801-833, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01364-7.
• Daehong Min, 2021, "Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 743-764, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01386-1.
• Andreas Blume & April Mitchell Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2021, "Dynamic coordination via organizational routines," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 4, pages 1001-1047, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01261-5.
• Paul H. Edelman & John A. Weymark, 2021, "Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 4, pages 1091-1120, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01324-7.
• Alex Barrachina & Yair Tauman & Amparo Urbano, 2021, "Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 1, pages 241-278, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00748-8.
• Shinji Ohseto, 2021, "Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 2, pages 419-432, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00754-4.
• Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021, "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 2, pages 475-502, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1.
• Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2021, "Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 4, pages 801-827, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00769-x.
• Christoph Diehl & Christoph Kuzmics, 2021, "The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 4, pages 911-925, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0.
• Áron Tóbiás, 2021, "Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 4, pages 989-1019, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00778-w.
• Daniel Aobdia & Saad Siddiqui & Andres Vinelli, 2021, "Heterogeneity in expertise in a credence goods setting: evidence from audit partners," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 2, pages 693-729, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09569-2.
• Jeremy Bertomeu & Igor Vaysman & Wenjie Xue, 2021, "Voluntary versus mandatory disclosure," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 2, pages 658-692, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09579-0.
• Jung Min Kim & Daniel J. Taylor & Robert E. Verrecchia, 2021, "Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 3, pages 971-1001, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09601-z.
• Omri Even-Tov & Naim Bugra Ozel, 2021, "What moves stock prices around credit rating changes?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 4, pages 1390-1427, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09573-6.
• Gino Loyola, 2021, "Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 1, pages 1-32, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00240-5.
• Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021, "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 1, pages 33-64, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00242-3.
• Rasoul Ramezanian & Mehdi Feizi, 2021, "Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 3, pages 157-176, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00246-7.
• Shuichi Tsugawa, 2021, "Two-agent interactive implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 4, pages 251-266, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00247-6.
• Silvia Martinez-Gorricho & Miguel Sanchez Villalba, 2021, "Incentives, ability and disutility of effort," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 453-487, September, DOI: 10.1007/s13209-021-00236-6.
• Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2021, "On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 57, issue 2, pages 431-468, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01329-8.
• Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2021, "Information disclosure with many alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 57, issue 4, pages 851-873, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01341-y.
• Gert G. Wagner, 2021, "Polit-ökonomische Aspekte des Berichts zur Lage der Verbraucher:innen
  [Political-Economic Aspects of the Report on the Position of Consumers by the Advisory Council for Consumer Affairs (SVRV)]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 101, issue 6, pages 473-480, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10273-021-2944-z.
• Bin-Tzong Chie & Chih-Hwa Yang, 2021, "Efficiency of the Experimental Prediction Market: Public Information, Belief Evolution, and Personality Traits," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, volume 11, issue 4, pages 1-3.
• Timmer, Yannick & Pierri, Niccola, 2021, "The importance of technology in banking during a crisis," ESRB Working Paper Series, European Systemic Risk Board, number 117, Mar.
• Suqin Ge & Andrea Moro & Beibei Zhu, 2021, "Testing for asymmetric employer learning and statistical discrimination," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 53, issue 12, pages 1361-1377, March, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2020.1830939.
• Pavel Ciaian & d’Artis Kancs & Miroslava Rajcaniova, 2021, "The economic dependency of bitcoin security," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 53, issue 49, pages 5738-5755, October, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2021.1931003.
• Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021, "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Li, Fei & Norman, Peter, 2021, "Sequential persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Siga, Lucas & Mihm, Maximilian, 2021, "Information aggregation in competitive markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 1, January.
• Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2021, "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Eilat, Ran & Pauzner, Ady, 2021, "Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021, "Relational communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Li, Yunan, 2021, "Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Guo, Yingni & Shmaya, Eran, 2021, "Costly miscalibration," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Azrieli, Yaron, 2021, "Monitoring experts," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Jehiel, Philippe, 2021, "Communication with forgetful liars," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Pei, Harry, 2021, "Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Escobar, Juan F. & Zhang, Qiaoxi, 2021, "Delegating learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Garrett, Daniel F., 2021, "Payoff implications of incentive contracting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Kushnir, Alexey I. & Lokutsievskiy, Lev V., 2021, "When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Eilat, Ran & Eliaz, Kfir & Mu, Xiaosheng, 2021, "Bayesian privacy," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Piotr Denderski & Christian A. Stoltenberg, 2021, "On existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 21-052/VI, Jun.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2021, "Search, Screening and Sorting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 21-058/VI, Jun.
• Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021, "An implementation approach to rotation programs," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics, number 150, Dec.
• Hugh Macartney & Robert McMillan & Uros Petronijevic, 2021, "A Quantitative Framework for Analyzing the Distributional Effects of Incentive Schemes," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-696, May.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2021, "Search, Screening and Sorting," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-699, Jun.
• Cherbonnier, Frédéric, 2021, "Optimal insurance for time-inconsistent agents," IAST Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), number 21-123, Oct.
• Crampes, Claude & Léautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2021, "Les Certificats d'Economie d'Energie entre économie et politique," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1205, Apr, revised Jan 2022.
• Calvano, Emilio & Assad, Stephanie & Calzolari, Giacomo & Clark, Robert & Denicolò, Vincenzo & Ershov, Daniel & Johnson, Justin & Pastorello, Sergio & Rhodes, Andrew & Wildenbeest, Matthijs & XU, Lei, 2021, "Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Economic research and policy implications," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1210, Mar.
• Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021, "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1227, Jun, revised Jun 2025.
• Yamashita, Takuro & Sarkisian, Roberto, 2021, "Large mechanism design with moment-based allocation externality," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1241, Aug.
• Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021, "Type-contingent Information Disclosure," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1242, Aug.
• Yamashita, Takuro & Murooka, Takeshi, 2021, "Optimal Trade Mechanism with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1245, Sep.
• Yamashita, Takuro & Murooka, Takeshi, 2021, "A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1244, Sep.
• Cherbonnier, Frédéric, 2021, "Optimal insurance for time-inconsistent agents," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1256, Sep.
• Barigozzi, Francesca & Cremer, Helmuth, 2021, "Shining with the stars: competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1257, Oct.
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• Furmaco, L. & Longley, N. & Palermo, A. & Rossi, G., 2021, "Employees’ Performance Variation over Fixed-Term Contracts - Evidence from the National Hockey League," Working Papers, Tulane University, Department of Economics, number 2107, May.
• Mikhail Golosov & Luigi Iovino, 2021, "Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 129, issue 9, pages 2629-2665, DOI: 10.1086/715022.
• Gerardi, Dino & Monzon, Ignacio & Grillo, Edoardo, 2021, "The Perils of Friendly Oversight," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16100, May.
• Falk, Armin & Abeler, Johannes & Kosse, Fabian, 2021, "Malleability of preferences for honesty," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16164, May.
• Mele, Antonio & Sangiorgi, Francesco, 2021, "Insider Trading Regulation and Market Quality Tradeoffs," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16179, May.
• Wagner, Alexander F. & Barth, Andreas & Laturnus, Valerie & Mansouri, Sasan, 2021, "Conflicted Analysts and Initial Coin Offerings," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16200, May.
• Sonin, Konstantin & Wright, Austin L., 2021, "Information Operations Increase Civilian Security Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16269, Jun.
• Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2021, "Contract Length and Severance Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16288, Jun.
• Gautier, Pieter & Cai, Xiaoming & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2021, "Search, Screening and Sorting," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16295, Jun.
• Pavlova, Anna & Kashyap, Anil & Kovrijnykh, Natalia & ,, 2021, "Is There Too Much Benchmarking in Asset Management?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16296, Jun.
• Thorburn, Karin S & Eckbo, B Espen & Su, Xunhua, 2021, "Bank Compensation for Penalty-Free Loan Prepayment: Theory and Tests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16300, Jun.
• Gottardi, Piero & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Moreira, Humberto, 2021, "Risk Classification in Insurance Markets with Risk and Preference Heterogeneity," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16310, Jun.
• Malenko, Andrey & Malenko, Nadya & Spatt, Chester, 2022, "Creating controversy in proxy voting advice," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16352, May.
• Bonatti, Alessandro & Bergemann, Dirk & Haupt, Andreas & Smolin, Alex, 2021, "The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16394, Jul.
• Ellul, Andrew & Kim, Dasol, 2021, "Counterparty Choice, Bank Interconnectedness, and Systemic Risk," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16458, Aug.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021, "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16459, Aug.
• Morris, Stephen & Yang, Ming, 2021, "Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16495, Aug.
• Sela, Aner, 2021, "Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16503, Sep.
• Sela, Aner, 2021, "Resource Allocations in Multi-Stage Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16505, Sep.
• Sela, Aner & Levi, Ofer & Lagziel, David & Cohen, Chen, 2021, "All-Pay Auctions with Two Heterogenous Prizes and Partially Asymmetric Players," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16506, Sep.
• Shelegia, Sandro & Martin, Simon, 2021, "Under-promise and Over-Deliver? - Online Product Reviews and Firm Pricing," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16508, Sep.
• Carlin, Wendy & Bowles, Samuel, 2021, "Shrinking capitalism: Components of a new political economy paradigm," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16515, Sep.
• Mariotti, Thomas & Attar, Andrea & Salanié, François, 2021, "Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16531, Sep.
• Gavazza, Alessandro & Lizzeri, Alessandro, 2021, "Frictions in Product Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16542, Sep.
• Blume, Andreas & Deimen, Inga & Inoue, Sean, 2021, "Contracts versus Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16697, Nov.
• Cremer, Helmuth & Barigozzi, Francesca, 2021, "Shining with the stars: competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16704, Nov.
• Drugov, Mikhail & ,, 2021, "Score Disclosure," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16707, Nov.
• Kamenica, Emir & Brooks, Benjamin A & Frankel, Alexander, 2021, "Information hierachies," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16790, Dec.
• Spiritus, Kevin & Lehmann, Etienne & Renes, Sander & Zoutman, Floris, 2022, "Optimal Taxation with Multiple Incomes and Types," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16797, Jan.
• Mariotti, Thomas & Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021, "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16807, Dec.
• Szalay, DezsÅ‘ & Deimen, Inga, 2021, "Communication in the shadow of catastrophe," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16831, Dec.
• Heloise Clolery, 2021, "Legislators in the Crossfire: The Effect of Transparency on Parliamentary Voting," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2021-12, Aug.
• Pavel Ciaian & d'Artis Kancs & Miroslava Rajcaniova, 2021, "Interdependencies between Mining Costs, Mining Rewards and Blockchain Security," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 22, issue 1, pages 25-62, May.
• Shihui Ma, 2021, "Diverging College Premiums: A General Equilibrium Framework on China's College Expansion Policy," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 22, issue 2, pages 289-315, November.
• Yutaka Suzuki, 2021, "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design in a Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 22, issue 2, pages 317-365, November.
• Holden,Richard & Malani,Anup, 2021, "Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781009001397, August.
• Florian Ederer & Weicheng Min, 2021, "Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2272, Jan.
• Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021, "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2285, May.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Andreas Haupt & Alex Smolin, 2021, "The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2290, Jul.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Andreas Haupt & Alex Smolin, 2021, "The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2290R, Jul, revised Dec 2021.
• Dirk Bergemann & Marco Ottaviani, 2021, "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2296, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Edmund Yeh & Jinkun Zhang, 2021, "Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2297, Aug.
• Ian Ball & Jose-Antonio Espin-Sanchez, 2021, "Experimental Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2298, Aug.
• Stephanie De Mel & Kaivan Munshi & Soenje Reiche & Hamid Sabourian, 2021, "Herding with Heterogeneous Ability: An Application to Organ Transplantation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2308, Oct.
• Steven Poelhekke & Razvan Vlahu & Vadym Volosovych, 2021, "Corporate Acquisitions and Bank Relationships," Working Papers, DNB, number 726, Sep.
• Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Arijit Mukherjee, 2021, "Pioneer, Early Follower or Late Entrant: Entry Dynamics with Learning and Market Competition," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1132, Apr.
• Nobuyuki Hanaki & Takashi Hayashi & Michele Lombardi & Kazuhito Ogawa, 2021, "Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: an experiment," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1138, Aug.
• Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2021, "An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1152, Dec.
• Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2021, "An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1152r, Dec, revised Jun 2022.
• Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2021, "Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments," EconomiX Working Papers, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX, number 2021-37.