Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2018

• Liu, Qi & Sun, Bo, 2018, "Managerial manipulation, corporate governance, and limited market participation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 98-117, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2017.12.004.
• Stadelmann, Marcel & Schubert, Renate, 2018, "How Do Different Designs of Energy Labels Influence Purchases of Household Appliances? A Field Study in Switzerland," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 112-123, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.07.031.
• Smith, Gregory & Day, Brett, 2018, "Addressing the Collective Action Problem in Multiple-purchaser PES: An Experimental Investigation of Negotiated Payment Contributions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 36-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.07.020.
• Chakraborty, Indranil, 2018, "A comparative analysis of multi-unit sequential auction under optimal reserve," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, pages 34-36, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.10.019.
• Ai, Hengjie & Li, Rui, 2018, "A tractable model of limited enforcement and the life-cycle dynamics of firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 136-140, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.11.025.
• Wong, Tsz-Ning & Yang, Lily Ling, 2018, "When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 186-189, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.001.
• Burkett, Justin, 2018, "Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 22-26, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.11.024.
• Terstiege, Stefan, 2018, "On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 83-86, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.014.
• Arcand, Jean-Louis & McDonald, Stuart, 2018, "Credit markets with imperfect information: Risk-aversion versus pessimism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 165, issue C, pages 35-38, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.029.
• Kim, Jin Yeub, 2018, "Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, pages 112-114, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.003.
• Gong, Qiang & Yang, Huanxing, 2018, "Balance of opinions in expert panels," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 151-154, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.019.
• Papanikolaou, Nikolaos I., 2018, "To screen or not to screen? Let the competition decide," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 175-178, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.015.
• Li, Fei & Norman, Peter, 2018, "On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 66-70, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.023.
• Jain, Vasudha, 2018, "Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 91-95, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.006.
• Dumav, Martin & Khan, Urmee, 2018, "Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: When are actions implementable?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 110-114, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.028.
• Zamani, Omid & Bittmann, Thomas & Loy, Jens-Peter, 2018, "Search costs and cost pass-through: Evidence for the Iranian poultry market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 119-122, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.022.
• Iluz, Asaf & Sela, Aner, 2018, "Sequential contests with first and secondary prizes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 6-9, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.029.
• Aiche, Avishay & Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Moreno, Diego & Sela, Aner & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2018, "Tullock contests reward information advantages," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 34-36, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.017.
• Yi, Jianxin & Wang, Hefei & Li, Yong, 2018, "Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 113-117, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.09.018.
• Luo, Yao, 2018, "Identification of participation constraints in contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 84-87, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.09.024.
• Glaeser, Edward L. & Ponzetto, Giacomo A.M., 2018, "The political economy of transportation investment," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, volume 13, issue C, pages 4-26, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2017.08.001.
• Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018, "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 230-249, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.10.004.
• Gauthier, Stéphane & Henriet, Fanny, 2018, "Commodity taxes and taste heterogeneity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 284-296, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.10.017.
• Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2018, "Guilt in voting and public good games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 664-681, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.08.001.
• Challe, Edouard & Chrétien, Edouard, 2018, "Market microstructure, information aggregation and equilibrium uniqueness in a global game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 82-99, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.004.
• Fernández-Blanco, Javier & Preugschat, Edgar, 2018, "On the effects of ranking by unemployment duration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 92-110, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.02.003.
• Loerke, Petra & Niedermayer, Andras, 2018, "On the effect of aggregate uncertainty on certification intermediaries’ incentives to distort ratings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 20-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.05.005.
• Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 211-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005.
• Walke, Adam G. & Fullerton, Thomas M. & Tokle, Robert J., 2018, "Risk-based loan pricing consequences for credit unions," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, volume 47, issue C, pages 105-119, DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2018.02.006.
• Reyes, Tomas, 2018, "Limited attention and M&A announcements," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, volume 49, issue C, pages 201-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2018.10.001.
• Bagnai, Alberto & Mongeau Ospina, Christian Alexander, 2018, "Asymmetries, outliers and structural stability in the US gasoline market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 250-260, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.11.014.
• Gerlach, Heiko & Zheng, Xuemei, 2018, "Preferences for green electricity, investment and regulatory incentives," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 430-441, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.12.011.
• Buso, Marco & Stenger, Anne, 2018, "Public-private partnerships as a policy response to climate change," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 487-494, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.063.
• Karpavičius, Sigitas & Suchard, Jo-Ann, 2018, "Institutional ownership and the choice of equity issue method," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 73-84, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2017.12.009.
• Bernales, Alejandro & Cañón, Carlos & Verousis, Thanos, 2018, "Bid–ask spread and liquidity searching behaviour of informed investors in option markets," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 25, issue C, pages 96-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2017.10.025.
• Niu, Weining & Zeng, Qingduo, 2018, "Corporate financing with loss aversion and disagreement," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 27, issue C, pages 80-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2018.02.021.
• Borochin, Paul A. & Cicon, James E. & DeLisle, R. Jared & Price, S. McKay, 2018, "The effects of conference call tones on market perceptions of value uncertainty," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 75-91, DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2017.12.003.
• Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018, "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 345-363, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.028.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2018, "Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 380-395, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.026.
• Dobzinski, Shahar & Mehta, Aranyak & Roughgarden, Tim & Sundararajan, Mukund, 2018, "Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 130-138, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.008.
• Jagadeesan, Ravi, 2018, "Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 275-286, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.015.
• Jagadeesan, Ravi & Kominers, Scott Duke & Rheingans-Yoo, Ross, 2018, "Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 287-294, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.010.
• Chen, Wei-Cheng & Chen, Yi-Yi & Kao, Yi-Cheng, 2018, "Limited choice in college admissions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 295-316, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.002.
• Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin, 2018, "Money as minimal complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 432-451, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.003.
• Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin, 2018, "Graphical exchange mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 452-465, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.002.
• Lubensky, Dmitry & Schmidbauer, Eric, 2018, "Equilibrium informativeness in veto games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 104-125, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.010.
• Blume, Andreas, 2018, "Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 132-155, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.014.
• Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2018, "Cognitive ability and games of school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 156-183, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.011.
• Mishra, Debasis & Nath, Swaprava & Roy, Souvik, 2018, "Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 240-261, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.018.
• Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2018, "Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 327-363, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.019.
• Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018, "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 382-400, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.004.
• Grosskopf, Brit & Rentschler, Lucas & Sarin, Rajiv, 2018, "An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 40-64, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.013.
• Hwang, Ilwoo, 2018, "A theory of bargaining deadlock," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 501-522, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.002.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 544-564, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006.
• Grant, Simon & Jude Kline, J. & Quiggin, John, 2018, "Contracting under uncertainty: A principal–agent model with ambiguity averse parties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 582-597, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.008.
• Galanis, Spyros, 2018, "Speculation under unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 598-615, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.001.
• Landeo, Claudia M. & Nikitin, Maxim, 2018, "Financially-constrained lawyers: An economic theory of legal disputes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 625-647, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.002.
• Ispano, Alessandro, 2018, "Information acquisition and the value of bad news," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 165-173, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.013.
• Mu'alem, Ahuva & Schapira, Michael, 2018, "Setting lower bounds on truthfulness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 174-193, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.001.
• Chen, Yan & Jiang, Ming & Kesten, Onur & Robin, Stéphane & Zhu, Min, 2018, "Matching in the large: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 295-317, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.004.
• Augenblick, Ned & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2018, "To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 318-329, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.014.
• Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2018, "Dynamic communication with biased senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 330-339, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.017.
• Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018, "Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 50-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.008.
• Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2018, "The object allocation problem with random priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 71-89, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.010.
• Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2018, "On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.001.
• Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per, 2018, "A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 20-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.002.
• Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2018, "Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 203-216, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.004.
• Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian, 2018, "Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 274-288, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.003.
• Khan, M. Ali & Zhang, Yongchao, 2018, "On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 289-304, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.006.
• Leucci, Stefano & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Penna, Paolo, 2018, "No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 64-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.003.
• Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018, "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 139-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.002.
• Tóbiás, Áron, 2018, "Non-linear pricing and optimal shipping policies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 194-218, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.008.
• Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2018, "Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 1-25, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.10.006.
• Schmidbauer, Eric & Lubensky, Dmitry, 2018, "New and improved?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 26-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.11.002.
• Niedermayer, Andras & Wang, Chengsi, 2018, "A search model of rental markets: Who should pay the commission?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 58, issue C, pages 214-235, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.002.
• Jullien, Bruno & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2018, "Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 58, issue C, pages 31-62, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007.
• Veiga, André, 2018, "A note on how to sell a network good," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, pages 114-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009.
• Asseyer, Andreas, 2018, "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, pages 222-252, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.03.004.
• Zhang, Chenglin & Ye, Lixin & Johnson, Joel & Baker, Christopher & Wang, Huaiyi, 2018, "Efficient and optimal mechanisms with radio spectrum sharing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, pages 206-227, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.08.004.
• Bester, Helmut & Ouyang, Yaofu, 2018, "Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, pages 96-129, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.08.008.
• MacMinn, Richard & Richter, Andreas, 2018, "The choice of trigger in an insurance linked security: The mortality risk case," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, pages 174-182, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2017.09.018.
• Karlsson, Martin & Klohn, Florian & Rickayzen, Ben, 2018, "The role of heterogeneous parameters for the detection of selection in insurance contracts," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 83, issue C, pages 110-121, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2018.08.002.
• Mazboudi, Mohamad & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2018, "Secrecy, information shocks, and corporate investment: Evidence from European Union countries," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 166-176, DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2017.11.002.
• Aussenegg, Wolfgang & Jelic, Ranko & Ranzi, Robert, 2018, "Corporate insider trading in Europe," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 27-42, DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2017.05.004.
• Chircop, Justin & Johan, Sofia & Tarsalewska, Monika, 2018, "Common auditors and cross-country M&A transactions," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 43-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2017.04.001.
• Guha, Brishti, 2018, "Secret ballots and costly information gathering: The jury size problem revisited," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 58-67, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2017.10.005.
• Cuny, Christine, 2018, "When knowledge is power: Evidence from the municipal bond market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 65, issue 1, pages 109-128, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.11.002.
• Sutherland, Andrew, 2018, "Does credit reporting lead to a decline in relationship lending? Evidence from information sharing technology," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 66, issue 1, pages 123-141, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.03.002.
• Marmora, Paul & Rytchkov, Oleg, 2018, "Learning about noise," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, pages 209-224, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.02.005.
• Vitale, Paolo, 2018, "Robust trading for ambiguity-averse insiders," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 113-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.03.007.
• Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018, "Signaling with costly acquisition of signals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 141-150, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.022.
• Andersen, Steffen & Gneezy, Uri & Kajackaite, Agne & Marx, Julie, 2018, "Allowing for reflection time does not change behavior in dictator and cheating games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 24-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.012.
• Haisken-DeNew, John & Hasan, Syed & Jha, Nikhil & Sinning, Mathias, 2018, "Unawareness and selective disclosure: The effect of school quality information on property prices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 449-464, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.015.
• Adriani, Fabrizio & Matheson, Jesse A. & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2018, "Teaching by example and induced beliefs in a model of cultural transmission," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 511-529, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.031.
• Holm, Hakan J. & Samahita, Margaret, 2018, "Curating social image: Experimental evidence on the value of actions and selfies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 148, issue C, pages 83-104, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.008.
• Thomas, Charles J., 2018, "An alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 269-293, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.004.
• Wen, Yuanji, 2018, "Voluntary information acquisition in an asymmetric-Information game:comparing learning theories in the laboratory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 202-219, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.023.
• Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Neset Joslin, Knut-Eric, 2018, "Should I Stay or should I Go? Bandwagons in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 86-97, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.019.
• De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2018, "The adverse consequences of tournaments: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 1-18, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.05.001.
• Barigozzi, Francesca & Burani, Nadia & Raggi, Davide, 2018, "Productivity crowding-out in labor markets with motivated workers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 199-218, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.018.
• Kajackaite, Agne, 2018, "Lying about luck versus lying about performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 194-199, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.07.010.
• Bayer, Ralph-C & Ke, Changxia, 2018, "What causes rockets and feathers? An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 223-237, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.010.
• Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias, 2018, "Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 362-378, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.07.016.
• Choi, Pak-Sing & Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2018, "Conservation procurement auctions with bidirectional externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 559-579, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.009.
• Cvitanić, Jakša & Xing, Hao, 2018, "Asset pricing under optimal contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 142-180, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.005.
• Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2018, "Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 95-117, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.009.
• Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2018, "Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.010.
• Zhang, Shengxing, 2018, "Liquidity misallocation in an over-the-counter market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 16-56, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.008.
• Honryo, Takakazu, 2018, "Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 273-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.003.
• Koch, Christian & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2018, "The winner's curse: Conditional reasoning and belief formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 57-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.12.002.
• Rivera, Thomas J., 2018, "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 201-247, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.012.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Dufwenberg, Martin A., 2018, "Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 248-264, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013.
• Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2018, "Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 291-317, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.016.
• Liu, Feng & Conlon, John R., 2018, "The simplest rational greater-fool bubble model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 38-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.001.
• Dai, Liang, 2018, "Asset bundling and information acquisition of investors with different expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 447-490, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.003.
• Yu, Edison G., 2018, "Dynamic market participation and endogenous information aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 491-517, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.002.
• Fanning, Jack, 2018, "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 518-555, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.001.
• Glode, Vincent & Opp, Christian C. & Zhang, Xingtan, 2018, "Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 652-688, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.005.
• Ali, S. Nageeb, 2018, "Herding with costly information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 713-729, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.009.
• Kendall, Chad, 2018, "The time cost of information in financial markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 118-157, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.007.
• Espino, Emilio & Kozlowski, Julian & Sánchez, Juan M., 2018, "Investment and bilateral insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 311-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.002.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Wu, Qinggong, 2018, "A simple model of competition between teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 372-392, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006.
• Choi, Michael, 2018, "Imperfect information transmission and adverse selection in asset markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 619-649, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.007.
• Song, Yangwei, 2018, "Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 693-726, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.007.
• Hwang, Ilwoo, 2018, "Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 761-802, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.002.
• Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2018, "Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 81-117, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.008.
• Bajaj, Ayushi, 2018, "Undefeated equilibria of the Shi–Trejos–Wright model under adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 957-986, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.014.
• Peck, James, 2018, "Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 126-161, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.001.
• Carrasco, Vinicius & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias & Monteiro, Paulo & Moreira, Humberto, 2018, "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 245-279, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.005.
• Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018, "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 34-69, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.013.
• Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro, 2018, "Hierarchical experimentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 365-404, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.006.
• Rahi, Rohit & Zigrand, Jean-Pierre, 2018, "Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 558-593, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.007.
• Frug, Alexander, 2018, "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 594-615, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.006.
• Sultanum, Bruno, 2018, "Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 616-658, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.002.
• Safronov, Mikhail, 2018, "Coalition-proof full efficient implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 659-677, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.009.
• De Castro, Luciano & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2018, "Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: Ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 678-707, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.008.
• Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018, "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 708-733, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.002.
• Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2018, "Sharing sequential values in a network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 734-779, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.004.
• Drozd, Lukasz A. & Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2018, "Financial contracting with enforcement externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 153-189, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.002.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Li, Jiangtao, 2018, "Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 294-317, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.001.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Condorelli, Daniele & Kim, Jinwoo, 2018, "Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 398-435, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.005.
• Aoyagi, Masaki, 2018, "Bertrand competition under network externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 517-550, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.006.
• Broer, Tobias, 2018, "Securitization bubbles: Structured finance with disagreement about default risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 127, issue 3, pages 505-518, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.12.001.
• Eckbo, B. Espen & Makaew, Tanakorn & Thorburn, Karin S., 2018, "Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 128, issue 3, pages 443-465, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.03.006.
• Rud, Olga A. & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Horowitz, John, 2018, "Does competition aggravate moral hazard? A Multi-Principal-Agent experiment," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, volume 33, issue C, pages 115-121, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2017.09.001.
• Shi, Lan & Zhang, Yan, 2018, "The effect of mortgage broker licensing under the originate-to-distribute model: Evidence from the U.S. mortgage market," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, volume 35, issue PA, pages 70-85, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2018.03.006.
• Nakamura, Leonard I. & Roszbach, Kasper, 2018, "Credit ratings, private information, and bank monitoring ability," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, volume 36, issue C, pages 58-73, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2017.11.001.
• Boone, Jan, 2018, "Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Access to care and the role of cost effectiveness," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, pages 53-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.05.002.
• Kirsch, Steffen & Burghof, Hans-Peter, 2018, "The efficiency of savings-linked relationship lending for housing finance," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, volume 42, issue C, pages 55-68, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2018.05.003.
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• Stöckl, Thomas & Palan, Stefan, 2018, "Catch me if you can. Can human observers identify insiders in asset markets?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, pages 1-17, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2018.04.004.
• Van Parys, Jessica & Ash, Elliott, 2018, "Sequential decision-making with group identity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 1-18, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2018.09.004.
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• Salonen, Hannu & Salonen, Mikko A.A., 2018, "Mutually best matches," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 91, issue C, pages 42-50, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.11.003.
• Fukui, Masao, 2018, "Asset Quality Cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 97-108, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.02.006.
• Le, Thanh & Yalcin, Erkan, 2018, "Lobbying, campaign contributions, and electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 559-572, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.05.003.
• Reischmann, Andreas & Oechssler, Joerg, 2018, "The Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good provision in dynamic settings — Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 104-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.009.
• Gersbach, Hans & Tejada, Oriol, 2018, "A Reform Dilemma in polarized democracies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 160, issue C, pages 148-158, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.007.
• Kartal, Melis & Tremewan, James, 2018, "An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, pages 44-55, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.04.003.
• Dahm, Matthias & González, Paula & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2018, "The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, pages 21-32, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.08.014.
• Bucciol, Alessandro, 2018, "False claims in politics: Evidence from the US," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 72, issue 2, pages 196-210, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2018.04.002.
• Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Roussel, Sébastien, 2018, "Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 51, issue C, pages 1-17, DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.10.004.
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• Leroux, Justin & Spiro, Daniel, 2018, "Leading the unwilling: Unilateral strategies to prevent arctic oil exploration," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 125-149, DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2018.08.002.
• Wan, Junmin, 2018, "Prevention and landing of bubble," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 190-204, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.10.024.
• Charoontham, Kittiphod & Amornpetchkul, Thunyarat (Bam), 2018, "Performance-based payment scheme to hedge against credit rating inflation," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, volume 44, issue C, pages 471-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.117.
• Galliera, Arianna, 2018, "Self-selecting random or cumulative pay? A bargaining experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, pages 106-120, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2017.12.003.
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• Yang, Xiaolan & Gao, Mei & Wu, Yun & Jin, Xuejun, 2018, "Performance evaluation and herd behavior in a laboratory financial market," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, pages 45-54, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.05.001.
• Rahi, Rohit & Zigrand, Jean-Pierre, 2018, "Information acquisition, price informativeness and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 118935, Apr.
• Babus, Ana & Kondor, Peter, 2018, "Trading and information diffusion in over-the-counter markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 118939, Apr.
• Cvitanić, Jakŝa & Xing, Hao, 2018, "Asset pricing under optimal contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 84952, Jan.
• Zhang, Shengxing, 2018, "Liquidity misallocation in an over-the-counter market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 86800, Mar.
• Babus, Ana & Kondor, Peter, 2018, "Trading and information diffusion in OTC markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 88050, Sep.
• Rahi, Rohit & Zigrand, Jean-Pierre, 2018, "Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 89385, Jul.
• Claudia M. Landeo, 2018, "Law and economics and tort litigation institutions: theory and experiments," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 9, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler, "Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics".
• Andrea Attar & Claude d’Aspremont, 2018, "Trading under asymmetric information: Positive and normative implications," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 15, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini, "Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I".
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• Ibarra Salazar, Jorge, 2018, "Fundamentos de la nueva fórmula de asignación del Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social en México," El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, volume 0, issue 337, pages .195-218, enero-mar, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20430/ete.v85i.
• Harun Bulut, 2017, "US farmers’ insurance choices under budget heuristics," Agricultural Finance Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, volume 78, issue 1, pages 152-172, December, DOI: 10.1108/AFR-02-2017-0009.
• Zelalem Yilma & Owen O’Donnell & Anagaw Mebratie & Getnet Alemu & Arjun S. Bedi, 2018, "Subjective Expectations of Medical Expenditures and Insurance in Rural Ethiopia," Contributions to Economic Analysis, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, "Health Econometrics", DOI: 10.1108/S0573-855520180000294002.
• Ahmed Bouteska & Boutheina Regaieg, 2018, "Loss aversion, overconfidence of investors and their impact on market performance evidence from the US stock markets," Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, volume 25, issue 50, pages 451-478, October, DOI: 10.1108/JEFAS-07-2017-0081.
• Alexander Bleck, 2018, "Regulating bank leverage," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, volume 10, issue 2, pages 264-274, July, DOI: 10.1108/JFEP-12-2017-0122.
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• Garrett Wood, 2018, "The enemy votes: Weapons improvisation and bargaining failure," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, volume 13, issue 1, pages 35-42, April, DOI: 10.15355/epsj.13.1.35.
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• Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, 2018, "Energy efficiency as a credence good: A review of informational barriers to building energy savings," Policy Papers, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, number 2018.04, Apr.
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• Guido Tatone, 2018, "La reputazione negli appalti pubblici: uno strumento socialmente desiderabile per risolvere il problema dello scadimento qualitativo," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, volume 2018, issue 1, pages 59-85.
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• Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2018, "Free-riding and knowledge spillovers in teams: The role of social ties," Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00704.
• Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2018, "The adverse consequences of tournaments: Evidence from a field experiment," Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00705.
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