Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2023

• Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2023, "The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 187-226, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210114.
• Aaron Kolb & Marilyn Pease & Daniel W. Sacks & Joshua Quick, 2023, "Blind Disclosure," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 41-79, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210182.
• Francisco Espinosa & Debraj Ray, 2023, "Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 493-535, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200472.
• T. Tony Ke & Christopher Li & Mikhail Safronov, 2023, "Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 536-567, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200192.
• Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2023, "Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Managerial Risk-Taking," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 568-598, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200325.
• Xiang Hui & Maryam Saeedi & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Steven Tadelis, 2023, "Raising the Bar: Certification Thresholds and Market Outcomes," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 599-626, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210179.
• Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2023, "Stable and Efficient Resource Allocation with Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 627-659, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210109.
• Murali Agastya & Oleksii Birulin, 2023, "Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 660-698, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210126.
• Anh Nguyen & Teck Yong Tan, 2023, "Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 699-726, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210112.
• Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2023, "Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 80-108, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210190.
• Bingchao Huangfu & Heng Liu, 2023, "Information Spillover in Multi-good Adverse Selection," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 118-165, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190287.
• Mogens Fosgerau & Rajiv Sethi & Jörgen Weibull, 2023, "Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 201-242, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210391.
• Ron Siegel & Bruno Strulovici, 2023, "Judicial Mechanism Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 243-270, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220100.
• Samuel Häfner & Curtis R. Taylor, 2023, "Working for References," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 33-77, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210299.
• Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Robert J. Gary-Bobo, 2023, "Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 387-425, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210392.
• Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu & Yuxuan Zhu, 2023, "Bid Caps in Noisy Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 426-473, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220046.
• Ran Weksler & Boaz Zik, 2023, "Disclosure in Markets for Ratings," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 501-526, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210214.
• Thomas Jungbauer & Michael Waldman, 2023, "Self-Reported Signaling," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 78-117, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210204.
• Iván Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2023, "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 4, pages 1-67, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220006.
• Fei Li & Jidong Zhou, 2023, "A Model of Sequential Crisis Management," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 4, pages 319-349, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220107.
• Giacomo De Giorgi & Andres Drenik & Enrique Seira, 2023, "The Extension of Credit with Nonexclusive Contracts and Sequential Banking Externalities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 233-271, February, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200220.
• Cher Hsuehhsiang Li & Basit Zafar, 2023, "Ask and You Shall Receive? Gender Differences in Regrades in College," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 359-394, May, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210053.
• Damien de Walque & Christine Valente, 2023, "Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 256-285, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210202.
• Joshua A. Blonz, 2023, "The Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 286-321, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210208.
• Ethan Kaplan & Fernando Saltiel & Sergio Urzúa, 2023, "Voting for Democracy: Chile's Plebiscito and the Electoral Participation of a Generation," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 438-464, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210338.
• Francesc Dilmé, 2023, "Robust Information Transmission," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 5, issue 1, pages 111-124, March, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210643.
• Emilio Esguerra & Leonhard Vollmer & Johannes Wimmer, 2023, "Influence Motives in Social Signaling: Evidence from COVID-19 Vaccinations in Germany," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 5, issue 2, pages 275-291, June, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20220163.
• Arthur Robson & Larry Samuelson & Jakub Steiner, 2023, "Decision Theory and Stochastic Growth," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 5, issue 3, pages 357-376, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20220456.
• Itai Arieli & Ronen Gradwohl & Rann Smorodinsky, 2023, "Herd Design," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 5, issue 4, pages 460-476, December, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20220412.
• Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden, 2023, "A Solomonic Solution to Blockchain Front-Running," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 248-252, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231029.
• Robert M. Townsend & Nicolas X. Zhang, 2023, "Technologies That Replace a "Central Planner"," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 257-262, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231031.
• Buso, Marco & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, , "Dynamic Regulation of Public Franchises with Imperfectly Correlated Demand Shocks," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 330499, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.330499.
• Levaggi, Rosella & Moretto, Michele & Pertile, Paolo, , "Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 338404, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.338404.
• Magdalena Judika Br. SIRINGORINGO & Jadongan SIJABATB, 2023, "The Influence of Information Asymmetry, Profitability and Company Size on Earnings Management in Companies in the Goods and Consumption Industry Sector Listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the 2016-2020 Period," CECCAR Business Review, Body of Expert and Licensed Accountants of Romania (CECCAR), volume 4, issue 1, pages 58-72, January, DOI: 10.37945/cbr.2023.01.07.
• Felix J. Bierbrauer & Pierre C. Boyer & Andreas Peichl & Daniel Weishaar, 2023, "The Political Economy of Joint Taxation," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 239, Jun.
• Loukas Balafoutas & Helena Fornwagner & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter & Maryna Tverdostup, 2023, "Diagnostic Uncertainty and Insurance Coverage in Credence Goods Markets," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 257, Oct.
• Loukas Balafoutas & Helena Fornwagner & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter & Maryna Tverdostup, 2023, "Serving Consumers in an Uncertain World: A Credence Goods Experiment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 258, Oct.
• Francesc Dilmé, 2023, "The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with Private Information," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 267, Dec.
• Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2023, "Variable Population Manipulations of Reallocation Rules in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 223, Mar.
• Manuel Foerster & Daniel Habermacher, 2023, "Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 229, Mar.
• Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar & Jorge Bruno & Renaud Foucart & Sonali SenGupta, 2023, "Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2303.10514, Mar, revised Dec 2024.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2023, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.07653, Apr.
• Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023, "The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.09381, Apr.
• Tatiana Daddario & Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023, "An Assignment Problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2305.01477, May.
• Gaetan Fournier & Alberto Grillo & Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2023, "Strategic flip-flopping in political competition," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2305.02834, May.
• Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen & Yimeng Zhang, 2023, "Coarse Information Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2305.18020, May, revised Jun 2025.
• Roweno J. R. K. Heijmans, 2023, "Unraveling Coordination Problems," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2307.08557, Jul, revised Aug 2023.
• Joshua S. Gans & Hanna Halaburda, 2023, ""Zero Cost'' Majority Attacks on Permissionless Blockchains," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2308.06568, Aug.
• Jan-Henrik Steg & Elshan Garashli & Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics, 2023, "Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2309.04193, Sep, revised Mar 2024.
• Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2023, "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2309.11595, Sep.
• Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin, 2023, "Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Recommendations," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2309.12122, Sep, revised Jun 2025.
• Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023, "Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2311.02889, Nov.
• Hans Gersbach & Akaki Mamageishvili & Fikri Pitsuwan, 2023, "Crowdsearch," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2311.08532, Nov.
• Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023, "Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2311.12242, Nov, revised Feb 2024.
• Yuliia Klius & Oleh Zamai, 2023, "Methods Of Valuation Of Items Of Financial Reporting Of Ukrainian Enterprises: Unification Of National And International Standards," Three Seas Economic Journal, Publishing house "Baltija Publishing", volume 4, issue 1, DOI: 10.30525/2661-5150/2023-1-4.
• Santiago Carbo-Valverde & Héctor Pérez Saiz & Hongyu Xiao, 2023, "Geographical and Cultural Proximity in Retail Banking," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 23-2, Jan, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2023-2.
• Thorsten Beck & Patrick Behr & Raquel de Freitas Oliveira, 2023, "Information Sharing, Access to Finance, Loan Contract Design, and the Labor Market," Working Papers Series, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department, number 580, May.
• Salomón García, 2023, "The amplification effects of adverse selection in mortgage credit suply," Working Papers, Banco de España, number 2316, Jun, DOI: https://doi.org/10.53479/30138.
• Carlo Gola & Valentina Cappa & Patrizio Fiorenza & Paolo Granata & Federica Laurino & Lorenzo Lesina & Francesco Lorizzo & Gabriele Marcelli, 2023, "The governance of blockchains and system based on distributed ledger technology," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 773, Jun.
• Carlo Gola & Patrizio Fiorenza & Federica Laurino & Lorenzo Lesina, 2023, "The use of logic circuits to classify blockchains," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 774, Jun.
• Altinok Ahmet & Mac Donald Diana E., 2023, "Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster Care," Working Papers, Banco de México, number 2023-19, Dec.
• Roland Strausz, 2023, "Correlation-Savvy Sellers," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 0016, May, DOI: 10.48462/opus4-4960.
• Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz, 2023, "The irrelevance of fee structures for certification," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 0017, May, DOI: 10.48462/opus4-4972.
• Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023, "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 0030, Dec, DOI: 10.48462/opus4-5207.
• David Lagziel & Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2023, "Second Opinions and the Humility Threshold," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2305.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "Elimination Games," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2312.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "All-Pay Matching Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2313.
• Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2023, "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2317.
• Ori Haimanko, 2023, "Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2318.
• Egemen Eren & Semyon Malamud & Haonan Zhou, 2023, "Signaling with debt currency choice," BIS Working Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 1067, Jan.
• Charles A.E. Goodhart & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos & Xuan Wang, 2023, "Support for small businesses amid COVID‐19," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, volume 90, issue 358, pages 612-652, April, DOI: 10.1111/ecca.12460.
• Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2023, "Cursed Consumers and the Effectiveness of Consumer Protection Policies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 71, issue 2, pages 407-440, June, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12332.
• Alex Smolin, 2023, "Disclosure and pricing of attributes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 54, issue 4, pages 570-597, December, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12451.
• Gabor Pinter & Semih Uslu, 2023, "Price formation in markets with trading delays," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England, number 1023, Jun.
• Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2023, "Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_256v3, Apr.
• Marco Reuter, 2023, "Revenue Maximization With Partially Verifiable Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_395, Feb.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mengxi Zhang, 2023, "Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random losses and Adverse Selection," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_399, Mar.
• Avi Lichtig & Ran Weksler, 2023, "Information Transmission in Voluntary Disclosure Games," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_405, Mar.
• Christoph Carnehl & Maximilian Schaefer & Andre Stenzel & Kevin Ducbao Tran, 2023, "Value for Money and Selection: How Pricing Affects Airbnb Ratings," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_411, Apr.
• Orhan Aygün & Günnur Ege Bilgin, 2023, "Placement With Assignment Guarantees and Semi-Flexible Capacities," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_417, Apr.
• Nina Bobkova & Helene Mass, 2023, "Two-Dimensional Information Acquisition in Social Learning," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_433, Jun.
• Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass, 2023, "Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_434, Jun.
• Christian Bayer & Moritz Kuhn, 2023, "Job Levels and Wages," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_437, Jul.
• Rosina Rodríguez Olivera, 2023, "Strategic Incentives and the Optimal Sale of Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_442, Jul.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mengxi Zhang, 2023, "Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_452, Aug.
• Claudia Herresthal & Tatiana Mayskaya & Arina Nikandrova, 2023, "Data Linkage Between Markets: Does Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm?," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_462, Sep.
• Susanne Goldluecke & Thomas Troeger, 2023, "The Multiple-Volunteers Principle for Assigning Unpleasant and Pleasant Tasks," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_464, Sep.
• Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2023, "Information Design in Cheap Talk," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_470, Oct.
• Francesc Dilmé, 2023, "The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with Private Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_479, Dec.
• Deniz Kattwinkel & Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser & Alexander Winter, 2023, "Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_485, Dec.
• Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser, 2023, "Simple Allocation with Correlated Types," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_486, Dec.
• Spiganti Alessandro, 2023, "Wealth Inequality and the Exploration of Novel Technologies," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 2, pages 753-790, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejm-2022-0073.
• Lorenzon Emmanuel, 2023, "Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 155-179, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0009.
• Esfahanian Homa & Moghaddasi Kelishomi Ali, 2023, "Redistributive Unemployment Benefit and Taxation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 327-343, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0049.
• Kosenko Andrew, 2023, "Constrained Persuasion with Private Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 345-370, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0017.
• Demougin Dominique & Upton Harvey, 2023, "Relative Income Concerns, Dismissal, and the Use of Pay-for-Performance," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 405-441, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0107.
• Suzuki Yutaka, 2023, "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 2, pages 537-575, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0130.
• Kim Jeong-Yoo & Xu Wei, 2023, "A Signaling Theory of the Online Consumer Review Policy," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, volume 22, issue 2, pages 53-84, August, DOI: 10.1515/rne-2023-0041.
• Pawel Doligalski & Piotr Dworczak & Joanna Krysta, 2023, "Incentive separability," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK, number 23/777, Dec.
• Claude Crampes & Thomas-Olivier Léautier, 2023, "Les certificats d’économie d’énergie entre économie et politique," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 74, issue 1, pages 51-80.
• Françoise Forges, 2023, "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 74, issue 4, pages 529-539.
• Lucie Ménager, 2023, "Common Knowledge in Game Theory," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 74, issue 4, pages 569-599.
• Philippe Trainar, 2023, "Le marché de l'assurance dépendance," Revue d'économie financière, Association d'économie financière, volume 0, issue 4, pages 151-165.
• M. Martin Boyer & Philippe de Donder & Claude Fluet & Marie-Louise Leroux & Pierre-Carl Michaud, 2023, "La mauvaise perception des risques de longévité et de dépendance ne suffit pas à expliquer la faiblesse du marché de l'assurance dépendance (au Canada)," Revue d'économie financière, Association d'économie financière, volume 0, issue 4, pages 185-201.
• Christian At & Daniel Gilbert & Lionel Thomas, 2023, "Optimal Policy for Organic Farming Conversion," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, volume 133, issue 1, pages 105-118.
• Anderson, E. & Holmberg, P., 2023, "Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 2339, Dec.
• Yuechen Dai & Richard Watt, 2023, "Adverse Selection with the Boot on the Other Foot: Insurer Insolvency as a Problem in Asymmetric Information," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 23/02, Mar.
• Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri & Ignacio Monzon, 2023, "Delegation with Endogenous States," Carlo Alberto Notebooks, Collegio Carlo Alberto, number 711 JEL Classification: C.
• Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2023, "Information-Forcing Effects of Non-Disclosure Rules," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 338, Aug.
• Georg Graetz, 2023, "Imperfect signals," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, number dp1919, May.
• Roland Hodler & Paul Schaudt & Alberto Vesperoni, 2023, "Mining for Peace," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10207.
• Sanjit Dhami & Narges Hajimoladarvish & Pavan Mamidi, 2023, "Loss Aversion and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10224.
• Georg Graetz, 2023, "Imperfect Signals," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10403.
• Felix J. Bierbrauer & Pierre C. Boyer & Andreas Peichl & Daniel Weishaar & Felix Bierbrauer, 2023, "The Taxation of Couples," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10414.
• Georgios Petropoulos & Bertin Martens & Geoffrey Parker & Marshall Van Alstyne, 2023, "Platform Competition and Information Sharing," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10663.
• Jay Pil Choi & Kyungmin Kim & Arijit Mukherjee, 2023, "“Sherlocking” and Platform Information Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10769.
• Vincent Anesi & Peter Buisseret, 2023, "The Politics of Bargaining as a Group," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10823.
• Kevin Bauer & Yan Chen & Florian Hett & Michael Kosfeld, 2023, "Group Identity and Belief Formation: A Decomposition of Political Polarization," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10859.
• Alexander Braun & Niklas Häusle & Paul D. Thistle, 2023, "Risk Classification with On-Demand Insurance," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 23-49, Jun.
• Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2023, "Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 2023s-13, Jun.
• David K Levine & Lee Ohanian, 2023, "When to Appease and When to Punish: Hitler, Putin, and Hamas," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 11694000000000159, May.
• Germain, Antoine, 2023, "Basic income versus fairness: redistribution with inactive agents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2023022, Jul.

2022

• Mikhail Drugov & Margaret Meyer & Marc Moeller, 2022, "Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard," Working Papers, New Economic School (NES), number w0290, Aug.
• Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2022, "Engaging in Wars of Attrition," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 147, pages 79-100, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/48684787.
• Renaud Bourlès & Anastasia Cozarenco & Dominique Henriet & Xavier Joutard, 2022, "Business Training with a Better-Informed Lender: Theory and Evidence from Microcredit in France," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 148, pages 65-108, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/48706310.
• David Huffman & Collin Raymond & Julia Shvets, 2022, "Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 10, pages 3141-3175, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190668.
• Melis Kartal & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2022, "Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 10, pages 3367-3397, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201844.
• Jacob D. Leshno, 2022, "Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 12, pages 3876-3910, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201111.
• Boyan Jovanovic & Viktor Tsyrennikov, 2022, "Trading on Sunspots," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 12, pages 3970-3994, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210972.
• Mehmet Ekmekci & Leandro Gorno & Lucas Maestri & Jian Sun & Dong Wei, 2022, "Learning from Manipulable Signals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 12, pages 3995-4040, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211158.
• Sam Kapon, 2022, "Dynamic Amnesty Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 12, pages 4041-4075, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211428.
• Luigi Butera & Robert Metcalfe & William Morrison & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2022, "Measuring the Welfare Effects of Shame and Pride," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 1, pages 122-168, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190433.
• George Georgiadis & Michael Powell, 2022, "A/B Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 1, pages 267-303, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200732.
• Victoria R. Marone & Adrienne Sabety, 2022, "When Should There Be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 1, pages 304-342, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201073.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Counterfactuals with Latent Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 1, pages 343-368, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210496.
• Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2022, "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 2, pages 534-577, February, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210083.
• Mark Shepard, 2022, "Hospital Network Competition and Adverse Selection: Evidence from the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 2, pages 578-615, February, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201453.
• Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2022, "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 2, pages 616-649, February, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201092.
• Reshmaan Hussam & Natalia Rigol & Benjamin N. Roth, 2022, "Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 3, pages 861-898, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200751.
• Erik Madsen, 2022, "Designing Deadlines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 3, pages 963-997, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200212.
• Kai Hao Yang, 2022, "Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and Its Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 4, pages 1364-1393, April, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210616.
• Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2022, "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1522-1554, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201026.
• Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri & Ignacio Monzón, 2022, "Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1591-1620, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201718.
• Gaurab Aryal & Manudeep Bhuller & Fabian Lange, 2022, "Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1669-1702, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200146.
• Yunmi Kong & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2022, "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1703-1736, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200864.
• Jeffrey Mensch, 2022, "Screening Inattentive Buyers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 6, pages 1949-1984, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201098.
• Marcin Pęski, 2022, "Bargaining with Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 6, pages 2044-2082, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210626.
• Paul Voss & Marius Kulms, 2022, "Separating Ownership and Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 9, pages 3039-3062, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211069.
• Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2022, "Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 9, pages 3063-3105, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190486.
• Tommaso Denti & Massimo Marinacci & Aldo Rustichini, 2022, "Experimental Cost of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 9, pages 3106-3123, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210879.
• Adam Leive, 2022, "Health Insurance Design Meets Saving Incentives: Consumer Responses to Complex Contracts," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 200-227, April, DOI: 10.1257/app.20200135.
• Lester Lusher & Geoffrey C. Schnorr & Rebecca L.C. Taylor, 2022, "Unemployment Insurance as a Worker Indiscipline Device? Evidence from Scanner Data," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 285-319, April, DOI: 10.1257/app.20190007.
• Franklin Allen & Gadi Barlevy & Douglas Gale, 2022, "Asset Price Booms and Macroeconomic Policy: A Risk-Shifting Approach," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 243-280, April, DOI: 10.1257/mac.20200041.
• Alexandre N. Kohlhas, 2022, "Learning by Sharing: Monetary Policy and Common Knowledge," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 324-364, July, DOI: 10.1257/mac.20190311.
• Alexander Frankel & Maximilian Kasy, 2022, "Which Findings Should Be Published?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 1-38, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190133.
• Yuk-Fai Fong & Ting Liu & Xiaoxuan Meng, 2022, "Trust Building in Credence Goods Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 490-528, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180313.
• Philipp Denter & John Morgan & Dana Sisak, 2022, "Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 529-580, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190234.
• Francis Bloch & Matthew Olckers, 2022, "Friend-Based Ranking," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 176-214, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190333.
• Yong Chao & Guofu Tan & Adam Chi Leung Wong, 2022, "Optimal Nonlinear Pricing by a Dominant Firm under Competition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 240-280, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190337.
• Tat-How Teh & Julian Wright, 2022, "Intermediation and Steering: Competition in Prices and Commissions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 281-321, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190344.
• Doh-Shin Jeon & Byung-Cheol Kim & Domenico Menicucci, 2022, "Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Two-Sided Monopoly Platform," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 322-369, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190369.
• Jonathan Libgober, 2022, "False Positives and Transparency," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 478-505, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190218.
• Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2022, "Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 506-560, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190379.
• Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, 2022, "Class Actions and Private Antitrust Litigation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 131-163, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200059.
• Eray Cumbul, 2022, "Acquisition, Aggregation, and Sharing of Information in Sequential-Move Aggregative Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 441-479, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190059.
• Dimitri Migrow & Sergei Severinov, 2022, "Investment and Information Acquisition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 480-529, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200115.
• Stefan Terstiege & Cédric Wasser, 2022, "Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 622-664, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200027.
• Jurre H. Thiel, 2022, "Adviser Compensation, Endogenous Entry, and the Advice Gap," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 76-130, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200074.
• Jean-Pierre Benoît & Juan Dubra & Giorgia Romagnoli, 2022, "Belief Elicitation When More than Money Matters: Controlling for "Control"," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 837-888, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200017.
• Stefano DellaVigna & Devin Pope, 2022, "Stability of Experimental Results: Forecasts and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 889-925, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200129.
• David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2022, "Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 1-24, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200284.
• S. Nageeb Ali & David A. Miller, 2022, "Communication and Cooperation in Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 200-217, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200296.
• Bin Liu & Jingfeng Lu, 2022, "Sequential Screening with Type-Enhancing Investment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 25-57, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200171.
• Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2022, "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 296-317, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200399.
• Doron Levit & Anton Tsoy, 2022, "A Theory of One-Size-Fits-All Recommendations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 318-347, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200138.
• Xiaogang Che & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2022, "Deposit Requirements in Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 465-493, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200206.
• Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022, "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 494-514, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200174.
• Bnaya Dreyfuss & Ori Heffetz & Matthew Rabin, 2022, "Expectations-Based Loss Aversion May Help Explain Seemingly Dominated Choices in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 515-555, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200259.
• Battal Doğan & Lars Ehlers, 2022, "Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 556-582, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200148.
• Vincent Anesi & Peter Buisseret, 2022, "Making Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 616-644, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200311.
• Ing-Haw Cheng & Alice Hsiaw, 2022, "Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 761-803, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200218.
• Katherine R. H. Wagner, 2022, "Adaptation and Adverse Selection in Markets for Natural Disaster Insurance," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 380-421, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200378.
• Gilat Levy & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Ronny Razin, 2022, "Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: A Full Manipulation Result," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 4, issue 1, pages 123-138, March, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210007.
• Michael Greenstone & Guojun He & Ruixue Jia & Tong Liu, 2022, "Can Technology Solve the Principal-Agent Problem? Evidence from China's War on Air Pollution," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 4, issue 1, pages 54-70, March, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200373.
• Tal Gross & Timothy J. Layton & Daniel Prinz, 2022, "The Liquidity Sensitivity of Healthcare Consumption: Evidence from Social Security Payments," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 4, issue 2, pages 175-190, June, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200830.
• Heng Liu, 2022, "Robust Predictions in Coasian Bargaining," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 4, issue 2, pages 209-222, June, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210144.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2022, "Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 4, issue 3, pages 371-388, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210504.
• Peicong Hu & Joel Sobel, 2022, "Getting Permission," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 4, issue 4, pages 459-472, December, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210494.
• Amy Finkelstein & Petra Persson & Maria Polyakova & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2022, "A Taste of Their Own Medicine: Guideline Adherence and Access to Expertise," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 4, issue 4, pages 507-526, December, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210591.
• Marta Lachowska & Alexandre Mas & Stephen A. Woodbury, 2022, "Poor Performance as a Predictable Outcome: Financing the Administration of Unemployment Insurance," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 102-106, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221073.
• Marina Halac & Elliot Lipnowski & Daniel Rappoport, 2022, "Addressing Strategic Uncertainty with Incentives and Information," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 431-437, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221087.
• Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2022, "Efficient Full Implementation via Transfers: Uniqueness and Sensitivity in Symmetric Environments," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 438-443, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221088.
• Harold Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2022, "Sovereign Debt Auctions in Turbulent Times," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 526-530, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221001.
• Bulent Guler & Yasin Kürşat Önder & Temel Taskin, 2022, "Hidden Debt," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 536-540, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221003.
• Hanna Halaburda & Guillaume Haeringer & Joshua Gans & Neil Gandal, 2022, "The Microeconomics of Cryptocurrencies," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 60, issue 3, pages 971-1013, September, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20201593.
• Vaccari, Federico, , "Competition in Signaling," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 329582, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.329582.
• Vaccari, Federico, , "Efficient Communication in Organizations," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 329583, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.329583.
• Vaccari, Federico, , "Influential News and Policy-making," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 329584, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.329584.
• Humpesch, Maximlian & Seifert, Stefan & Balman, Alfons & Hüttel, Silke, 2022, "How does Tenancy Affect Farmland Prices? Effects of Lease Status, Lease Term, and Buyer Type," 62nd Annual Conference, Stuttgart, Germany, September 7-9, 2022, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), number 329588, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.329588.