Adverse Selection with the Boot on the Other Foot: Insurer Insolvency as a Problem in Asymmetric Information
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Insurance insolvency; asymmetric information; adverse selection;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2023-04-17 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-DES-2023-04-17 (Economic Design)
- NEP-UPT-2023-04-17 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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