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Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice

Author

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  • Melis Kartal
  • Jean-Robert Tyran

Abstract

This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common-interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We then analyze richer models that allow for partisanship, targeted misinformation intended to sway public opinion, and news signals correlated across voters (due to media ownership concentration or censorship). In our experiment, overconfidence severely undermines information aggregation, suggesting that the effect of overconfidence can be much more pronounced at the collective than at the individual level.

Suggested Citation

  • Melis Kartal & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2022. "Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(10), pages 3367-3397, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:112:y:2022:i:10:p:3367-97
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201844
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ralph-Christopher Bayer & Marco Faravelli & Carlos Pimienta, 2023. "The Wisdom of the Crowd: Uninformed Voting and the Efficiency of Democracy," Discussion Papers 2023-08, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    2. Kishishita, Daiki, 2025. "Inequality, conspiracy theories, and redistribution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    3. Christopher Adamo & Jeffrey Carpenter, 2023. "Sentiment and the belief in fake news during the 2020 presidential primaries," Oxford Open Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2, pages 512-547.
    4. Agneman, Gustav, 2022. "How economic expectations shape preferences for national independence: Evidence from Greenland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    5. Thomas Markussen & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2023. "Is There a Dividend of Democracy? Experimental Evidence from Cooperation Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 10616, CESifo.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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