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Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion

Author

Listed:
  • Ronen Gradwohl
  • Niklas Hahn
  • Martin Hoefer
  • Rann Smorodinsky

Abstract

The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper, we study a setting with multiple senders in which the receiver is restricted to choosing, at the interim stage, one sender with whom to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are uncertain about each other's preferences and, in particular, cannot dismiss with certainty the possibility that others are aligned with the receiver, the receiver receives all the informational surplus in all equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2022. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 296-317, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:296-317
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200399
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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