Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1998

• Jose M. Cordoba & Peter J. Hammond, 1998, "Asymptotically Strategy-Proof Walrasian Exchange," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics, number 98005, Feb.
• Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998, "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9805001, May, revised 26 Jul 1999.
• V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998, "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9809004, Sep.
• Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, 1998, "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9811002, Nov.
• P. K. Monteiro & J. L. Moraga, 1998, "``We sold a million copies''-The role of advertising past sales," Industrial Organization, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9812001, Dec.
• Feltovich, N. & Harbaugh, R. & To, T., 1998, "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Counter signaling," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 518.
• Dezsö Szalay, 1998, "Financial Contracting, R&D and Growth," GK working paper series, Post Graduate Programme "Allocation on Financial Markets", University of Mannheim, number 1999-03, Oct, revised 08 Dec 1999.
• Hellwig, Martin & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998, "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion, Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 98-06, May.
• Hellwig, Martin, 1998, "Risk Aversion and Incentive Compatibility with Ex Post Information Asymmetry," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 98-38, Nov.
• Sander, Birgit, 1998, "Strategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetz," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 901.
• Föllmer, Hans & Wu, Ching-tang & Yor, Marc, 1998, "Canonical decomposition of linear transformations of two independent Brownian motions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,61.
• Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut & Peleg, Bezalel, 1998, "Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,72.
• Neff, Cornelia, 1998, "Innovation under financial restrictions," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics, number 129.
• Bräuer, Wolfgang, 1998, "Electoral Competition under Media Influence," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 98-19.
• Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998, "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 6941.
• Bertrand Villeneuve, 1998, "Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, volume 49, issue 3, pages 821-829.
• James Bergin, 1998, "Common Knowledge With Monotone Statistics," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 974, Sep.
• Robert Townsend & Rolf Mueller, 1998, "Mechanism Design and Village Economies: From Credit, to Tenancy, to Cropping Groups," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 1, issue 1, pages 119-172, January, DOI: 10.1006/redy.1997.0005.
• Stephen D. Williamson, 1998, "Discount Window Lending and Deposit Insurance," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 1, issue 1, pages 246-275, January, DOI: 10.1006/redy.1997.0002.
• Youngjae Lim & Robert Townsend, 1998, "General Equilibrium Models of Financial Systems: Theory and Measurement in Village Economies," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 1, issue 1, pages 59-118, January, DOI: 10.1006/redy.1997.0003.
• Georges Dionne & Sandrine Spaeter, 1998, "Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies," Working Papers, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, number 98-12, Aug.
• Hyun Song Shin, 1998, "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, volume 29, issue 2, pages 378-405, Summer.
• Péter Esõ, 1998, "Farkas Törvény az Árveréselméletben," Rajk László Szakkollégium Working Papers, Rajk László College, number 1, Mar.
• Thomas J. Prusa & Dobrin Kolev, 1998, "Tariff Policy for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 199705, Jun.
• Kwang Soo Cheong, 1998, "Corporate Income Taxation and Signaling," Public Finance Review, , volume 26, issue 5, pages 480-502, September, DOI: 10.1177/109114219802600504.
• Victor V. Claar, 1998, "An Incentive-Compatibility Approach To the Problem of Monitoring a Bureau," Public Finance Review, , volume 26, issue 6, pages 599-610, November, DOI: 10.1177/109114219802600605.
• Yaw Nyarko, 1998, "Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 3, pages 643-655.
• James A. Dearden, 1998, "Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 189-198.
• Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998, "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 2, pages 227-258.
• Steven R. Williams & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 1998, "The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 2, pages 393-421.
• Hillel Rapoport & Frederic Docquier, 1998, "Are migrant minorities strategically self-selected?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, volume 11, issue 4, pages 579-588.
• Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & Shyam Sunder, 1998, "Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 3, issue 1, pages 7-34, March, DOI: 10.1023/A:1009631714430.
• John Duggan, 1998, "An extensive form solution to the adverse selection problem in principal/multi-agent environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 2, pages 167-191.
• C. Choe, 1998, "A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 3, pages 237-255.
• Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 1998, "On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 4, pages 303-328.
• Rustichini, A., 1998, "Minimizing Regret : The General Case," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-41.
• Prat, A., 1998, "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-123.
• Palomino, F.A. & Prat, A., 1998, "Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-108.
• Rigotti, L., 1998, "Imprecise Beliefs in a Principal Agent Model," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-128.
• Suijs, J.P.M. & De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Borm, P.E.M., 1998, "Optimal Design of Pension Funds : A Mission Impossible," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-25.
• Prat, A., 1998, "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 30b6424e-efe1-48c7-9709-7.
• Palomino, F.A. & Prat, A., 1998, "Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 3da5cec4-4ab5-495a-8786-3.
• Suijs, J.P.M. & De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Borm, P.E.M., 1998, "Optimal Design of Pension Funds : A Mission Impossible," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number ccc7c4fa-fdf8-4276-8d5c-6.
• Hege, U. & Feess, E., 1998, "Efficient liability rules for multi-party accidents with moral hazard," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number e216300c-126c-4e48-ad1f-2.
• Matthew Shum, 1998, "The Econometrics Of English Auctions," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mshum-98-02, Sep.
• Frédéric Docquier & Hillel Rapoport, 1998, "Are migrant minorities strategically self-selected?," ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2013/230712.
• Claude Crampes & Corinne Langinier, 1998, "Information Disclosure in the REnewal of Patent," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 49-50, pages 265-288.
• Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998, "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 3, pages 587-597, June.
• Karp, Larry S., 1998, "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," CUDARE Working Papers, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, number 25100, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25100.
• Feltovich, Nick & Harbaugh, Rick & To, Ted, , "Too Cool For School? A Theory Of Countersignaling," Economic Research Papers, University of Warwick - Department of Economics, number 268800, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268800.
• Jelovac, I. & Macho-Stadler, I., 1998, "Comparing Organizational Structures in Health Services," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 412.98.
• Davila, J., 1998, "Overlapping Generations Economies and Symmetrical Economies under Extrinsic Uncertainty," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 416.98.
• Alejandro Esteller More, 1998, "A model of regional equalisation transfers under asymmetric information with reference to the spanish regional financing system," Working Papers in Economics, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia, number 26.
• Pietro Reichlin & Paolo Siconolfi, 1998, "Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 326, Feb.
• Gigler, F & Hemmer, T, 1998, "On the frequency, quality, and informational role of mandatory financial reports," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 36, issue , pages 117-147, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24913.
• Dye, RA, 1998, "Discussion of on the frequency, quality, and informational role of mandatory financial reports," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 36, issue , pages 149-160, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24913.
• Max Blouin & Roberto Serrano, 1998, "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 98-5, revised 10 Aug 1998.
• Karp, Larry, 1998, "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, number qt4z62b52k, Mar.
• Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 346, Jan.
• Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande, 1998, "Read My Lips: The Political Economy of Information Transmission," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 355, Jul.
• Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998, "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 356, Jul.
• Gian Luca Clementi & Hugo Hopenhayn, , "A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2002-E9.
• d’ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1998, "Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998010, Jan.
• CALCAGNO, Riccardo & LOVO, Stefano M., 1998, "Bid-ask price competition with asymmetric information between market makers," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998016, Feb.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998017, Feb.

1997

• Chen, Yongmin & Wang, Ruqu, 1997, "Learning buyers' valuation distribution in posted-price selling," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273387, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273387.
• Rocher, F. & Vila, X., 1997, "A Note on Agent Based Imperfect Competition," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 398.97.
• Olivella, P. & Pastor, M., 1997, "Cost Reducing Strategies," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 402.97.
• Tore Nilssen, 1997, "On the Consistency of Merger Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 45, issue 1, pages 89-100, March, DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00036.
• Kirschenheiter, M, 1997, "Information quality and correlated signals," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 35, issue 1, pages 43-59, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24914.
• Amir, E & Ziv, A, 1997, "Recognition, disclosure, or delay: Timing the adoption of SFAS no 106," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 35, issue 1, pages 61-81, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24914.
• Coller, M & Yohn, TL, 1997, "Management forecasts and information asymmetry: An examination of bid-ask spreads," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 35, issue 2, pages 181-191, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24913.
• Chong-en Bai & Yijang Wang, 1997, "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why is Good Money Thrown after Bad?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics, number 347., Jan.
• Marcel Boyer, 1997, "L'économie des organisations : Mythes et réalités," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 97s-02, Jan.
• Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997, "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 97s-29, Jun.
• PODDAR, Sougata, 1997, "Capacity and entry deterrence under asymmetric information on demand," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997009, Jan.
• GHATAK, Maithreesh & MORELLI, Massimo & SJÖSTRÖM, Tomas, 1997, "Moral hazard and overlapping generations with endogenous occupational choice," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997028, Apr.
• ALBANO, Gian Luigi & LIZZERI, Alessandro, 1997, "A monopolistic market for certification," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997037, May.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997, "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997077, Oct.
• Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, 1997, "Taxes and employment subsidies in an optimal redistribution program," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange), CEPREMAP, number 9709.
• Suarez, Javier & Sussman, Oren, 1997, "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1604, Mar.
• Fingleton, John & Waldron, Patrick, 1997, "Optimal Determination of Bookmakers' Betting Odds: Theory and Tests," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1623, Apr.
• Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni, 1997, "Excess Capacity as an Incentive Device," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1625, May.
• Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1997, "Setting Standards: Information Accumulation in Development," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1641, May.
• Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 1997, "Bank Solvency, Market Structure, and Monitoring Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1665, Jun.
• Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 73, issue 1, pages 118-156, March.
• Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, pages 388-406, August.
• Suarez, Javier & Sussman, Oren, 1997, "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 76, issue 1, pages 47-71, September.
• Bhattacharya, Utpal & Weller, Paul, 1997, "The advantage to hiding one's hand: Speculation and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 39, issue 2, pages 251-277, July.
• Ng, Francis & Yeats, Alexander, 1997, "Open economies work better! did Africa's protectionist policies cause its marginalization in world trade?," World Development, Elsevier, volume 25, issue 6, pages 889-904, June.
• Nier, Erlend, 1997, "Optimal managerial remuneration and firm-level diversification," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119172, Jul.
• Marín, José & Rahi, Rohit, 1997, "Speculative securities," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119175, Apr.
• L. Caron & G. Dionne, 1997, "Insurance fraud estimation : more evidence from the Quebec automobile insurance industry," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 97-21.
• S. Marette, 1997, "Intermédiation et affichage des prix dans un contexte d'anti-sélection," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 97-32.
• Bala, V. & Goyal, S., 1997, "Self-Organization in Communication Networks," Econometric Institute Research Papers, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute, number EI 9713-/A, Jan.
• Dow, J & Rahi, R, 1997, "Informed Trading, Investment, and Welfare," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco97/03.
• Labory, S, 1997, "Signalling Aspects of Managers' Incentives," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco97/04.
• Gonzalez de Lara, Y, 1997, "Changes in Information and Optimal Debt Contracts. The Sea Loan," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco97/06.
• Dow, J. & Rahi, R., 1997, "Should Speculators be Taxed?," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco97/21.
• Coco, Guiseppe, 1997, "Collateral, Heterogeneity in Risk Attitude and the Credit Market Equilibrium," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9702.
• Coco, G., 1997, "Credit Rationing and the Welfare Gain from Usury Laws," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9715.
• Takatoshi Ito & Richard K. Lyons & Michael Melvin, 1997, "Is there private information in the FX market? the Tokyo experiment," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, number 97-04.
• Gregory R. Duffee & Chunsheng Zhou, 1997, "Credit derivatives in banking: useful tools for managing risk?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 1997-13.
• Rohit Rahi & José Marín, 1997, "Speculative Securities," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp268, Jul.
• d'Aspremont, C & Cremer, J & Gerard-Varet, L-A, 1997, "Unique Implementation in Auctions and in Public Goods Problems," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a15.
• Henriet, D., 1997, "The Value of Information in Health Insurance: A Theoretical Approach," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a38.
• Vagstad, S., 1997, "Centralized vs. Decentralized Procurement: Does Dispersed Information Call for Decentralized Decision-Making," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 1497.
• Deborah Minehart & Zvika Neeman, 1997, "Termination and Coordination in Partnerships," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0083, Mar.
• Minehart, D. & Neeman, Z., 1997, "Termination and Coordination in Partnerships," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 83.
• Aguirre Perez, I, 1997, "Uniform Pricing : Good or Bad News About Market Profitability?," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 149.
• de Garidel, T., 1997, "Welfare-Improving Asymmetric Information in a Dynamic Insurance Market," Papers, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie, number 32.
• Ito, T. & Lyons, R. & Melvin, M.T., 1997, "Is There Private Information on the FX Market? The Tokyo Experiment," Papers, Economisch Institut voor het Midden en Kleinbedrijf-, number 97-04.
• Pezanis-Christou, P, 1997, "On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 97/05.
• Osmundsen, P, 1997, "Regulation of Industry-Specific Externalities under Private Information," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 1/97.
• Renault, J., 1997, "On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Signals," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97.72.
• Renault, J., 1997, "Strategic Transmission of Information: A Chracterization," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97.79.
• Kenneth A. Kavajecz, , "A Specialist's Quoted Depth and the Limit Order Book," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, number 04-97.
• Armando Gomes, , "Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs and Dynamic Trading," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, number 09-97.
• Marette, S., 1997, "Intermediation et affichage des prix dans un contexte d'anti-selection," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9732.
• Augier, L. & Mokrane, M., 1997, "Strategic Uniformed Traders," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9739.
• Seidmann, A. & Sundarajan, A., 1997, "Sharing Logistics Information Across Organizations: Technology, Competition and Contracting," Papers, Rochester, Business - Operations Management, number 97-01.
• Lebraty, J-F, 1997, "Reseaux de neurones et structure informationelle de l'organisation," Papers, Recherche, organisation, la dynamique, information, gestion, Nice-, number 97/03.
• Heifetz, A & Minelli, E, 1997, "Informational Smallness in Rational Expectations Equilibria," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 10-97.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Lundholm, M., 1997, "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1997-28.
• Eicher, T-S & Kalaitzidakis, P, 1997, "The Human Capital Dimension to Foreign Direct Investment : Training, Adverse Selection and Firm Location," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington, number 97-03.
• Khalil, F & Parigi, B-M, 1997, "The Loan Size as a Commitment Device," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington, number 97-08.
• Khalil, F & Rochet, J-C, 1997, "Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington, number 97-15.
• Khalil, F & Rochet, J-C, 1997, "Contracts and Productive Information Gathering," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington, number 97-16.
• Kwang Soo Cheong, 1997, "Corporate Income Taxation and Signaling," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 199713.
• Kang, Yeongjae, 1997, "Expropriation Risk, Governance Control and Equilibrium Financial Contract," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 166, Apr.
• Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1997, "Agency costs in the process of development," Seminar Papers, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies, number 607, Oct.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 1997, "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1997:28, Nov.
• Wang, Cheng, 1997, "Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 5170, Sep.
• Hans-Theo Normann, 1997, "Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 66, issue 2, pages 177-187, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF01234405.
• Peter Lyk-Jensen, 1997, "How to Cheat the Auctioneer: Collusion in Auctions when Signals are Affiliated," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-05, Feb.
• Dan Sasaki, 1997, "Newtonian Auctioneering," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-09, May.
• Sougata Poddar, 1997, "Capacity and Entry Deterrence under Asymmetric Information on Demand," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-12, Aug.
• Christian Schultz, 1997, "Limit Pricing when Incumbents have Conflicting Interests," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-17, Jun.
• José Luis Moraga-González, 1997, "Quality Uncertainty and Informative Advertising," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-19, Dec.
• Dan Sasaki, 1997, "Strategic Quality Decisions by Heterogeneously Informed Suppliers," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-20, Dec.
• Dan Sasaki, 1997, "Strategic Information Acquisition," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 97-07, Jun.
• Tone Dieckmann, 1997, "The Evolution of conventions with Mobile Players," Economics Department Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth, number n720897, Aug.
• Paul E. Fischer & John S. Hughes, 1997, "Mutual Monitoring and Best Agency Contracts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 153, issue 2, pages 334-334, June.
• Athey, S., 1997, "Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 97-11.
• Ellison, S.F. & Mullin, W.S., 1997, "Gradual Incorporation of Information into Stock Prices: Empirical Strategies," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 97-13b.
• Acemoglu, D. & Zilibotti, F., 1997, "Setting Standards: Information Accumulation in Development," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 97-6.
• Sherstyuk, K, 1997, "Using Reputation Costs in Non-Repeated Incentive Contracts," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 563.
• HEGE, Ulrich & VIALA, Pascale, 1997, "Contentious Contracts," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 9711.
• Robert Gibbons, 1997, "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory," NBER Technical Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 0199, Jul.
• Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 1997, "Tariff Policy for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 6090, Jul.
• Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 1997, "Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 6194, Sep.
• Darin Lee & Oscar Volij, 1997, "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij, number 005, Nov.
• Lewis, Tracy R & Poitevin, Michel, 1997, "Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 13, issue 1, pages 50-73, April.
• Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 1997, "Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 10, issue 1, pages 205-236.
• Bacha, Obiyathulla I., 1997, "Adapting Mudarabah Financing to Contemporary Realities: A Proposed Financing Structure," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 12732, Jun, revised Nov 1996.
• Claar, Victor V, 1997, "An Incentive-Compatibility Approach to the Problem of Monitoring a Bureau," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 14240.
• Koray, Semih & Saglam, Ismail, 1997, "Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 4459.
• Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1997, "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1687, Aug.
• Shin, Hyun Song, 1997, "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1722, Oct.
• Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 1997, "Can Competition in the Credit Market be Excessive?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1725, Oct.
• Medrano, Luis Angel & Vives, Xavier, 1997, "Strategic Behaviour and Price Discovery," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1768, Dec.
• Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1997, "Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, number 47, Mar.
• Meglena Jeleva & Bertrand Villeneuve, 1997, "Insurance Contracts with Imprecise Probabilities and Adverse Selection," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 97-16.
• Moraga González, José Luis, 1997, "Quality uncetainty and informative advertising," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 6040, Jun.
• Hauk, Esther & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1997, "Secret information acquisition in cournot markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 6062, Sep.
• Heider, Florian, 1997, "Signalling with debt and equity: a unifying approach and its implications for the Pecking-Order hypothesis and competitive credit rationing," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 2000024, Apr, revised 00 Jun 2000.
• Bisin, Alberto & Gottardi, Piero, 1997, "General Competitive Analysis with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 97-38.
• Bisin, A. & Gottardi, P., 1997, "General Competitive Analysis with Asymmetric Information," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure), number 97-26.
• Mirrlees, James A, 1997, "Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 107, issue 444, pages 1311-1329, September.
• Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Feyzioglu, Tarhan N., 1997, "Is demand for polluting goods manageable? An econometric study of car ownership and use in Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 53, issue 2, pages 423-445, August.
• Mody, Ashoka & Yilmaz, Kamil, 1997, "Is there persistence in the growth of manufactured exports? Evidence from newly industrializing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 53, issue 2, pages 447-470, August.
• Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1997, "Developing countries and environmental protection: the effects of budget balance and pollution ceiling constraints," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 54, issue 2, pages 285-305, December.
• Harrison, Glenn W. & Rutherford, Thomas F. & Tarr, David G., 1997, "Economic implications for Turkey of a Customs Union with the European Union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 3-5, pages 861-870, April.
• Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard & Gabel, H. Landis, 1997, "Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 33, issue 3, pages 331-346, July.
• Louis Bujold & Georges Dionne & Robert Gagné, 1997, "Assurance valeur à neuf et vols d’automobiles: une étude statistique," Working Papers, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, number 97-1, Feb.
• James A. Mirrlees, 1997, "Autobiography," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 1996-4.
• William S. Vickrey, 1997, "Biography," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 1996-5.
• Ananish Chaudhuri, 1997, "The Ratchet Principle in a Principal Agent Game with Unknown Costs: An Experimental Analysis," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 199608, Jul.
• Thomas J. Prusa & Dobrin Kolev, 1997, "Discriminatory Tariffs for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 199623, Jun.
• Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 1997, "Determinants of Land Tenure Contracts; Theory and Evidence from Rural India," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 199710, Jul.
• Ananish Chaudhuri, 1997, "A Dynamic Model of Contractual Choice in Tenancy," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 199711, Jul.
• Van Kolpin & Larry Singell Jr., 1997, "Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 1, pages 175-184.
• Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik, 1997, "Competition between asymmetrically informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 227-240.
• Alberto Trejos, 1997, "Incentives to produce quality and the liquidity of money (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 2, pages 355-365.