Signalling Aspects of Managers' Incentives
This paper analyses a signalling model of managers' promotion from divisions to the CEO position, in both cases of a monopoly and a duopoly. Explicit and implicit incentives in the presence of asymmetric information are shown to induce managers to increase effort in order to signal high ability to owners, therby raising their probability of promotion.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
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