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Discount Window Lending and Deposit Insurance

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  • Stephen D. Williamson

    (University of Iowa)

Abstract

A banking model is constructed where roles for government-provided deposit insurance and discount window lending arise when there are restrictions on branch banking. Banks arise endogenously as an efficient arrangement for sharing risk. Discount window lending permits better risk-sharing by making bank assets more liquid, but is limited because of a moral hazard problem which arises from adverse selection in the loan market. Deposit insurance also creates the potential for better risk-sharing, but accomplishes this through contingent transfers rather than enhancing liquidity. Banks tend to take on more risk with deposit insurance and to take less care in screening loans, but this is consistent with an increase in welfare for depositors and borrowers. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Discount Window Lending and Deposit Insurance," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 246-275, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:1:y:1998:i:1:p:246-275
    DOI: 10.1006/redy.1997.0002
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    Cited by:

    1. Huberto M. Ennis, 2016. "Models of Discount Window Lending: A Review," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 1Q, pages 1-50.
    2. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June.
    3. Antinolfi, Gaetano & Huybens, Elisabeth & Keister, Todd, 2001. "Monetary Stability and Liquidity Crises: The Role of the Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 187-219, July.
    4. Sophio Khundadze, 2010. "Expected Effect of Deposit Insurance System Over the State of the Banking Environment of Georgia," IBSU Scientific Journal, International Black Sea University, vol. 4(2), pages 53-72.
    5. Antoine Martin, 2009. "Reconciling Bagehot and the Fed's Response to September 11," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2-3), pages 397-415, March.
    6. Schreft, Stacey L. & Smith, Bruce D., 2000. "The evolution of cash transactions: Some implications for monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 97-120, August.
    7. Hajime Tomura, 2019. "On Separation between Payment and Saving Instruments," Working Papers 1813, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    8. Antoine Martin, 2002. "Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to Sept. 11," Research Working Paper RWP 02-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    9. Antinolfi, Gaetano & Keister, Todd, 2006. "Discount Window Policy, Banking Crises, And Indeterminacy Of Equilibrium," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, February.
    10. Antoine Martin, 2006. "Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(1), pages 197-211, May.
    11. Enrique L. Kawamura, 2004. "Exchange Rate Regimes, Monetary Policy and Banking Performance in Economies with Cash Constraints. Chang and Velasco Revisited," Working Papers 66, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jan 2004.
    12. Chang, Roberto & Velasco, Andres, 2000. "Financial Fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 1-34, May.
    13. Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2012. "Bagehot for beginners: the making of lender‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 65(2), pages 580-608, May.
    14. Makoto WATANABE & Tarishi Matsuoka, 2023. "A Monetary Equilibrium with the Lender of Last Resort," CIGS Working Paper Series 23-010E, The Canon Institute for Global Studies.
    15. Enrique L. Kawamura, 2003. "Diamond-Dybvig Banks in Two-Good, Two-Currencies, Small Open Economies with Cash-in-Advance Constraints," Working Papers 57, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jan 2004.
    16. Smith, Bruce D. & Wang, Cheng, 1998. "Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: With an application to deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 207-240, July.
    17. Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2009. "Bagehot for beginners: The making of lending of last resort operations in the mid-19th century," Working Paper 2009/22, Norges Bank.
    18. Antoine Martin, 2005. "Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to September 11," Staff Reports 217, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    19. Kawamura, Enrique, 2007. "Exchange rate regimes, banking and the non-tradable sector," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 325-345, March.
    20. Todd Keister, 2009. "Central Bank Lending and Inflation," 2009 Meeting Papers 782, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    21. Loewy Michael B., 2003. "``To Furnish an Elastic Currency'': Banking, Aggregate Risk, and Welfare," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-19, March.
    22. Gaetano Antinolfi & Todd Keister, 2000. "Liquidity Crises and Discount Window Lending: Theory and Implications for the Dollarization Debate," Working Papers 0002, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    23. Hajime Tomura, 2019. "Imperfect Contract Enforcement and Nominal Liabilities," Working Papers 1905, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    24. Nancy Silva, 2008. "Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and the Risk of Runs," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 474, Central Bank of Chile.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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