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Discount Window Policy, Banking Crises, And Indeterminacy Of Equilibrium

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  • ANTINOLFI, GAETANO
  • KEISTER, TODD

Abstract

We study how discount window policy affects the frequency of banking crises, the level of investment, and the scope for indeterminacy of equilibrium. Previous work has shown that providing costless liquidity through a discount window has mixed effects in terms of these criteria: It prevents episodes of high liquidity demand from causing crises but can lead to indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium and to inefficiently low levels of investment. We show how offering discount window loans at an above-market interest rate can be unambiguously beneficial. Such a policy generates a unique stationary equilibrium. Banking crises occur with positive probability in this equilibrium and the level of investment is suboptimal, but a proper combination of discount window and monetary policies can make the welfare effects of these inefficiencies arbitrarily small. The near-optimal policies can be viewed as approximately implementing the Friedman rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Antinolfi, Gaetano & Keister, Todd, 2006. "Discount Window Policy, Banking Crises, And Indeterminacy Of Equilibrium," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:10:y:2006:i:01:p:1-19_05
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    Cited by:

    1. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2008. "Usefulness Of The Constrained Planning Problem In A Model Of Money," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 503-525, September.
    2. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2008. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 1273-1311, April.
    3. repec:tsa:wpaper:00115eco is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Tarishi Matsuoka & Makoto Watanabe, 2019. "Banking Panics and the Lender of Last Resort in a Monetary Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series 7451, CESifo.
    5. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Haslag, Joseph H. & Martin, Antoine, 2009. "Why does overnight liquidity cost more than intraday liquidity?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1236-1246, June.
    6. Huberto M. Ennis, 2016. "Models of Discount Window Lending: A Review," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 1Q, pages 1-50.
    7. Matsuoka, Tarishi, 2012. "Imperfect interbank markets and the lender of last resort," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 1673-1687.
    8. Matsuoka, Tarishi, 2022. "Asset prices and standing facilities in a monetary economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    9. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2010. "Optimal monetary rules under persistent shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(7), pages 1277-1294, July.
    10. Ghossoub, Edgar & Reed III, Robert R., 2010. "Liquidity risk, economic development, and the effects of monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 252-268, February.
    11. Tarishi Matsuoka & Makoto Watanabe, 2023. "A Monetary Equilibrium with the Lender of Last Resort," CESifo Working Paper Series 10439, CESifo.
    12. Joseph H. Haslag & Antoine Martin, 2007. "Optimality of the Friedman Rule in an Overlapping Generations Model with Spatial Separation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(7), pages 1741-1758, October.
    13. Todd Keister, 2009. "Central Bank Lending and Inflation," 2009 Meeting Papers 782, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Matsuoka, Tarishi & Watanabe, Makoto, 2019. "Banking crises and liquidity in a monetary economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    15. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2005. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Instruments in an Economy with Real and Liquidity Shocks," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12355, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    16. Eisei Ohtaki, 2023. "Climate change, financial intermediation, and monetary policy," Working Papers e179, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    17. Tarishi Matsuoka & Makoto Watanabe, 2017. "Banking Panics and Liquidity in a Monetary Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series 6722, CESifo.
    18. Hajime Tomura, 2019. "On Separation between Payment and Saving Instruments," Working Papers 1813, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    19. Tarishi Matsuoka, 2011. "Temporary Bubbles and Discount Window Policy," KIER Working Papers 802, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    20. Hajime Tomura, 2019. "Imperfect Contract Enforcement and Nominal Liabilities," Working Papers 1905, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    21. Hajime Tomura, 2021. "Nominal contracts and the payment system," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 185-216, April.
    22. Tetsuo Ono, 2020. "Fiscal rules in a monetary economy: Implications for growth and welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(1), pages 190-219, February.
    23. Joseph H. Haslag & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Antoine Martin, 2007. "Money, output and the payment system: Optimal monetary policy in a model with hidden effort," Working Papers 0704, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    24. Machicado, Carlos Gustavo, 2008. "Liquidity shocks and the dollarization of a banking system," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 369-381, March.

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