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Bagehot for beginners: The Making of Lending of Last Resort Operations in the Mid-19th Century

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  • Vincent Bignon

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Marc Flandreau
  • Stefano Ugolini

Abstract

According to a Keynesian view, short term output fluctuations are normally demand side led. Since prices reflect demand, they should mirror output fluctuations. Thus, prices and output are expected to move in the same direction in the short run. The present paper investigates the historical co-movements of output and prices for a small open raw material based economy, in this case Norway 1830-2006. We find little evidence of a positive relationship. On the contrary, we rather find negative correlations between the two variables, indicating that supply side shocks through the foreign sector were more important for historical business cycles in Norway than assumed hitherto.
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  • Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2012. "Bagehot for beginners: The Making of Lending of Last Resort Operations in the Mid-19th Century," Post-Print hal-01410545, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01410545
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael D. Bordo & David C. Wheelock, 2010. "The promise and performance of the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort 1914-1933," Working Papers 2010-036, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    2. Stefano Ugolini, 2021. "The coevolution of banks and corporate securities markets: The financing of Belgium’s industrial take-off in the 1830s," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(6), pages 892-913, August.
    3. Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2014. "The Crisis of 1866," Post-Print hal-01293925, HAL.
    4. Gary B. Gorton & Guillermo L. Ordoñez, 2014. "How Central Banks End Crises," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-025, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    5. Dimitrios Bisias & Mark Flood & Andrew W. Lo & Stavros Valavanis, 2012. "A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 255-296, October.
    6. Calomiris, Charles W. & Flandreau, Marc & Laeven, Luc, 2016. "Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 48-65.
    7. Jobst, Clemens & Bignon, Vincent, 2017. "Economic Crises and the Eligibility for the Lender of Last Resort: Evidence from Nineteenth Century France," CEPR Discussion Papers 11737, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Jobst, Clemens & Ugolini, Stefano, 2014. "The coevolution of money markets and monetary policy, 1815-2008," Working Paper Series 1756, European Central Bank.
    9. Stefano Ugolini, 2018. "The Historical Evolution of Central Banking," Post-Print hal-01887004, HAL.
    10. Olivier Accominotti & Delio Lucena‐Piquero & Stefano Ugolini, 2021. "The origination and distribution of money market instruments: sterling bills of exchange during the first globalization," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 74(4), pages 892-921, November.
    11. Stefano Ugolini, 2012. "The origins of foreign exchange policy: the National Bank of Belgium and the quest for monetary independence in the 1850s," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 16(1), pages 51-73, February.
    12. Grund, Sebastian & Nomm, Nele & Walch, Florian, 2020. "Liquidity in resolution: comparing frameworks for liquidity provision across jurisdictions," Occasional Paper Series 251, European Central Bank.
    13. Stefano Ugolini, 2010. "Universal Banking and the Development of Secondary Corporate Debt Markets: Lessons from 1830s Belgium," Working Paper 2010/21, Norges Bank.
    14. Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2016. "Fighting Crises," NBER Working Papers 22787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Flores Zendejas, Juan & Gaillard, Norbert, 2021. "The International Lender of Last Resort Between Scylla and Charybdis," Working Papers unige:152743, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.
    16. Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Central Banking and Macroeconomic Ideas: Economics, Politics and History," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1858, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    17. Carolyn Sissoko, 2022. "Becoming a central bank: The development of the Bank of England's private sector lending policies during the Restriction," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 75(2), pages 601-632, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • N13 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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