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Can Competition in the Credit Market be Excessive?

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  • Caminal, Ramon
  • Matutes, Carmen

Abstract

We study the welfare implications of market power in a model where banks choose between credit rationing and monitoring in order to alleviate an underlying moral-hazard problem. We show that the effect of banks’ market power on social welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. On the one hand, higher market power increases lending rates, worsens the borrower’s incentive problem and investment is further reduced below the efficient level. On the other hand, higher market power induces banks to exert higher monitoring effort and reduces the frequency of credit rationing. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is socially optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

Suggested Citation

  • Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 1997. "Can Competition in the Credit Market be Excessive?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1725
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. Miguel Villas-Boas & Udo Schmidt-Mohr, 1999. "Oligopoly with Asymmetric Information: Differentiation in Credit Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 375-396, Autumn.
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    10. Bacchetta, Philippe & Caminal, Ramon, 2000. "Do capital market imperfections exacerbate output fluctuations?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 449-468, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Corvoisier, Sandrine & Gropp, Reint, 2002. "Bank concentration and retail interest rates," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(11), pages 2155-2189, November.
    2. Elsas, Ralf, 2005. "Empirical determinants of relationship lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 32-57, January.
    3. Claudia M. Buch, 2000. "Capital Market Integration in Euroland: The Role of Banks," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(4), pages 443-464, November.
    4. Luz Adriana Flórez & Carlos Esteban Posda & José Fernando Escobar, 2004. "El crédito y sus factores determinantes: el caso colombiano (1990 -2004)," Borradores de Economia 311, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    5. Utrero-Gonzalez, Natalia, 2007. "Banking regulation, institutional framework and capital structure: International evidence from industry data," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 481-506, September.
    6. Mitchell Berlin & Alexander W. Butler, 2002. "Collateral and competition," Working Papers 02-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    7. Koskela, Erkki & Stenbacka, Rune, 2000. "Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial fragility?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(12), pages 1853-1873, December.
    8. Kabir, Md. Nurul & Worthington, Andrew C., 2017. "The ‘competition–stability/fragility’ nexus: A comparative analysis of Islamic and conventional banks," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 111-128.
    9. Felix J. Lopez Iturriaga, 2005. "Debt ownership structure and legal system: an international analysis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(3), pages 355-365.
    10. Chen, Xiaofen, 2007. "Banking deregulation and credit risk: Evidence from the EU," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 356-390, March.
    11. Luz Adriana Flórez & Carlos Esteban Posada & José Fernando Escobar, 2005. "Crédito y depósitos bancarios en Colombia (1990-2004): una relación de largo plazo," Ensayos sobre Política Económica, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, vol. 23(48), pages 12-63, Junio.
    12. Mannonen, Pekka, 2001. "Advancing information technology and financial intermediation," Discussion Papers 770, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    13. Ramon Caminal, 2002. "Taxation of banks: A theoretical framework," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 525.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    14. Bonini, Stefano & Dell'Acqua, Alberto & Fungo, Matteo & Kysucky, Vlado, 2016. "Credit market concentration, relationship lending and the cost of debt," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 172-179.
    15. Mannonen, Pekka, 2002. "The Strategic Response of Banks to an Exogenous Positive Information Shock in the Credit Markets," Discussion Papers 830, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    16. Vesa Kanniainen & Rune Stenbacka, 1997. "Project Monitoring and Banking Competition under Adverse Selection," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-23, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Oct 1998.
    17. Fiona, Tregenna, 2006. "An empirical investigation of the effects of concentration on profitability among US banks," MPRA Paper 13731, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2009.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit Rationing; market power; Monitoring; Moral Hazard;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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