Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2021

• Sémirat, S. & Forges, F., 2021, "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case," Working Papers, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), number 2021-03.
• Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2021, "The Comparative Statics of Sorting," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~21-21-06, Mar.
• Daniel Houser & Jian Song, 2021, "Costly Waiting in Dynamic Contests: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, number 1082, Aug.
• Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2021, "An Experiment on the Nash Program: Comparing two Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value," GREDEG Working Papers, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, number 2021-07, Feb.
• Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2022, "Jury Theorems," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number halshs-03443155.
• Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Gwenaël Piaser, 2021, "Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03106896, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006.
• Kenza Benhima & Céline Poilly, 2021, "Does demand noise matter? Identification and implications," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03173423, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.01.006.
• Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolas Quérou, 2021, "Goal-oriented agents in a market," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03214933, Jun, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Thomas Trégouët, 2021, "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03328387, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102791.
• Mohamed Saleh & Jean Tirole, 2021, "Taxing identity: theory and evidence from early Islam," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03352999, Jul, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17265.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2021, "Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03353054, Mar, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190189.
• Stephanie Assad & Emilio Calvano & Giacomo Calzolari & Robert Clark & Vincenzo Denicolo & Daniel Ershov & Justin Pappas Johnson & Sergio Pastorello & Andrew Rhodes & Lei Xu & Matthijs Wildenbeest, 2021, "Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Economic research and policy implications," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03360129, Sep, DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/grab011.
• Romain Baeriswyl & Kene Boun My & Camille Cornand, 2021, "Double overreaction in beauty-contests with information acquisition: theory and experiment," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03468857, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.12.004.
• Daniel F. Garrett & Renato Gomes & Lucas Maestri, 2021, "Oligopoly under incomplete information: on the welfare effects of price discrimination," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03515749, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102735.
• Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021, "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03544026, Jan, DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa092.
• Bruno Biais & Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, 2021, "Variation margins, fire-sales and information-constrained optimality," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03546710, Nov, DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa083.
• Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2021, "Under/Over‐Investment and Early Renegotiation in Public‐Private Partnerships," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03563239, Dec, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12280.
• Takakazu Honryo & Péter Vida, 2021, "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03637788, May, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.006.
• Marvin Deversi & Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2021, "Spin doctors: An experiment on vague disclosure," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03639362, Oct, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103872.
• Damien Besancenot & Karine Lamiraud & Radu Vranceanu, 2021, "Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03834837, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2021-0011.
• Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2021, "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04120443, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001.
• Pierre Mérel & Ariel Ortiz-Bobea & Emmanuel Paroissien, 2021, "How big is the “lemons” problem? Historical evidence from French wines," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04148936, Sep, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103824.
• Emna Trabelsi & Walid Hichri, 2021, "Central Bank Transparency with (semi-)public Information: Laboratory Experiments," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03042860, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101645.
• Philippe Jehiel, 2021, "Communication with forgetful liars," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03229984, DOI: 10.3982/te4154.
• Francis Bloch & Matthew Olckers, 2021, "Friend-Based Ranking in Practice," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03230056, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20211060.
• Marco Angrisani & Antonio Guarino & Philippe Jehiel & Toru Kitagawa, 2021, "Information Redundancy Neglect versus Overconfidence: A Social Learning Experiment," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03325779, Aug, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180394.
• Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2022, "Jury Theorems," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03443155.
• Victor Stephane, 2021, "Hiding behind the veil of ashes: Social capital in the wake of natural disasters," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03462364, Sep, DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105518.
• Bruno Jullien & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2021, "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03476144, Mar, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100880.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Thomas Trégouët, 2021, "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number hal-03328387, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102791.
• Philippe Jehiel, 2021, "Communication with forgetful liars," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03229984, DOI: 10.3982/te4154.
• Francis Bloch & Matthew Olckers, 2021, "Friend-Based Ranking in Practice," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03230056, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20211060.
• Marco Angrisani & Antonio Guarino & Philippe Jehiel & Toru Kitagawa, 2021, "Information Redundancy Neglect versus Overconfidence: A Social Learning Experiment," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03325779, Aug, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180394.
• Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022, "Informed Information Design," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03107866, Nov.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2021, "Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03151009, Feb.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2021, "Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main), HAL, number halshs-03151009, Feb.
• Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024, "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03099678, Mar, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822.
• Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2021, "Keeping the agents in the dark : private disclosures in competing mechanisms," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03266804.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2021, "Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03485384, Dec, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190189.
• Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2021, "Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04159724.
• Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022, "Informed Information Design," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03107866, Nov.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2021, "Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03151009, Feb.
• Zsolt Bihary & Péter Csóka & Péter Kerényi & Alexander Szimayer, 2021, "Self-respecting worker in the gig economy: A dynamic principal-agent model," KRTK-KTI WORKING PAPERS, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, number 2129, Jun.
• Tangerås, Thomas & Gick, Wolfgang, 2021, "Contracting with Endogenously Incomplete Commitment: Escape Clauses," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1390, May.
• Bastani, Spencer & Blumkin, Tomer & Micheletto, Luca, 2021, "Optimal Redistribution in the Presence of Signaling," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1413, Nov.
• Jehiel, Philippe & Mohlin, Erik, 2021, "Cycling and Categorical Learning in Decentralized Adverse Selection Economies," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2021:11, Sep.
• Miglo, Anton, 2021, "A New Capital Structure Theory: The Four-Factor Model," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 105102, Jan.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 105106.
• Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2021, "Strategy-proof Allocation of Indivisible Goods when Preferences are Single-peaked," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 105320, Jan.
• Banerjee, Shraman, 2021, "Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 105971, Jan.
• Vaccari, Federico, 2021, "Competition in Signaling," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 106071, Feb.
• Berliant, Marcus & Gouveia, Miguel, 2021, "On the political economy of income taxation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 106138, Feb.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 106947, Mar.
• de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco & Reyniers, Diane, 2021, "Too much trade: A problem of adverse selection," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 107084, Mar.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 107609.
• Asano, Koji, 2021, "Managing Financial Expertise," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 107665, May.
• Yasui, Yuta, 2021, "Controlling Fake Reviews," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 108177, May.
• Bellon, Aymeric & Harpedanne de Belleville, Louis-Marie & Pinardon-Touati, Noémie, 2021, "Mediating Financial Intermediation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 108339, Jun.
• Mitoko, Jeremiah, 2021, "Concentration of power and Populism's Rise in America: evidence from recent US elections," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 108757, Jul.
• Malakhov, Sergey, 2021, "Invisible hand equilibrium in family: the gravitation between men and women in marriage markets," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 108896, Jul.
• Christmann, Robin, 2021, "Plea Bargaining and Investigation Effort: Inquisitorial Criminal Procedure as a Three-Player Game," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 108976, Jul.
• Astaiza-Gómez, José Gabriel, 2021, "Investors' Information Choice," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110008.
• Astaiza-Gómez, José Gabriel, 2021, "The Effects of Investors' Information Acquisition On Sell-Side Analysts Forecast Bias," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110059.
• Zambrano, Juan Carlos & Astaiza-Gómez, José Gabriel & García, Juan David, 2021, "Un Modelo Principal-Agente Dinámico de Reducción de Perdidas de Energía Electrica en Tiempo Continuo
  [A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model of Electric Power Loss Reduction in Continuous Time]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110143.
• Roy, Souvik & Kumar, Ujjwal, 2021, "Local incentive compatibility in non-convex type-spaces," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110872, Nov.
• Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2021, "Formation of committees under constraints through random voting rules," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110873, Nov.
• Kumar, Ujjwal & Roy, Souvik, 2021, "Local incentive compatibility in ordinal type-spaces," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110994, Dec.
• Malakhov, Sergey, 2021, "Allocation of time in ideal family: golden ratio as a means of survival in preindustrial societies and its applications in modern family," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 111166, Dec.
• Miglo, Anton, 2021, "Crowdfunding and Bank Financing: Substitutes or Complements?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 115761.
• Pitterle, Claudia, 2021, "What do cyber- attacks and pandemics have in common? Some lessons from the German medical practices behaviour," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117728.
• Agranov Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021, "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 273, Jan.
• Mark Braverman & Sylvain Chassang, 2021, "Data-Driven Incentive Alignment in Capitation Schemes," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 282, Feb.
• Yuhei Miyauchi & Kentaro Nakajima & Stephen J. Redding, 2021, "Consumption Access and Agglomeration: Evidence from Smartphone Data," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 287, Jun.
• Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2021, "Renegotiation and Dynamic Inconsistency: Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2021-58, Feb.
• Ran Eilat & Kfir Eliaz Eliaz & Xiaosheng Mu, 2021, "Bayesian Privacy," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2021-65, Jan.
• Marina Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021, "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2021-74, Jan.
• Antoine L. Noël & Amy Hongfei Sun, 2021, "Information Transparency of Firm Financing," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1459, Nov.
• Jonas Hedlund & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Carlos Oyarzún, 2021, "Contagion Management through Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 651, Dec.
• Fries, Tilman, 2021, "Signaling Motives in Lying Games," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 269, Jan.
• Abeler, Johannes & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian, 2021, "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 282, May.
• Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2021, "Signaling versus Auditing," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 286, Oct.
• Abeler, Johannes & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian, 2021, "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 296, Nov.
• Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2021, "Optimal Non-Linear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 301, Nov.
• Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2021, "Aiding Applicants: Leveling the Playing Field within the Immediate Acceptance Mechanism," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 303, Nov.
• Deversi, Marvin & Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2021, "Spin Doctors: An Experiment on Vague Disclosure," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 304, Dec.
• Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2021, "Cursed Consumers and the Effectiveness of Consumer Protection Policies," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 305, Dec.
• Wang, Banban & Pizer, William & Munnings, Clayton, 2021, "Price Limits in a Tradable Performance Standard," RFF Working Paper Series, Resources for the Future, number 21-05, Feb.
• Shurojit Chatterji & Peng Liu, 2021, "On the Decomposability of Fractional Allocations," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 3-2021, Apr.
• Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2021, "Efficient Bilateral Trade via Two-Stage Mechanisms under One- Sided Asymmetric Information," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 8-2021, Aug.
• Abdul RASHID & Farah WAHEED, 2021, "Forward-Backward-Looking Monetary Policy Rules: Derivation and Empirics," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, volume 0, issue 1, pages 71-92, December.
• Guillaume Pommey, 2021, "Partnership Dissolution with Cash-Constrained Agents," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 514, Oct, revised 10 Oct 2021.
• Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2021, "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 519, Oct, revised 21 Oct 2021.
• Daniela Di Cagno & Lorenzo Ferrari & Werner Güth & Vittorio Larocca, 2021, "Transparent Dealing instead of Insider Haggling - Experimentally Analyzing an Institutional Choice for Repeated Trade," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 523, Nov, revised 18 Feb 2023.
• Bruno Lanz & Evert Reins, 2021, "Asymmetric Information on the Market for Energy Efficiency: Insights from the Credence Goods Literature," The Energy Journal, , volume 42, issue 4, pages 91-110, July, DOI: 10.5547/01956574.42.4.blan.
• Franz Ostrizek & Elia Sartori, 2021, "Screening while Controlling an Externality," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 605, Feb.
• Jérôme Mathis & Marcello Puca & Simone M. Sepe, 2021, "Deliberative Institutions and Optimality," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 614, May, revised 09 Jun 2021.
• R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2021, "An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, number 21-A001, Jul.
• R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2021, "Iterative Monotonicity Is Equivalent To Strict Group Monotonicity : A Direct Proof," IEAS Working Paper : academic research, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, number 21-A003, Jul.
• R Jain & M Lombardi, 2021, "On the Relationship between Robust and Rationalizable Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, number 21-A004, Nov.
• Beni Kouevi Gath, 2021, "Credit Information Sharing and Bank Stability: Evidence from SSA Countries," Working Papers CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 21-009, Jul.
• Luis V. M. Freitas & Wilfredo L. Maldonado, 2021, "Quadratic Funding with Incomplete Information," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2021_24, Sep.
• Øivind Schøyen, 2021, "What limits the efficacy of coercion?," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), volume 15, issue 2, pages 267-318, May, DOI: 10.1007/s11698-020-00207-0.
• Arianna Dal Forno & Ugo Merlone, 2021, "Envy effects on conflict dynamics in supervised work groups," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 44, issue 2, pages 755-779, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-021-00331-0.
• Matthew J. Baker & Kurtis J. Swope, 2021, "Sharing, gift-giving, and optimal resource use in hunter-gatherer society," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 22, issue 2, pages 119-138, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10101-021-00254-x.
• Jacopo Arpetti & Marco Delmastro, 2021, "The privacy paradox: a challenge to decision theory?," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 48, issue 4, pages 505-525, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-021-00192-z.
• Alfred Galichon, 2021, "Fritz John’s equation in mechanism design," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-5, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-020-00195-4.
• Teddy Mekonnen, 2021, "Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 1, pages 119-142, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00201-3.
• Erya Yang, 2021, "Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 2, pages 269-293, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00211-1.
• Shuli Brammli-Greenberg & Ira Yaari & Elad Daniels & Ariella Adijes-Toren, 2021, "How Managed Entry Agreements can improve allocation in the public health system: a mechanism design approach," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), volume 22, issue 5, pages 699-709, July, DOI: 10.1007/s10198-021-01284-2.
• Christian Hackober & Carolin Bock, 2021, "Which investors’ characteristics are beneficial for initial coin offerings? Evidence from blockchain technology-based firms," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, volume 91, issue 8, pages 1085-1124, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11573-021-01029-w.
• Donald F. Vitaliano, 2021, "Information asymmetry in fire insurance: a frontier approach," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, volume 45, issue 4, pages 764-773, October, DOI: 10.1007/s12197-021-09547-7.
• Chien-Yuan Sher & Nai-Wei Chen & Yu-Hsi Liu & Ryan H. Murphy, 2021, "The impact of soil-liquefaction information disclosures on housing prices: evidence from Kaohsiung, Taiwan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 72, issue 2, pages 217-241, April, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-020-00048-6.
• Demian Macedo & Victor Troster, 2021, "Liquidity shocks and interbank market failures: the role of deposit flights, non-performing loans, and competition," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 16, issue 4, pages 705-746, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-021-00326-5.
• Immanuel Bomze & Werner Schachinger & Jörgen Weibull, 2021, "Does moral play equilibrate?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 1, pages 305-315, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01246-4.
• Sander Heinsalu, 2021, "Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 1, pages 317-339, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01247-3.
• Guilherme Carmona, 2021, "On the optimality of monetary trading," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 3, pages 1121-1160, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01219-2.
• Peter J. Hammond & Lei Qiao & Yeneng Sun, 2021, "Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 3, pages 1161-1187, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01318-5.
• Ori Haimanko, 2021, "Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 3, pages 1231-1258, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01358-5.
• Gino Loyola, 2021, "Effects of competition in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 4, pages 1527-1567, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01347-8.
• Zhifeng Cai & Feng Dong, 2021, "A Model of Secular Migration from Centralized to Decentralized Trade," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 1, pages 201-244, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01280-2.
• Dawen Meng & Guoqiang Tian, 2021, "The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 1, pages 337-375, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01283-z.
• Artyom Jelnov & Yair Tauman & Chang Zhao, 2021, "Stag Hunt with unknown outside options," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 1, pages 303-335, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01286-w.
• Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2021, "Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 2, pages 579-614, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01300-1.
• Sambuddha Ghosh & Yan Long & Manipushpak Mitra, 2021, "Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 2, pages 671-700, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01308-7.
• Maxim Ivanov, 2021, "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 955-1000, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01277-x.
• Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021, "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 909-953, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01299-5.
• Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021, "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 723-742, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01339-0.
• Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021, "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 869-908, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01346-9.
• Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2021, "Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 801-833, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01364-7.
• Daehong Min, 2021, "Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 743-764, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01386-1.
• Andreas Blume & April Mitchell Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2021, "Dynamic coordination via organizational routines," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 4, pages 1001-1047, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01261-5.
• Paul H. Edelman & John A. Weymark, 2021, "Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 4, pages 1091-1120, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01324-7.
• Alex Barrachina & Yair Tauman & Amparo Urbano, 2021, "Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 1, pages 241-278, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00748-8.
• Shinji Ohseto, 2021, "Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 2, pages 419-432, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00754-4.
• Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021, "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 2, pages 475-502, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1.
• Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2021, "Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 4, pages 801-827, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00769-x.
• Christoph Diehl & Christoph Kuzmics, 2021, "The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 4, pages 911-925, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0.
• Áron Tóbiás, 2021, "Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 4, pages 989-1019, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00778-w.
• Daniel Aobdia & Saad Siddiqui & Andres Vinelli, 2021, "Heterogeneity in expertise in a credence goods setting: evidence from audit partners," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 2, pages 693-729, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09569-2.
• Jeremy Bertomeu & Igor Vaysman & Wenjie Xue, 2021, "Voluntary versus mandatory disclosure," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 2, pages 658-692, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09579-0.
• Jung Min Kim & Daniel J. Taylor & Robert E. Verrecchia, 2021, "Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 3, pages 971-1001, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09601-z.
• Omri Even-Tov & Naim Bugra Ozel, 2021, "What moves stock prices around credit rating changes?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 4, pages 1390-1427, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09573-6.
• Gino Loyola, 2021, "Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 1, pages 1-32, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00240-5.
• Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021, "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 1, pages 33-64, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00242-3.
• Rasoul Ramezanian & Mehdi Feizi, 2021, "Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 3, pages 157-176, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00246-7.
• Shuichi Tsugawa, 2021, "Two-agent interactive implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 4, pages 251-266, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00247-6.
• Silvia Martinez-Gorricho & Miguel Sanchez Villalba, 2021, "Incentives, ability and disutility of effort," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 453-487, September, DOI: 10.1007/s13209-021-00236-6.
• Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2021, "On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 57, issue 2, pages 431-468, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01329-8.
• Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2021, "Information disclosure with many alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 57, issue 4, pages 851-873, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01341-y.
• Gert G. Wagner, 2021, "Polit-ökonomische Aspekte des Berichts zur Lage der Verbraucher:innen
  [Political-Economic Aspects of the Report on the Position of Consumers by the Advisory Council for Consumer Affairs (SVRV)]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 101, issue 6, pages 473-480, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10273-021-2944-z.
• Bin-Tzong Chie & Chih-Hwa Yang, 2021, "Efficiency of the Experimental Prediction Market: Public Information, Belief Evolution, and Personality Traits," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, volume 11, issue 4, pages 1-3.
• Timmer, Yannick & Pierri, Niccola, 2021, "The importance of technology in banking during a crisis," ESRB Working Paper Series, European Systemic Risk Board, number 117, Mar.
• Suqin Ge & Andrea Moro & Beibei Zhu, 2021, "Testing for asymmetric employer learning and statistical discrimination," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 53, issue 12, pages 1361-1377, March, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2020.1830939.
• Pavel Ciaian & d’Artis Kancs & Miroslava Rajcaniova, 2021, "The economic dependency of bitcoin security," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 53, issue 49, pages 5738-5755, October, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2021.1931003.
• Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021, "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Li, Fei & Norman, Peter, 2021, "Sequential persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Siga, Lucas & Mihm, Maximilian, 2021, "Information aggregation in competitive markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 1, January.
• Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2021, "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Eilat, Ran & Pauzner, Ady, 2021, "Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021, "Relational communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Li, Yunan, 2021, "Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Guo, Yingni & Shmaya, Eran, 2021, "Costly miscalibration," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Azrieli, Yaron, 2021, "Monitoring experts," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Jehiel, Philippe, 2021, "Communication with forgetful liars," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Pei, Harry, 2021, "Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Escobar, Juan F. & Zhang, Qiaoxi, 2021, "Delegating learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Garrett, Daniel F., 2021, "Payoff implications of incentive contracting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Kushnir, Alexey I. & Lokutsievskiy, Lev V., 2021, "When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Eilat, Ran & Eliaz, Kfir & Mu, Xiaosheng, 2021, "Bayesian privacy," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Piotr Denderski & Christian A. Stoltenberg, 2021, "On existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 21-052/VI, Jun.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2021, "Search, Screening and Sorting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 21-058/VI, Jun.
• Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021, "An implementation approach to rotation programs," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics, number 150, Dec.
• Hugh Macartney & Robert McMillan & Uros Petronijevic, 2021, "A Quantitative Framework for Analyzing the Distributional Effects of Incentive Schemes," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-696, May.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2021, "Search, Screening and Sorting," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-699, Jun.
• Cherbonnier, Frédéric, 2021, "Optimal insurance for time-inconsistent agents," IAST Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), number 21-123, Oct.
• Perez-Richet, Eduardo & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2021, "Test Design under Falsification," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15627, Jan.
• Prummer, Anja & Nava, Francesco, 2021, "Discrimination in Promotion," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15672, Jan.
• Koessler, Frédéric & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2021, "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15709, Jan.
• Levit, Doron & Malenko, Nadya & Maug, Ernst, 2021, "The voting premium," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15718, Jan.
• Nocke, Volker & Strausz, Roland, 2021, "Collective Brand Reputation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15732, Jan.
• Gnan, Phillipp & Rieder, Kilian, 2021, "The (Not So) Quiet Period: Communication by ECB Decision-makers during Monetary Policy Blackout Days," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15735, Jan.
• Bowen, T. Renee & Dmitriev, Danil & Galperti, Simone, 2021, "Learning from Shared News: When Abundant Information Leads to Belief Polarization," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15789, Feb.
• Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2021, "Optimal Sequential Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15855, Feb.
• Malamud, Semyon & Cieslak, Anna & Schrimpf, Andreas, 2021, "Optimal Transport of Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15859, Feb.
• Fernandez, Marcelo & Rudov, Kirill & Yariv, Leeat, 2021, "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15873, Mar.
• Asker, John & Fershtman, Chaim & Pakes, Ariel, 2021, "Artificial intelligence and Pricing: The Impact of Algorithm Design," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15880, Mar.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15970, Mar.