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Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection

Author

Listed:
  • M. Martin Boyer
  • Philippe De Donder
  • Claude Fluet
  • Marie-Louise Leroux
  • Pierre-Carl Michaud

Abstract

This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses, while selection plays little role.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Martin Boyer & Philippe De Donder & Claude Fluet & Marie-Louise Leroux & Pierre-Carl Michaud, 2020. "Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 134-169, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:12:y:2020:i:3:p:134-69
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180227
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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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