Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2017

• Cason, Timothy N. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2017, "Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 218-233, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.001.
• Palfrey, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard & Roy, Nilanjan, 2017, "How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 234-259, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004.
• Linardi, Sera, 2017, "Accounting for noise in the microfoundations of information aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 334-353, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.004.
• McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2017, "A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 34-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.007.
• Page, Lionel & Siemroth, Christoph, 2017, "An experimental analysis of information acquisition in prediction markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 354-378, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.002.
• Krajbich, Ian & Camerer, Colin & Rangel, Antonio, 2017, "Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 49-62, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.001.
• Van Essen, Matthew & Walker, Mark, 2017, "A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 6-19, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.002.
• Siegenthaler, Simon, 2017, "Meet the lemons: An experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 147-161, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.11.001.
• McMurray, Joseph, 2017, "Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 199-223, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.005.
• Schmidbauer, Eric, 2017, "Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 240-254, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.003.
• Kirkegaard, René, 2017, "Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 373-387, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.001.
• Hahn, Volker, 2017, "Committee design with endogenous participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 388-408, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.009.
• Kajackaite, Agne & Gneezy, Uri, 2017, "Incentives and cheating," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 433-444, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.015.
• Chun, Youngsub & Yengin, Duygu, 2017, "Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 462-476, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.005.
• Leo, Greg, 2017, "Taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 525-547, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.003.
• Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017, "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 548-561, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.010.
• Wang, Tao, 2017, "Information revelation through bunching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 568-582, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.017.
• Kim, Jin Yeub, 2017, "Interim third-party selection in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 645-665, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.013.
• Gottardi, Piero & Tallon, Jean Marc & Ghirardato, Paolo, 2017, "Flexible contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 145-167, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013.
• Li, Yunan, 2017, "Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 225-253, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.006.
• Martin, Daniel, 2017, "Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 131-145, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.007.
• Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2017, "Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: The impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 177-189, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.006.
• Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017, "Calendar mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 252-270, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.004.
• Gradwohl, Ronen & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017, "Perception games and privacy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 293-308, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.006.
• Kim, Semin, 2017, "Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 350-371, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.012.
• Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2017, "Efficient voting with penalties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 468-485, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.006.
• Garrett, Daniel F., 2017, "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 595-612, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.005.
• Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve, 2017, "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 613-631, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.014.
• Rosar, Frank, 2017, "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 632-655, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.002.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017, "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 744-759, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.014.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Parreiras, Sérgio O., 2017, "Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 78-91, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.005.
• Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017, "Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 212-229, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.008.
• Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2017, "Sequential commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 297-315, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.009.
• Long, Yan & Mishra, Debasis & Sharma, Tridib, 2017, "Balanced ranking mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 9-39, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.002.
• Anbarci, Nejat & Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep, 2017, "Information control in reputational cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 153-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.010.
• Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017, "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 227-238, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010.
• Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2017, "Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 317-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.015.
• Chatterjee, Kalyan & Das, Kaustav, 2017, "Bilateral trading and incomplete information: Price convergence in a small market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 89-113, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.006.
• Wang, Hong, 2017, "Information acquisition versus information manipulation in multi-period procurement markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 48-59, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.12.003.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017, "Club good intermediaries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 430-459, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.007.
• Miklós-Thal, Jeanine & Shaffer, Greg, 2017, "Private contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 460-472, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.03.002.
• Rosar, Frank, 2017, "Strategic outsourcing and optimal procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 91-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.11.001.
• Hiriart, Yolande & Thomas, Lionel, 2017, "The optimal regulation of a risky monopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 51, issue C, pages 111-136, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.002.
• Freedman, Seth & Jin, Ginger Zhe, 2017, "The information value of online social networks: Lessons from peer-to-peer lending," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 51, issue C, pages 185-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.09.002.
• Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2017, "Contracting with endogenous entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 51, issue C, pages 85-110, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.001.
• Su, Alice Peng-Ju, 2017, "Information revelation in the Property Right Theory of the firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 133-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.004.
• Meng, Xin & Gunay, Hikmet, 2017, "Exposure problem in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 165-187, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.005.
• Chen, Bo & Ni, Debing, 2017, "Optimal bundle pricing under correlated valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 248-281, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.002.
• Seres, Gyula, 2017, "Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 282-306, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.002.
• Troya-Martinez, Marta, 2017, "Self-enforcing trade credit," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 333-357, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.001.
• Chalioti, Evangelia & Serfes, Konstantinos, 2017, "Strategic incentives for innovations and market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 427-449, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.004.
• Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2017, "Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 148-174, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009.
• Strausz, Roland, 2017, "Politically induced regulatory risk and independent regulatory agencies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 215-238, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.07.003.
• Sogo, Takeharu, 2017, "Effects of seller’s information disclosure in equity auctions requiring post-auction investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 166-181, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.005.
• Durguner, Sena, 2017, "Do borrower-lender relationships still matter for small business loans?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 98-118, DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2017.09.007.
• Lo, Kin & Ramos, Felipe & Rogo, Rafael, 2017, "Earnings management and annual report readability," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 63, issue 1, pages 1-25, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.09.002.
• Schoenfeld, Jordan, 2017, "The effect of voluntary disclosure on stock liquidity: New evidence from index funds," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 63, issue 1, pages 51-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.10.007.
• Chen, Qi & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2017, "The effects of bank mergers on corporate information disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 64, issue 1, pages 56-77, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.05.003.
• Berger, Philip G. & Minnis, Michael & Sutherland, Andrew, 2017, "Commercial lending concentration and bank expertise: Evidence from borrower financial statements," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 64, issue 2, pages 253-277, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.06.005.
• Beltran, Daniel O. & Cordell, Larry & Thomas, Charles P., 2017, "Asymmetric information and the death of ABS CDOs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 76, issue C, pages 1-14, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.11.008.
• Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago & Vo, Quynh-Anh, 2017, "Resolution of financial distress under agency frictions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 40-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.05.009.
• Huang, Fali & Jin, Ginger Zhe & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2017, "Love, money, and parental goods: Does parental matchmaking matter?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, volume 45, issue 2, pages 224-245, DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2016.09.005.
• De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017, "The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 172-186, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.006.
• Cordella, Antonio & Cordella, Tito, 2017, "Motivations, monitoring technologies, and pay for performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 236-255, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.10.016.
• Stepanov, Sergey & Suvorov, Anton, 2017, "Agency problem and ownership structure: Outside blockholder as a signal," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 87-107, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.10.024.
• Sharma, Priyanka, 2017, "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 269-283, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.002.
• Mialon, Sue H. & Yoo, Seung Han, 2017, "Incentives for discrimination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 141-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.021.
• Choi, Jay Pil & Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard & Nahm, Jae, 2017, "Communication of soft information: Reputation and imperfect enforcement of reporting quality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 91-106, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.02.002.
• Omiya, Shungo & Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2017, "Optimal delegation with self-interested agents and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 54-71, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.003.
• Schudy, Simeon & Utikal, Verena, 2017, "‘You must not know about me’—On the willingness to share personal data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 1-13, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.023.
• Conlin, Michael & Dickert-Conlin, Stacy, 2017, "Inference by college admission departments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 14-28, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.001.
• Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2017, "Trust, but verify? Monitoring, inspection costs, and opportunism under limited observability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 320-330, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.028.
• Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017, "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, pages 1-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.001.
• Grüner, Hans Peter, 2017, "Mechanisms for the control of fiscal deficits," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 133-152, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.019.
• Saglam, Ismail, 2017, "The Effect of Observability on the Noncontractible Investment of a Regulated Firm," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 75963, Jan.
• Moreno-García, Emma & Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo, 2017, "Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 76428, Jan.
• Wittwer, Milena, 2017, "Centralizing Disconnected Markets? An Irrelevance Result," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 76534, Feb.
• Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan, 2017, "It's your turn: experiments with three-player public good games," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 76565, Feb.
• Antelo, Manel & Antonio, Sampayo, 2017, "Licensing contracts and the number of licenses under screening," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 77252, Mar.
• Gay, Victor & Albertus, Michael, 2017, "Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty Under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 77567, Mar.
• Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017, "On Top-connected Single-peaked and Partially Single-peaked Domains," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 78102, Apr.
• Gao, Lin, 2017, "Between Trust and Performance: Exploring Socio-Economic Mechanisms on Directed Weighted Regular Ring with Agent-Based Modeling," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 78428, Apr.
• Guha, Brishti & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2017, "Affirmative Action in the Presence of a Creamy Layer: Identity or Class Based?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 78686.
• Li, Shengwu, 2017, "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 78930.
• Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2017, "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 79181.
• Anginer, Deniz & Yildizhan, Celim & Han, Xue Snow, 2017, "Do Individual Investors Ignore Transaction Costs?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 79358, May.
• Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2017, "A Unified Characterization of Randomized Strategy-proof Rules," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 79363, May.
• Baumann, Stuart, 2017, "Comparative Advertising: The role of prices," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 79872, Jun.
• Guha, Brishti, 2017, "Should Jurors Deliberate?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 79876, Jun.
• Chen, Yongmin & Li, Jianpei & Zhang, Jin, 2017, "Liability in Markets for Credence Goods," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 80206, Jul.
• Conti, Chiara & Marini, Marco A., 2017, "Are You the Right Partner ? R&D Agreement as a Screening Device," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 80423, Jul.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Valimaki, Juuso, 2017, "All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Values," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 80799, Jun.
• Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017, "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 80870, Aug.
• Makofske, Matthew, 2017, "Mandatory Disclosure, Letter-Grade Systems, and Corruption: The Case of Los Angeles County Restaurant Inspections," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 80925, Aug.
• Cerezo Sánchez, David, 2017, "An Optimal ICO Mechanism," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 81285, Sep.
• Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017, "Dictatorship on Top-circular Domains," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 81368, Aug.
• Chatterjee, Rittwik & Chattopadhyay, Srobonti & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2017, "Spillover and R&D Incentives under Incomplete Information in a Duopoly Industry," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 81371, Jun.
• Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017, "On Single-peaked Domains and Min-max Rules," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 81375, Sep.
• Daher, Wassim & Aydilek, Harun & Saleeby, Elias G., 2017, "Insider Trading With Different Risk Attitudes," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 81733, Sep.
• Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017, "Strategy-proof Rules on Partially Single-peaked Domains," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 82267, Oct.
• Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017, "Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 82753, Nov.
• Li, Yue, 2017, "Economic Analysis of Social Security Survivors Insurance," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 84038, Oct.
• Smolin, Alex, 2017, "Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 84132, Oct.
• Smolin, Alex, 2017, "Dynamic Evaluation Design," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 84133, Oct.
• Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2017, "Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 84134, Oct.
• Wolton, Stephane, 2017, "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 84837, Feb.
• Bobkova, Nina, 2017, "Asymmetric Budget Constraints in a First Price Auction," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 88628, Feb, revised Aug 2018.
• Anginer, Deniz & Han, Xue Snow & Yildizhan, Celim, 2017, "Do Individual Investors Ignore Transaction Costs?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 89941, May.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 91460.
• Adam Kapor & Christopher A. Neilson & Seth D. Zimmerman, 2017, "Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section., number 612, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017, "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program., number 089_2017, Feb.
• Pierre C. Boyer & Kai A. Konrad & Brian Roberson, 2017, "Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics, number 1290, Mar.
• Fehr, Dietmar & Heinemann, Frank & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2017, "The Power of Sunspots: an Experimental Analysis," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 11, Mar.
• Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2017, "Auctions versus Negotiations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 12, Mar.
• Schmidt, Klaus, 2017, "The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 19, Mar.
• Strausz, Roland, 2017, "A Theory of Crowdfunding," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 2, Mar.
• Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2017, "Sequential versus Static Screening: an Equivalence Result," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 24, Mar.
• Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias, 2017, "Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? An Experiment on Voluntary Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 26, Mar.
• Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017, "Ex-Post Optimal Knapsack Procurement," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 27, Mar.
• Strausz, Roland, 2017, "Certification and Market Transparency," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 3, Mar.
• Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017, "Deterministic Mechanisms, the Revelation Principle, and Ex-Post Constraints," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 32, May.
• Strausz, Roland, 2017, "Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 44, Jul.
• Strausz, Roland, 2017, "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 45, Aug.
• Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2017, "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 47, Oct.
• von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2017, "Consumer-Optimal Information Design," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 53, Nov.
• Herweg, Fabian & Schwarz, Marco A., 2017, "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 56, Nov.
• Ctirad Slavik & Kevin Wiseman, 2017, "Online Appendix to "Tough Love for Lazy Kids: Dynamic Insurance and Equal Bequests"," Online Appendices, Review of Economic Dynamics, number 14-279.
• Stephane Verani, 2017, "Online Appendix to "Aggregate Consequences of Dynamic Credit Relationships"," Online Appendices, Review of Economic Dynamics, number 15-244.
• Ctirad Slavik & Kevin Wiseman, 2017, "Code and data files for "Tough Love for Lazy Kids: Dynamic Insurance and Equal Bequests"," Computer Codes, Review of Economic Dynamics, number 14-279, revised .
• Stephane Verani, 2017, "Code and data files for "Aggregate Consequences of Dynamic Credit Relationships"," Computer Codes, Review of Economic Dynamics, number 15-244, revised .
• Bruno Sultanum, 2017, "Financial Fragility and Over-the-counter Markets," 2017 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 1122.
• Carlos da Costa, 2017, "Optimal Mirrleesian Taxation in Non-competitive Labor Markets," 2017 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 1207.
• Pablo Kurlat, 2017, "The Social Value of Financial Expertise," 2017 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 134.
• Marcelo Veracierto, 2017, "Adverse Selection, Risk Sharing and Business Cycles," 2017 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 1574.
• Yuzhe Zhang & Borys Grochulski, 2017, "Optimal Contracts with Reflection," 2017 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 544.
• George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2017, "Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge," 2017 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 89.
• Koutroumpis, Pantelis & Leiponen, Aija & Thomas, Llewellyn D W, 2017, "The (Unfulfilled) Potential of Data Marketplaces," ETLA Working Papers, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, number 53, Sep.
• Georges Dionne & Ying Liu, 2017, "Effects of Insurance Incentives on Road Safety: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China," Working Papers, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, number 17-1, Mar.
• Georges Dionne & Scott Harrington, 2017, "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, number 17-2, Mar.
• Shokoofeh Sadat Ashrafzadeh & Seyyed Mohammad Javad Razmi & Mohammad Reza Lotfalipour & Mehdi Feizi, 2017, "Investigation of Profit-Loss Sharing and Fixed-Return Contracts Recovery Rate Using Game Theory Approach," Quarterly Journal of Applied Theories of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management and Business, University of Tabriz, volume 3, issue 4, pages 1-20.
• Constantin Anghelache & Bodo Gyorgy & Andreea Ioana Marinescu, 2017, "Asymmetric information in case of decision under risk," Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, volume 65, issue 1, pages 22-36, January.
• Mario Tirelli, 2017, "Optimal Financial Contracts With Unobservable Investments," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre', Department of Economics - University Roma Tre, number 0230, Dec.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2017, "Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A Comment," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 403, May, revised 03 May 2017.
• Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2017, "On the Role of Menus in Sequential Contracting: a Multiple Lending Example," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 409, Jul, revised 13 Jul 2017.
• Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2017, "Can the Private Sector Ensure the Public Interest? Evidence from Federal Procurement," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 411, Jul, revised 20 Jul 2017.
• Sergei Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2017, "Memory and Markets," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 415, Dec, revised 07 Dec 2017.
• Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2017, "On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 421, Dec, revised 16 Dec 2017.
• Hans Gersbach & Markus Müller, 2017, "Higher bars for incumbents and experience," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , volume 29, issue 3, pages 492-513, July, DOI: 10.1177/0951629816664419.
• Robin Hahnel, 2017, "Wanted: A Pollution Damage Revealing Mechanism," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, volume 49, issue 2, pages 233-246, June, DOI: 10.1177/0486613415608134.
• Gülen Karakoç & Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2017, "The Value of Transparency in Dynamic Contracting with Entry," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 482, Sep.
• Mercy Raquel Orellana Bravo & Juan Andrés Piedra Peña & Luis Santiago Sarmiento Moscoso, 2017, "Evidence About The Moral Hazard In The Ecuadorian Health System," Journal of Smart Economic Growth, , volume 2, issue 1, pages 109-132, March.
• Bartosz Wachnik, 2017, "The Phenomenon of Information Asymmetry Between the Supplier and the Client in IT Projects," Problemy Zarzadzania, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, volume 15, issue 71, pages 83-101.
• Simon Cornée & Panu Kalmi & Ariane Szafarz, 2017, "How Costly is Social Screening? Evidence from the Banking Industry," Working Papers CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 17-026, Oct.
• Aida Isabel Tavares, 2017, "Generic substitution policy, an incentive approach," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, volume 23, issue 2, pages 199-220, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10588-016-9223-3.
• Arieh Gavious & Ella Segev, 2017, "Price Discrimination Based on Buyers’ Purchase History," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 7, issue 2, pages 229-265, June, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-015-0179-6.
• Alexander W. Cappelen & Tone Ognedal, 2017, "Certification and socially responsible production," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 18, issue 1, pages 71-84, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10101-016-0184-2.
• Nicholas Charles Bedard, 2017, "Contracts in informed-principal problems with moral hazard," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 5, issue 1, pages 21-34, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0093-0.
• Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017, "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 5, issue 1, pages 47-56, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0099-7.
• Philippe Gillen & Vitali Gretschko & Alexander Rasch, 2017, "Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 5, issue 2, pages 139-150, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0108-x.
• K. P. M. Winssen & R. C. Kleef & W. P. M. M. Ven, 2017, "A voluntary deductible in health insurance: the more years you opt for it, the lower your premium?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), volume 18, issue 2, pages 209-226, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10198-016-0767-4.
• Anna Aksamit & Tahir Choulli & Jun Deng & Monique Jeanblanc, 2017, "No-arbitrage up to random horizon for quasi-left-continuous models," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 21, issue 4, pages 1103-1139, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-017-0337-3.
• Prudence Dato, 2017, "Economic analysis of e-waste market," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, volume 17, issue 6, pages 815-837, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10784-017-9350-4.
• Daniel Feser & Till Proeger, 2017, "Asymmetric information as a barrier to knowledge spillovers in expert markets," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, volume 13, issue 1, pages 211-232, March, DOI: 10.1007/s11365-016-0404-9.
• Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Guido Voigt, 2017, "Strategic risk in supply chain contract design," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, volume 87, issue 1, pages 125-153, January, DOI: 10.1007/s11573-015-0790-4.
• Yoshiaki Ogura, 2017, "The Certification Role of pre-IPO Banking Relationships: Evidence from IPO Underpricing in Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 68, issue 2, pages 257-278, June, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12082.
• Toyotaka Sakai, 2017, "Considering Collective Choice: The Route 328 Problem in Kodaira City," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 68, issue 3, pages 323-332, September, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12115.
• Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017, "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 68, issue 4, pages 521-554, December, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12144.
• Lukas Meub & Till Proeger & Hendrik Hüning, 2017, "A comparison of endogenous and exogenous timing in a social learning experiment," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 12, issue 1, pages 143-166, April, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-015-0156-6.
• Björn Bartling & Tobias Gesche & Nick Netzer, 2017, "Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 3, issue 1, pages 44-61, July, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-017-0037-y.
• Sebastián Cea-Echenique & Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, 2017, "Endogenous differential information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 1, pages 51-72, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0924-5.
• James C. D. Fisher & John Wooders, 2017, "Interacting information cascades: on the movement of conventions between groups," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 1, pages 211-231, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-1013-0.
• Luciano I. Castro & Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2017, "Ambiguous implementation: the partition model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 1, pages 233-261, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-1023-y.
• Amanda Friedenberg & Martin Meier, 2017, "The context of the game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 2, pages 347-386, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0938-z.
• Sushil Bikhchandani & Ichiro Obara, 2017, "Mechanism design with information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 3, pages 783-812, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0964-5.
• Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2017, "The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 4, pages 925-942, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3.
• Aristotelis Boukouras & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2017, "Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 64, issue 1, pages 75-98, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0993-0.
• Parikshit De & Manipushpak Mitra, 2017, "Incentives and justice for sequencing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 64, issue 2, pages 239-264, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0983-2.
• Mustafa Og̃uz Afacan & Zeynel Harun Aliog̃ulları & Mehmet Barlo, 2017, "Sticky matching in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 64, issue 3, pages 509-538, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0995-y.
• Gilad Bavly, 2017, "Uncertainty in the traveler’s dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 1, pages 1-12, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0508-4.
• Ezra Einy & Mridu Prabal Goswami & Ori Haimanko & Ram Orzach & Aner Sela, 2017, "Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 1, pages 79-102, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0524-4.
• M. Ali Khan & Yongchao Zhang, 2017, "Existence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games: a sharpened necessity result," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 1, pages 167-183, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0528-8.
• Volker Hahn, 2017, "On the drawbacks of large committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 2, pages 563-582, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0546-6.
• Fabrizio Germano & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2017, "Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 3, pages 595-629, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0547-5.
• Elisabeth Schulte & Mike Felgenhauer, 2017, "Preselection and expert advice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 3, pages 693-714, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9.
• Sergiu Ungureanu, 2017, "Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 3, pages 667-692, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0552-8.
• Ottorino Chillemi & Benedetto Gui & Lorenzo Rocco, 2017, "Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 3, pages 737-760, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0553-7.
• Vladimir Karamychev & Bauke Visser, 2017, "Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 3, pages 813-850, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0558-2.
• Takashi Shimizu, 2017, "Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 4, pages 1071-1088, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0571-0.
• Anne-Kathrin Bronsert & Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, 2017, "Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, volume 30, issue 1, pages 163-186, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00148-016-0610-3.
• Vikash Gautam & Vikash Vaibhav, 2017, "Investment, Uncertainty and Credit Market Imperfection in India," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 15, issue 2, pages 265-289, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-016-0048-1.
• Phuong Le, 2017, "Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 1, pages 1-31, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-016-0188-y.
• David Cantala & Juan Sebastián Pereyra, 2017, "Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 1, pages 49-63, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0197-5.
• Tilman Börgers, 2017, "(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 2, pages 73-82, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0201-0.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017, "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 3, pages 163-175, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0203-y.
• Pinghan Liang, 2017, "Transfer of authority within hierarchies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 4, pages 273-290, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0206-8.
• André Berger & Rudolf Müller & Seyed Hossein Naeemi, 2017, "Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 48, issue 2, pages 367-383, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-1008-6.
• Inácio Bó & C.-Philipp Heller, 2017, "Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 48, issue 3, pages 545-572, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-1024-6.
• Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2017, "Reordering an existing queue," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 49, issue 1, pages 65-87, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1051-y.
• Ahnert, Toni & Anand, Kartik & Gai, Prasanna & Chapman, James, 2017, "Asset encumbrance, bank funding and fragility," ESRB Working Paper Series, European Systemic Risk Board, number 52, Jul.