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Does Random Selection of Commissioners Improve the Quality of Selected Candidates? An Investigation in the Italian Academia

Author

Listed:
  • Checchi, Daniele

    (University of Milan)

  • De Poli, Silvia

    (FBK-IRVAPP)

  • Rettore, Enrico

    (University of Padova)

Abstract

We study a reform occurred in Italy in 2008 in the formation of selection committees for qualifying as university professor. Prior to the reform members of the selection committees were elected by their peers, after the reform they have been randomly drawn. This policy was intended to increase the equality of opportunities of candidates via a reduction of the role played by connections to commissioners. Results show that the reform was ineffective in reducing the probability contribution of being an insider, but attenuated the impact of being connected to a commissioner without significantly raising the impact of scientific quality of candidates on the outcome of competitions. We also find that candidates internalised the changed environment and adapted their strategy of application.

Suggested Citation

  • Checchi, Daniele & De Poli, Silvia & Rettore, Enrico, 2017. "Does Random Selection of Commissioners Improve the Quality of Selected Candidates? An Investigation in the Italian Academia," IZA Discussion Papers 10844, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10844
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniele Checchi & Gianni De Fraja & Stefano Verzillo, 2014. "Publish or Perish? Incentives and Careers in Italian Academia," CEIS Research Paper 323, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 07 Aug 2014.
    2. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2015. "Gender Discrimination and Evaluators’ Gender: Evidence from Italian Academia," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 82(325), pages 162-188, January.
    3. Godechot, Olivier, 2014. "The chance of influence: A natural experiment on the role of social capital in academic hiring," MaxPo Discussion Paper Series 14/1, Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo).
    4. Natalia Zinovyeva & Manuel Bagues, 2015. "The Role of Connections in Academic Promotions," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 264-292, April.
    5. Bagues, Manuel & Sylos-Labini, Mauro & Zinovyeva, Natalia, 2019. "Connections in scientific committees and applicants’ self-selection: Evidence from a natural randomized experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 81-97.
    6. Perotti, Roberto & Labartino, Giovanna, 2011. "Academic Dynasties: Decentralization and Familism in the Italian Academia," CEPR Discussion Papers 8645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Manuel Bagues & Mauro Sylos-Labini & Natalia Zinovyeva, 2014. "Do gender quotas pass the test ? Evidence from academic evaluations in Italy," LEM Papers Series 2014/14, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/37ufknmfv39tppkbjb4dmidnqe is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Stefano Allesina, 2011. "Measuring Nepotism through Shared Last Names: The Case of Italian Academia," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(8), pages 1-6, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    negotiation; incentives; university recruitment; formal procedures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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