Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

• Arato Hiroki & Nakamura Tomoya, 2011, "The Benefit of Mixing Private Noise into Public Information in Beauty Contest Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 11, issue 1, pages 1-17, March, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1694.
• Osório António M., 2012, "A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-27, April, DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1782.
• Regev Tali, 2012, "Education Signaling with Uncertain Returns," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-31, August, DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1867.
• Bar-Isaac Heski, 2012, "Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-15, January, DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1796.
• LI Daniel Zhiyun, 2012, "Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-31, March, DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1709.
• Anwar Ahmed W, 2007, "Equilibria in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-18, January, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1327.
• Andrianova Svetlana, 2007, "On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-34, April, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1353.
• Chouinard Hayley H & Yoder Jonathan K, 2007, "Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-15, June, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1332.
• Panaccione Luca, 2007, "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-21, October, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1358.
• Basov Suren & Danilkina Svetlana, 2007, "Auctions with Opportunistic Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-11, November, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1350.
• Rantakari Heikki V, 2008, "On the Role of Uncertainty in the Risk-Incentives Tradeoff," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-25, April, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1407.
• Pouyet Jérome & Salanié Bernard & Salanié Francois, 2008, "On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-16, April, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1385.
• Kirkegaard Rene, 2008, "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-32, September, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1417.
• Krahmer Daniel & Strausz Roland, 2008, "Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-27, October, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1458.
• Celik Gorkem, 2008, "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-45, February, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1363.
• Obara Ichiro, 2008, "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-28, March, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1399.
• Martinez Leonardo, 2009, "Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-29, May, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1367.
• Malcomson James M, 2009, "Principal and Expert Agent," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-36, May, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1528.
• Theilen Bernd, 2009, "Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-29, June, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1471.
• Loginova Oksana & Lu Haibin & Wang X. Henry, 2009, "Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-24, January, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1501.
• Celik Gorkem & Yilankaya Okan, 2009, "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-33, July, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1522.
• Theilen Bernd, 2009, "Monitoring Gains and Decentralization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-26, September, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1525.
• Poudou Jean-Christophe & Roland Michel & Thomas Lionel, 2009, "Universal Service Obligations and Competition with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-25, October, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1581.
• Menicucci Domenico, 2009, "Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-19, December, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1600.
• Mookherjee Dilip & Reichelstein Stefan, 2001, "Incentives and Coordination in Hierarchies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 1, issue 1, pages 1-38, April, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1009.
• Martimort David & Stole Lars, 2003, "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 3, issue 1, pages 1-40, July, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1037.
• Battaglini Marco, 2004, "Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-34, April, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1100.
• Faure-Grimaud Antoine & Laffont Jean-Jacques & Martimort David, 2003, "Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 2, issue 1, pages 1-32, January, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1055.
• Ryan Matthew Joseph & Vaithianathan Rhema, 2003, "Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 3, issue 1, pages 1-20, August, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1074.
• Doraszelski Ulrich & Gerardi Dino & Squintani Francesco, 2003, "Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 3, issue 1, pages 1-41, August, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1084.
• Kim Jeong-Yoo, 2003, "Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 3, issue 1, pages 1-20, November, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1080.
• Park In-Uck, 2004, "A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-26, June, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1103.
• Ye Lixin, 2004, "Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-29, October, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1158.
• Parreiras Sergio O., 2006, "Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-21, December, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1304.
• Gintis Herbert, 2006, "The Emergence of a Price System from Decentralized Bilateral Exchange," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-17, December, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1302.
• Menichini Anna Maria C. & Simmons Peter J., 2006, "Liars and Inspectors: Optimal Financial Contracts When Monitoring is Non-Observable," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-21, June, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1216.
• Hori Kazumi, 2006, "Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-11, July, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1248.
• Maravall-Rodriguez Carlos, 2006, "A Spatial Election with Common Values," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-19, August, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1269.
• Dam Kaniska & Perez-Castrillo David, 2006, "The Principal-Agent Matching Market," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 2, issue 1, pages 1-34, August, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1257.
• Basov Suren, 2003, "Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 3, issue 1, pages 1-16, June, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1093.
• King John T, 2004, "A Sequential Signaling Model of the Sale of an Invention to an Oligopolist," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-27, May, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1117.
• Stivers Andrew E, 2004, "Unraveling of Information: Competition and Uncertainty," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-18, December, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1151.
• Feinberg Yossi & Tennenholtz Moshe, 2005, "Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 5, issue 1, pages 1-12, October, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1061.
• Casamatta Georges & Sand-Zantman Wilfried, 2006, "Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 5, issue 1, pages 1-41, February, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1244.
• Kwon Illoong, 2006, "Endogenous Favoritism in Organizations," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-26, August, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1273.
• Bardsley Peter & Sherstyuk Katerina, 2006, "Rat Races and Glass Ceilings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-37, November, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1297.
• Beckert Walter, 2006, "Competitive Externalities in Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-14, December, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1330.
• Lensink Robert & Pham Thi Thu Tra, 2006, "On the Signalling Role of Debt Maturity," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-32, December, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1286.
• Mahenc Philippe, 2009, "Wasteful Labeling," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, volume 7, issue 2, pages 1-20, December, DOI: 10.2202/1542-0485.1279.
• Lemennicier Bertrand, 2001, "Collective Belief Formation and the Politically Correct Concerning Information on Risk Behaviour," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, volume 11, issue 4, pages 1-25, December, DOI: 10.2202/1145-6396.1032.
• Ganuza Juan-Jose & Gomez Fernando, 2006, "Caution, Children Crossing: Heterogeneity of Victim's Cost of Care and the Negligence Rule," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, volume 1, issue 3, pages 365-397, January, DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1001.
• Finkle Aaron & Shin Dongsoo, 2010, "Disregarding the Attorney's Advice: An Agency Perspective," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 2, pages 197-217, September, DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1414.
• Kelly David L. & Steigerwald Douglas G, 2004, "Private Information and High-Frequency Stochastic Volatility," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-30, March, DOI: 10.2202/1558-3708.1167.
• Michael Louis George, 2007, "Predicting the Profit Potential of a Microeconomic Process: An Information Theoretic/Thermodynamic Approach," Working Papers, Institute of Business Entropy, number 0607, Sep.
• Michael Louis George, 2007, "United States Patent Application Publication - Predictive Cost Reduction Based on a Thermodynamic Model," Working Papers, Institute of Business Entropy, number 0608, Sep.