Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2017

• Louis Kaplow, 2017, "Optimal Multistage Adjudication," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 33, issue 4, pages 613-652.
• Christian At & Lionel Thomas, 2017, "Optimal lending contracts," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, volume 69, issue 1, pages 263-277.
• Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017, "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, volume 33, issue 4, pages 541-571.
• Pablo Moran, 2017, "Information Revelation in Merger Waves," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 6, issue 2, pages 174-233.
• Alfredo di Tillio & Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2017, "The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 1, pages 237-276.
• Alessandro Bonatti & Gonzalo Cisternas & Juuso Toikka, 2017, "Dynamic Oligopoly with Incomplete Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 2, pages 503-546.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2017, "Optimal Voting Rules," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 2, pages 688-717.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017, "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 2, pages 816-852.
• Xavier Vives, 2017, "Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 2, pages 935-963.
• Catherine Bobtcheff & Jérôme Bolte & Thomas Mariotti, 2017, "Researcher’s Dilemma," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 3, pages 969-1014.
• Songzi Du & Haoxiang Zhu, 2017, "What is the Optimal Trading Frequency in Financial Markets?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 4, pages 1606-1651.
• Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2017, "Certification and Market Transparency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 4, pages 1842-1868.
• Gary B. Gorton & Lixin Huang & Qiang Kang, 2017, "The Limitations of Stock Market Efficiency: Price Informativeness and CEO Turnover," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, volume 21, issue 1, pages 153-200.
• Jess N. Cornaggia & Kimberly J. Cornaggia & John E. Hund, 2017, "Credit Ratings Across Asset Classes: A Long-Term Perspective," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, volume 21, issue 2, pages 465-509.
• Chris Yung, 2017, "Venture Capital and the Market for Talent during Booms and Busts," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, volume 21, issue 5, pages 1875-1899.
• Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, 2017, "Size Discovery," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 30, issue 4, pages 1095-1150.
• Zhiguo He & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu & Feng Gao, 2017, "Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 30, issue 6, pages 2006-2065.
• Toni Ahnert & Ali Kakhbod, 2017, "Information Choice and Amplification of Financial Crises," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 30, issue 6, pages 2130-2178.
• Irani Arráiz & Miriam Bruhn & Rodolfo Stucchi, 2017, "Psychometrics as a Tool to Improve Credit Information," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, volume 30, issue Supplemen, pages 67-76.
• Ganesh Seshan & Robertas Zubrickas, 2017, "Asymmetric Information about Migrant Earnings and Remittance Flows," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, volume 31, issue 1, pages 24-43.
• Grazia Rapisarda & Eleonora Patacchini & University of Southampton, 2003, "A Study of the Effectiveness of Credit Subsidies: Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 153, Mar.
• Ottorino Chillemi & Stefano Galavotti & Benefetto Gui, 2017, "Inefficient Rationing With Post-Contractual Information," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0214, Dec.
• Kogan, Liuba, 2017, "El rap en el Callao: la aflicción profunda," Working Papers, Centro de Investigación, Universidad del Pacífico, number 17-06, Dec.
• Lisa L. Posey & Paul D. Thistle, 2017, "Automobile Insurance and Driver Ability: Contract Choice as a Screening Mechanism," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 42, issue 2, pages 141-170, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-017-0022-7.
• Rachel J. Huang & Arthur Snow & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2017, "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets with Compound Risk," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 42, issue 2, pages 171-192, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-017-0023-6.
• Renate Lange & Jörg Schiller & Petra Steinorth, 2017, "Demand and Selection Effects in Supplemental Health Insurance in Germany," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, volume 42, issue 1, pages 5-30, January, DOI: 10.1057/s41288-016-0023-2.
• Alberto Cavaliere & Giovanni Crea, 2017, "Vertical Differentiation With Optimistic Misperceptions And Information Disparities," DEM Working Papers Series, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management, number 137, May.
• Britta Hoyer & Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2017, "Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse," Working Papers CIE, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics, number 110, Dec.
• Yunan Li, 2017, "Efficient Mechanisms with Information Acquisition," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 16-007, Jun, revised 23 Jun 2017.
• Yunan Li, 2017, "Mechanism Design with Costly Verification and Limited Punishments, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 16-009, Sep, revised 28 Sep 2017.
• Yunan Li, 2017, "Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 17-001, Jan, revised 18 Jan 2017.
• Audrey Hu & Steven Matthews & Liang Zou, 2017, "Low Reserve Prices in Auctions," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 17-004, Mar, revised 13 Mar 2017.
• Aislinn Bohren & Daniel Hauser, 2017, "Bounded Rationality And Learning: A Framwork and A Robustness Result," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 17-007, May, revised 01 May 2017.
• Renata Marks-Bielska & Agata Zielinska, 2017, "Leasing of Agricultural Land Versus Agency Theory in the Light of Study Results," Working Papers, Institute of Economic Research, number 72/2017, May, revised May 2017.
• László Á. Kóczy & János Kiss Hubert, 2017, "The contributions of Hart and Holmström to Contract Theory," Working Paper Series, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management, number 1701.
• Chen, Yongmin & Li, Jianpei & Zhang, Jin, 2017, "Efficient Liability in Expert Markets," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 104090, Jul, revised 06 Nov 2020.
• Schilling, Linda, 2017, "Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 112409, Dec.
• Pierre C. Boyer & Hubert Kempf, 2017, "Regulatory arbitrage and the efficiency of banking regulation," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2017-06, Aug.
• Aiche, A. & Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Moreno, Diego & Selay, A. & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2017, "Information in Tullock contest," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 25820, Nov.
• Hong Liu & Jingyuan Wu & Qingshan Yang, 2017, "Inside Trading when the Market Deviates from the Semi-strong Efficient Condition," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 18, issue 1, pages 111-128, May.
• Mayshar, Joram & Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika, 2017, "Geography, Transparency, and Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, volume 111, issue 3, pages 622-636, August.
• Bignon, Vincent & Dutu, Richard, 2017, "Coin Assaying And Commodity Money," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, volume 21, issue 6, pages 1305-1335, September.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2017, "The Design and Price of Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2049R, Jun.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017, "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2075, Feb.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017, "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2075R, Feb, revised Mar 2017.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017, "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2075R2, Mar, revised Nov 2017.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017, "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2075R3, Mar, revised Mar 2018.
• Dirk Bergemann & Francisco Castro & Gabriel Weintraub, 2017, "The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2078, Feb.
• Dirk Bergemann & Francisco Castro & Gabriel Weintraub, 2017, "The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2078R, Feb, revised Jun 2017.
• Dirk Bergemann & Francisco Castro & Gabriel Weintraub, 2017, "The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2078R2, Feb, revised Jun 2018.
• Dirk Bergemann & Francisco Castro & Gabriel Weintraub, 2017, "The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2078R3, Feb, revised Jul 2019.
• Dirk Bergemann & Francisco Castro & Gabriel Weintraub, 2017, "The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2078R4, Feb, revised Feb 2020.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2102, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2102R, Aug, revised Jun 2018.
• Georg F. Camehl & Pia S. Schober & C. Katharina Spieß, 2017, "Information Asymmetries between Parents and Educators in German Childcare Institutions," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), number 939.
• Pio Baake & Andreas Harasser, 2017, "Upstream Monopoly and Downstream Information Sharing," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 1635.
• Georg F. Camehl & Pia S. Schober & C. Katharina Spiess, 2017, "Information Asymmetries between Parents and Educators in German Childcare Institutions," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 1693.
• Masaki Aoyagi, 2017, "Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 0993, Mar.
• Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017, "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1001, May.
• Anne-Marie Rieu-Foucault, 2017, "Réguler la liquidité des actifs risqués," EconomiX Working Papers, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX, number 2017-19.
• Houdou Basse Mama & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2017, "Investor Relations' Quality and Mispricing," EconomiX Working Papers, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX, number 2017-33.
• Ian Jewitt & Daniel Z. Li, 2017, "Cheap Talk Advertising in Auctions: Horizontally vs Vertically Differentiated Products," Department of Economics Working Papers, Durham University, Department of Economics, number 2017_03, Apr.
• Josie I Chen & Kenju Kamei, 2017, "Disapproval Aversion or Inflated Inequity Acceptance? The Impact of Expressing Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining," Department of Economics Working Papers, Durham University, Department of Economics, number 2017_10, Oct.
• Larmande, François & Stolowy, Hervé, 2017, "Managerial Risk Aversion and Accounting Conservatism," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1215, Jun, revised 27 Jul 2017.
• Colliard, Jean-Edouard, 2017, "Strategic Selection of Risk Models and Bank Capital Regulation," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1229, Sep, revised 29 Nov 2017.
• Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2017, "Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1244, Dec, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3083932.
• Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2017, "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," IESE Research Papers, IESE Business School, number D/1162, Jan.
• Luisa Dressler & Elisabetta Cornago, 2017, "The Rent Impact of Disclosing Energy Performance Certificates: Energy Efficiency and Information Effects," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number ECARES 2017-16, Apr.
• Heider, Florian, 2017, "Collateral, central clearing counterparties and regulation," Research Bulletin, European Central Bank, volume 41.
• Chahrour, Ryan & Gaballo, Gaetano, 2017, "Learning from prices: amplication and business fluctuations," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank, number 2053, May.
• Guttman, Ilan & Marinovic, Ivan, 2017, "Debt Contractsin the Presence of Performance Manipulation," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3495, Jan.
• Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Hebert, Benjamin, 2017, "The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number repec:ecl:stabus:3569, Dec.
• Duffie, Darrell & Antill, Samuel, 2017, "Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number repec:ecl:stabus:3623, Dec.
• Haider Mahmood & Tarek Tawfik Yousef Alkhateeb & Tarek Tawfik Yousef Alkhateeb, 2017, "Testing Asymmetrical Effect of Exchange Rate on Saudi Service Sector Trade: A Non-linear Auto-regressive Distributive Lag Approach," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, volume 7, issue 1, pages 73-77.
• Clara Cardone-Riportella & Marta Garc a-Mandaloniz, 2017, "Does Recent Regulation Improve (or not) the Spanish Mutual Guarantee System?," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, volume 7, issue 1, pages 515-523.
• Stuart Baumann & Margaryta Klymak, 2017, "It's Good to be Bad. A Model of Low Quality Dominance in a Full Information Consumer Search Market," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 280, Jun.
• Anjos, Fernando & Kang, Chang-Mo, 2017, "Managerial myopia, financial expertise, and executive-firm matching," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 43, issue C, pages 464-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.02.010.
• Wang, Jing, 2017, "Debt covenant design and creditor control rights: Evidence from the tightest covenant," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 44, issue C, pages 331-352, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.04.004.
• Sila, Vathunyoo & Gonzalez, Angelica & Hagendorff, Jens, 2017, "Independent director reputation incentives and stock price informativeness," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 47, issue C, pages 219-235, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.09.018.
• Dai, Rui & Massoud, Nadia & Nandy, Debarshi K. & Saunders, Anthony, 2017, "Hedge funds in M&A deals: Is there exploitation of insider information?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 47, issue C, pages 23-45, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.08.001.
• Maitra, Pushkar & Mitra, Sandip & Mookherjee, Dilip & Motta, Alberto & Visaria, Sujata, 2017, "Financing smallholder agriculture: An experiment with agent-intermediated microloans in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, pages 306-337, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.03.001.
• Berentsen, Aleksander & McBride, Michael & Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2017, "Limelight on dark markets: Theory and experimental evidence on liquidity and information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, pages 70-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2016.11.003.
• Wang, Kun Tracy & Wang, Wanbin Walter, 2017, "Competition in the stock market with asymmetric information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, pages 40-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.11.024.
• Aguirre, Iñaki & Beitia, Arantza, 2017, "Modelling countervailing incentives in adverse selection models: A synthesis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 62, issue C, pages 82-89, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2017.01.007.
• Wei, Yu-Chen & Lu, Yang-Cheng & Chen, Jen-Nan & Hsu, Yen-Ju, 2017, "Informativeness of the market news sentiment in the Taiwan stock market," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 39, issue C, pages 158-181, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2016.10.004.
• Miglo, Anton, 2017, "Timing of earnings and capital structure," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2017.01.001.
• Lai, Ya-Wen & Lin, Chiou-Fa & Tang, Mei-Ling, 2017, "Mispricing and trader positions in the S&P 500 index futures market," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 42, issue C, pages 250-265, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2017.07.012.
• Wang, Jian & Wang, Xiaoting & Zhuang, Xintian & Yang, Jun, 2017, "Optimism bias, portfolio delegation, and economic welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 111-113, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.025.
• Barbieri, Stefano, 2017, "Voluntary public good provision with private information using order statistics," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 63-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.005.
• Herzberg, Frederik, 2017, "Respect for experts vs. respect for unanimity: The liberal paradox in probabilistic opinion pooling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 44-47, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.012.
• Li, Daniel Z., 2017, "Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 47-50, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.003.
• Dworczak, Piotr & Zhang, Anthony Lee, 2017, "Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 57-60, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.022.
• Ginzburg, Boris, 2017, "Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 120-123, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.033.
• Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert & Lavi, Ron & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017, "Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 55-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024.
• Zhou, Yu, 2017, "A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 76-79, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012.
• König, Philipp J. & Meyer-Gohde, Alexander, 2017, "Decoupling nominal and real rigidities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 129-132, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.04.019.
• Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2017, "On the efficiency of the first price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 159-161, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003.
• Wu, Zenan & Zheng, Jie, 2017, "Information sharing in private value lottery contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 36-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.030.
• Palazzo, Francesco & Zhang, Min, 2017, "Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 37-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027.
• Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017, "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 18-22, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007.
• Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2017, "First-price auction implements efficient investments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 198-200, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.013.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 96-99, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.026.
• Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017, "Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, pages 96-98, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.039.
• Penczynski, Stefan P., 2017, "The nature of social learning: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 148-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.01.010.
• Poblete, Joaquín & Spulber, Daniel, 2017, "Managing innovation: Optimal incentive contracts for delegated R&D with double moral hazard," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 38-61, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.004.
• Heinz, Matthias & Schumacher, Heiner, 2017, "Signaling cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 199-216, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.06.017.
• Bernales, Alejandro, 2017, "The success of option listings," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 139-161, DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2016.10.004.
• Stede, Jan, 2017, "Bridging the industrial energy efficiency gap – Assessing the evidence from the Italian white certificate scheme," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 112-123, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.01.031.
• Harris, Terry, 2017, "Earnings announcements and quoted bid-ask spreads of U.S. Bank Holding Companies," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 20, issue C, pages 223-228, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2016.10.003.
• Nishihara, Michi, 2017, "Selling out or going public? A real options signaling approach," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 22, issue C, pages 146-152, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2017.04.003.
• Palan, Stefan & Stöckl, Thomas, 2017, "When chasing the offender hurts the victim: The case of insider legislation," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 35, issue C, pages 104-129, DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2016.07.002.
• Sensoy, Ahmet, 2017, "Firm size, ownership structure, and systematic liquidity risk: The case of an emerging market," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, volume 31, issue C, pages 62-80, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2017.06.007.
• Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2017, "Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 172-188, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.008.
• de Castro, Luciano I. & Liu, Zhiwei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017, "Implementation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 20-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010.
• Cason, Timothy N. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2017, "Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 218-233, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.001.
• Palfrey, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard & Roy, Nilanjan, 2017, "How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 234-259, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004.
• Linardi, Sera, 2017, "Accounting for noise in the microfoundations of information aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 334-353, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.004.
• McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2017, "A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 34-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.007.
• Page, Lionel & Siemroth, Christoph, 2017, "An experimental analysis of information acquisition in prediction markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 354-378, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.002.
• Krajbich, Ian & Camerer, Colin & Rangel, Antonio, 2017, "Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 49-62, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.001.
• Van Essen, Matthew & Walker, Mark, 2017, "A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 6-19, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.002.
• Siegenthaler, Simon, 2017, "Meet the lemons: An experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 147-161, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.11.001.
• McMurray, Joseph, 2017, "Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 199-223, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.005.
• Schmidbauer, Eric, 2017, "Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 240-254, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.003.
• Kirkegaard, René, 2017, "Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 373-387, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.001.
• Hahn, Volker, 2017, "Committee design with endogenous participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 388-408, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.009.
• Kajackaite, Agne & Gneezy, Uri, 2017, "Incentives and cheating," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 433-444, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.015.
• Chun, Youngsub & Yengin, Duygu, 2017, "Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 462-476, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.005.
• Leo, Greg, 2017, "Taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 525-547, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.003.
• Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017, "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 548-561, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.010.
• Wang, Tao, 2017, "Information revelation through bunching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 568-582, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.017.
• Kim, Jin Yeub, 2017, "Interim third-party selection in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 645-665, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.013.
• Gottardi, Piero & Tallon, Jean Marc & Ghirardato, Paolo, 2017, "Flexible contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 145-167, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013.
• Li, Yunan, 2017, "Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 225-253, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.006.
• Martin, Daniel, 2017, "Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 131-145, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.007.
• Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2017, "Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: The impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 177-189, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.006.
• Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017, "Calendar mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 252-270, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.004.
• Gradwohl, Ronen & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017, "Perception games and privacy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 293-308, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.006.
• Kim, Semin, 2017, "Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 350-371, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.012.
• Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2017, "Efficient voting with penalties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 468-485, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.006.
• Garrett, Daniel F., 2017, "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 595-612, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.005.
• Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve, 2017, "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 613-631, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.014.
• Rosar, Frank, 2017, "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 632-655, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.002.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017, "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 744-759, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.014.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Parreiras, Sérgio O., 2017, "Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 78-91, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.005.
• Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017, "Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 212-229, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.008.
• Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2017, "Sequential commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 297-315, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.009.
• Long, Yan & Mishra, Debasis & Sharma, Tridib, 2017, "Balanced ranking mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 9-39, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.002.
• Anbarci, Nejat & Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep, 2017, "Information control in reputational cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 153-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.010.
• Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017, "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 227-238, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010.
• Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2017, "Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 317-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.015.
• Chatterjee, Kalyan & Das, Kaustav, 2017, "Bilateral trading and incomplete information: Price convergence in a small market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 89-113, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.006.
• Wang, Hong, 2017, "Information acquisition versus information manipulation in multi-period procurement markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 48-59, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.12.003.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017, "Club good intermediaries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 430-459, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.007.
• Miklós-Thal, Jeanine & Shaffer, Greg, 2017, "Private contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 460-472, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.03.002.
• Rosar, Frank, 2017, "Strategic outsourcing and optimal procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 91-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.11.001.
• Hiriart, Yolande & Thomas, Lionel, 2017, "The optimal regulation of a risky monopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 51, issue C, pages 111-136, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.002.
• Freedman, Seth & Jin, Ginger Zhe, 2017, "The information value of online social networks: Lessons from peer-to-peer lending," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 51, issue C, pages 185-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.09.002.
• Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2017, "Contracting with endogenous entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 51, issue C, pages 85-110, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.001.
• Su, Alice Peng-Ju, 2017, "Information revelation in the Property Right Theory of the firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 133-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.004.
• Meng, Xin & Gunay, Hikmet, 2017, "Exposure problem in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 165-187, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.005.
• Chen, Bo & Ni, Debing, 2017, "Optimal bundle pricing under correlated valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 248-281, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.002.
• Seres, Gyula, 2017, "Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 282-306, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.002.
• Troya-Martinez, Marta, 2017, "Self-enforcing trade credit," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 333-357, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.001.
• Chalioti, Evangelia & Serfes, Konstantinos, 2017, "Strategic incentives for innovations and market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 427-449, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.004.
• Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2017, "Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 148-174, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009.
• Strausz, Roland, 2017, "Politically induced regulatory risk and independent regulatory agencies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 215-238, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.07.003.
• Sogo, Takeharu, 2017, "Effects of seller’s information disclosure in equity auctions requiring post-auction investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 166-181, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.005.
• Durguner, Sena, 2017, "Do borrower-lender relationships still matter for small business loans?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 98-118, DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2017.09.007.
• Lo, Kin & Ramos, Felipe & Rogo, Rafael, 2017, "Earnings management and annual report readability," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 63, issue 1, pages 1-25, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.09.002.
• Schoenfeld, Jordan, 2017, "The effect of voluntary disclosure on stock liquidity: New evidence from index funds," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 63, issue 1, pages 51-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.10.007.
• Chen, Qi & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2017, "The effects of bank mergers on corporate information disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 64, issue 1, pages 56-77, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.05.003.
• Berger, Philip G. & Minnis, Michael & Sutherland, Andrew, 2017, "Commercial lending concentration and bank expertise: Evidence from borrower financial statements," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 64, issue 2, pages 253-277, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.06.005.
• Beltran, Daniel O. & Cordell, Larry & Thomas, Charles P., 2017, "Asymmetric information and the death of ABS CDOs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 76, issue C, pages 1-14, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.11.008.
• Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago & Vo, Quynh-Anh, 2017, "Resolution of financial distress under agency frictions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 40-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.05.009.
• Huang, Fali & Jin, Ginger Zhe & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2017, "Love, money, and parental goods: Does parental matchmaking matter?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, volume 45, issue 2, pages 224-245, DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2016.09.005.
• De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017, "The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 172-186, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.006.
• Cordella, Antonio & Cordella, Tito, 2017, "Motivations, monitoring technologies, and pay for performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 236-255, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.10.016.
• Stepanov, Sergey & Suvorov, Anton, 2017, "Agency problem and ownership structure: Outside blockholder as a signal," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 87-107, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.10.024.
• Sharma, Priyanka, 2017, "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 269-283, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.002.
• Mialon, Sue H. & Yoo, Seung Han, 2017, "Incentives for discrimination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 141-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.021.
• Choi, Jay Pil & Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard & Nahm, Jae, 2017, "Communication of soft information: Reputation and imperfect enforcement of reporting quality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 91-106, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.02.002.
• Omiya, Shungo & Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2017, "Optimal delegation with self-interested agents and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 54-71, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.003.
• Schudy, Simeon & Utikal, Verena, 2017, "‘You must not know about me’—On the willingness to share personal data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 1-13, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.023.
• Conlin, Michael & Dickert-Conlin, Stacy, 2017, "Inference by college admission departments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 14-28, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.001.
• Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2017, "Trust, but verify? Monitoring, inspection costs, and opportunism under limited observability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 320-330, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.028.
• Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017, "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, pages 1-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.001.
• Grüner, Hans Peter, 2017, "Mechanisms for the control of fiscal deficits," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 133-152, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.019.
• Shrestha, Ratna K., 2017, "Menus of price-quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 83, issue C, pages 1-7, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.11.008.
• Saglam, Ismail, 2017, "The Effect of Observability on the Noncontractible Investment of a Regulated Firm," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 75963, Jan.
• Moreno-García, Emma & Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo, 2017, "Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 76428, Jan.
• Wittwer, Milena, 2017, "Centralizing Disconnected Markets? An Irrelevance Result," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 76534, Feb.
• Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan, 2017, "It's your turn: experiments with three-player public good games," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 76565, Feb.
• Antelo, Manel & Antonio, Sampayo, 2017, "Licensing contracts and the number of licenses under screening," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 77252, Mar.
• Gay, Victor & Albertus, Michael, 2017, "Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty Under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 77567, Mar.
• Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017, "On Top-connected Single-peaked and Partially Single-peaked Domains," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 78102, Apr.