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Collateral, central clearing counterparties and regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Heider, Florian

Abstract

Regulation has encouraged the use of collateral and central clearing. This Research Bulletin article summarises research on why such regulation promotes financial stability. JEL Classification: E59, G18, D82

Suggested Citation

  • Heider, Florian, 2017. "Collateral, central clearing counterparties and regulation," Research Bulletin, European Central Bank, vol. 41.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbrbu:2017:0041:
    Note: 276127
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2009. "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2201-2238, June.
    2. Bruno Biais & Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, 2016. "Risk-Sharing or Risk-Taking? Counterparty Risk, Incentives, and Margins," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 1669-1698, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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