Incentives for discrimination
This paper models employers’ incentives for discrimination against ex ante identical groups of workers when the workers must compete for a limited number of positions. Employers benefit from discrimination against minority workers because it can reduce the overall risk from workers’ noisy signals by increasing the expected quality of “majority” workers and their chance to win the competition for the limited number of positions. We show that employers can influence the selection of a discriminatory equilibrium by choosing the set of finalists in competition primarily from a majority group, and favoring them when the two groups are equally qualified. We discuss the implications of equal opportunity laws in this context.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 136 (2017)
Issue (Month): C ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lawrence E. Blume, 2005. "Learning and Statistical Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 118-121, May.
- Jingfeng Lu, 2009. "Auction design with opportunity cost," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 73-103, January.
- Kevin Lang, 1986. "A Language Theory of Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 363-382.
- Moro, Andrea & Norman, Peter, 2004.
"A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 1-30, January.
- Moro,A. & Norman,P., 2001. "A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination," Working papers 4, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Becker, Gary S., 1971. "The Economics of Discrimination," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 2, number 9780226041162, October.
- Cornell, Bradford & Welch, Ivo, 1996. "Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimination," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(3), pages 542-571, June.
- Shubham Chaudhuri & Rajiv Sethi, 2008. "Statistical Discrimination with Peer Effects: Can Integration Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 579-596.
- Phelps, Edmund S, 1972. "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 659-661, September.
- Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-599, June.
- Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, 1977. "Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 30(2), pages 175-187, January.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:1:y:1986:i:c:p:693-785 is not listed on IDEAS
- Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn C, 1993. "Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1220-1240, December.
- Coate, S. & Loury, G.C., 1992. "Will Affirmative Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?," Papers 3, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath & Avner Shaked, 2000. "Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 46-72, March.
- George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, "undated". ""Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search''," CARESS Working Papres 98-06, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, "undated". "Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search," Penn CARESS Working Papers 90ff654ed11b714e3f7530c57, Penn Economics Department.
- Fryer, Roland, 2007. "Belief Flipping in a Dynamic Model of Statistical Discrimination," Scholarly Articles 2955768, Harvard University Department of Economics. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:136:y:2017:i:c:p:141-160. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.