Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2021

• Erya Yang, 2021, "Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 2, pages 269-293, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00211-1.
• Shuli Brammli-Greenberg & Ira Yaari & Elad Daniels & Ariella Adijes-Toren, 2021, "How Managed Entry Agreements can improve allocation in the public health system: a mechanism design approach," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), volume 22, issue 5, pages 699-709, July, DOI: 10.1007/s10198-021-01284-2.
• Christian Hackober & Carolin Bock, 2021, "Which investors’ characteristics are beneficial for initial coin offerings? Evidence from blockchain technology-based firms," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, volume 91, issue 8, pages 1085-1124, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11573-021-01029-w.
• Donald F. Vitaliano, 2021, "Information asymmetry in fire insurance: a frontier approach," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, volume 45, issue 4, pages 764-773, October, DOI: 10.1007/s12197-021-09547-7.
• Chien-Yuan Sher & Nai-Wei Chen & Yu-Hsi Liu & Ryan H. Murphy, 2021, "The impact of soil-liquefaction information disclosures on housing prices: evidence from Kaohsiung, Taiwan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 72, issue 2, pages 217-241, April, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-020-00048-6.
• Demian Macedo & Victor Troster, 2021, "Liquidity shocks and interbank market failures: the role of deposit flights, non-performing loans, and competition," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 16, issue 4, pages 705-746, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-021-00326-5.
• Immanuel Bomze & Werner Schachinger & Jörgen Weibull, 2021, "Does moral play equilibrate?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 1, pages 305-315, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01246-4.
• Sander Heinsalu, 2021, "Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 1, pages 317-339, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01247-3.
• Guilherme Carmona, 2021, "On the optimality of monetary trading," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 3, pages 1121-1160, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01219-2.
• Peter J. Hammond & Lei Qiao & Yeneng Sun, 2021, "Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 3, pages 1161-1187, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01318-5.
• Ori Haimanko, 2021, "Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 3, pages 1231-1258, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01358-5.
• Gino Loyola, 2021, "Effects of competition in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 4, pages 1527-1567, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01347-8.
• Zhifeng Cai & Feng Dong, 2021, "A Model of Secular Migration from Centralized to Decentralized Trade," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 1, pages 201-244, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01280-2.
• Dawen Meng & Guoqiang Tian, 2021, "The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 1, pages 337-375, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01283-z.
• Artyom Jelnov & Yair Tauman & Chang Zhao, 2021, "Stag Hunt with unknown outside options," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 1, pages 303-335, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01286-w.
• Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2021, "Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 2, pages 579-614, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01300-1.
• Sambuddha Ghosh & Yan Long & Manipushpak Mitra, 2021, "Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 2, pages 671-700, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01308-7.
• Maxim Ivanov, 2021, "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 955-1000, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01277-x.
• Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021, "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 909-953, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01299-5.
• Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021, "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 723-742, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01339-0.
• Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021, "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 869-908, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01346-9.
• Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2021, "Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 801-833, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01364-7.
• Daehong Min, 2021, "Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 743-764, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01386-1.
• Andreas Blume & April Mitchell Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2021, "Dynamic coordination via organizational routines," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 4, pages 1001-1047, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01261-5.
• Paul H. Edelman & John A. Weymark, 2021, "Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 4, pages 1091-1120, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01324-7.
• Alex Barrachina & Yair Tauman & Amparo Urbano, 2021, "Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 1, pages 241-278, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00748-8.
• Shinji Ohseto, 2021, "Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 2, pages 419-432, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00754-4.
• Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021, "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 2, pages 475-502, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1.
• Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2021, "Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 4, pages 801-827, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00769-x.
• Christoph Diehl & Christoph Kuzmics, 2021, "The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 4, pages 911-925, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0.
• Áron Tóbiás, 2021, "Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 50, issue 4, pages 989-1019, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00778-w.
• Daniel Aobdia & Saad Siddiqui & Andres Vinelli, 2021, "Heterogeneity in expertise in a credence goods setting: evidence from audit partners," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 2, pages 693-729, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09569-2.
• Jeremy Bertomeu & Igor Vaysman & Wenjie Xue, 2021, "Voluntary versus mandatory disclosure," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 2, pages 658-692, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09579-0.
• Jung Min Kim & Daniel J. Taylor & Robert E. Verrecchia, 2021, "Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 3, pages 971-1001, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09601-z.
• Omri Even-Tov & Naim Bugra Ozel, 2021, "What moves stock prices around credit rating changes?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 26, issue 4, pages 1390-1427, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09573-6.
• Gino Loyola, 2021, "Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 1, pages 1-32, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00240-5.
• Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021, "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 1, pages 33-64, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00242-3.
• Rasoul Ramezanian & Mehdi Feizi, 2021, "Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 3, pages 157-176, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00246-7.
• Shuichi Tsugawa, 2021, "Two-agent interactive implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 4, pages 251-266, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00247-6.
• Silvia Martinez-Gorricho & Miguel Sanchez Villalba, 2021, "Incentives, ability and disutility of effort," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 453-487, September, DOI: 10.1007/s13209-021-00236-6.
• Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2021, "On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 57, issue 2, pages 431-468, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01329-8.
• Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2021, "Information disclosure with many alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 57, issue 4, pages 851-873, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01341-y.
• Gert G. Wagner, 2021, "Polit-ökonomische Aspekte des Berichts zur Lage der Verbraucher:innen
  [Political-Economic Aspects of the Report on the Position of Consumers by the Advisory Council for Consumer Affairs (SVRV)]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 101, issue 6, pages 473-480, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10273-021-2944-z.
• Bin-Tzong Chie & Chih-Hwa Yang, 2021, "Efficiency of the Experimental Prediction Market: Public Information, Belief Evolution, and Personality Traits," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, volume 11, issue 4, pages 1-3.
• Timmer, Yannick & Pierri, Niccola, 2021, "The importance of technology in banking during a crisis," ESRB Working Paper Series, European Systemic Risk Board, number 117, Mar.
• Suqin Ge & Andrea Moro & Beibei Zhu, 2021, "Testing for asymmetric employer learning and statistical discrimination," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 53, issue 12, pages 1361-1377, March, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2020.1830939.
• Pavel Ciaian & d’Artis Kancs & Miroslava Rajcaniova, 2021, "The economic dependency of bitcoin security," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 53, issue 49, pages 5738-5755, October, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2021.1931003.
• Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021, "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Li, Fei & Norman, Peter, 2021, "Sequential persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Siga, Lucas & Mihm, Maximilian, 2021, "Information aggregation in competitive markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 1, January.
• Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2021, "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Eilat, Ran & Pauzner, Ady, 2021, "Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021, "Relational communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Li, Yunan, 2021, "Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Guo, Yingni & Shmaya, Eran, 2021, "Costly miscalibration," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Azrieli, Yaron, 2021, "Monitoring experts," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Jehiel, Philippe, 2021, "Communication with forgetful liars," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Pei, Harry, 2021, "Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Escobar, Juan F. & Zhang, Qiaoxi, 2021, "Delegating learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 2, May.
• Garrett, Daniel F., 2021, "Payoff implications of incentive contracting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Kushnir, Alexey I. & Lokutsievskiy, Lev V., 2021, "When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Eilat, Ran & Eliaz, Kfir & Mu, Xiaosheng, 2021, "Bayesian privacy," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 4, November.
• Piotr Denderski & Christian A. Stoltenberg, 2021, "On existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 21-052/VI, Jun.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2021, "Search, Screening and Sorting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 21-058/VI, Jun.
• Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021, "An implementation approach to rotation programs," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics, number 150, Dec.
• Hugh Macartney & Robert McMillan & Uros Petronijevic, 2021, "A Quantitative Framework for Analyzing the Distributional Effects of Incentive Schemes," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-696, May.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2021, "Search, Screening and Sorting," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-699, Jun.
• Cherbonnier, Frédéric, 2021, "Optimal insurance for time-inconsistent agents," IAST Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), number 21-123, Oct.
• Crampes, Claude & Léautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2021, "Les Certificats d'Economie d'Energie entre économie et politique," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1205, Apr, revised Jan 2022.
• Assad, Stephanie & Calvano, Emilio & Calzolari, Giacomo & Clark, Robert & Ershov, Daniel & Johnson, Justin & Pastorello, Sergio & Rhodes, Andrew & XU, Lei & Wildenbeest, Matthijs & Denicolò, Vincenzo, 2021, "Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Economic research and policy implications," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1210, Mar.
• Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021, "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1227, Jun, revised Jun 2025.
• Yamashita, Takuro & Sarkisian, Roberto, 2021, "Large mechanism design with moment-based allocation externality," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1241, Aug.
• Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021, "Type-contingent Information Disclosure," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1242, Aug.
• Yamashita, Takuro & Murooka, Takeshi, 2021, "Optimal Trade Mechanism with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1245, Sep.
• Yamashita, Takuro & Murooka, Takeshi, 2021, "A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1244, Sep.
• Cherbonnier, Frédéric, 2021, "Optimal insurance for time-inconsistent agents," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1256, Sep.
• Barigozzi, Francesca & Cremer, Helmuth, 2021, "Shining with the stars: competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1257, Oct.
• Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021, "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1261, Nov, revised Apr 2022.
• Furmaco, L. & Longley, N. & Palermo, A. & Rossi, G., 2021, "Employees’ Performance Variation over Fixed-Term Contracts - Evidence from the National Hockey League," Working Papers, Tulane University, Department of Economics, number 2107, May.
• Mikhail Golosov & Luigi Iovino, 2021, "Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 129, issue 9, pages 2629-2665, DOI: 10.1086/715022.
• Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Anwesha Mukherjee & Theodore L. Turocy, 2021, "And the first runner-up is...: Sequential versus simultaneous winner revelation in multi-winner discriminated Tullock contests," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS), School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK., number 21-01, May.
• Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2021, "Cross-Examination," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2021-40.
• Kerman, Toygar & Tenev, Anastas P., 2021, "Persuading communicating voters," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 003, Jan, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2021003.
• Leandro Arozamena & Andres Fioriti & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021, "De teoría de subastas a diseño de mercados: las contribuciones de Paul Milgrom y Robert Wilson a la economía
  [From auction theory to market design: Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson’s contributions to Economics]," Estudios Economicos, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Departamento de Economia, volume 38, issue 76, pages 279-296, january-j.
• Grigory V. Kalyagin, 2021, "Corruption in Law Enforcement Agen-cies and Optimal Enforcement of Law," Working Papers, Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics, number 0035, Apr.
• Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2021, "A network solution to robust implementation: The case of identical but unknown distributions," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1776, Apr.
• Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, 2021, "Informed Choices: A Model of Occupational Licensing and Statistical Discrimination," Upjohn Working Papers, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number 21-351, Aug.
• D.J. da Cunha Batista Geraldes & Franziska Heinicke & S. Rosenkranz, 2021, "Lying in Two Dimensions," Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics, number 2101, Jan.
• Heloise Clolery, 2021, "Legislators in the Crossfire: The Effect of Transparency on Parliamentary Voting," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2021-12, Aug.
• Pavel Ciaian & d'Artis Kancs & Miroslava Rajcaniova, 2021, "Interdependencies between Mining Costs, Mining Rewards and Blockchain Security," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 22, issue 1, pages 25-62, May.
• Shihui Ma, 2021, "Diverging College Premiums: A General Equilibrium Framework on China's College Expansion Policy," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 22, issue 2, pages 289-315, November.
• Yutaka Suzuki, 2021, "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design in a Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 22, issue 2, pages 317-365, November.
• Holden,Richard & Malani,Anup, 2021, "Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781009001397, January.
• Florian Ederer & Weicheng Min, 2021, "Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2272, Jan.
• Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021, "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2285, May.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Andreas Haupt & Alex Smolin, 2021, "The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2290, Jul.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Andreas Haupt & Alex Smolin, 2021, "The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2290R, Jul, revised Dec 2021.
• Dirk Bergemann & Marco Ottaviani, 2021, "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2296, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Edmund Yeh & Jinkun Zhang, 2021, "Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2297, Aug.
• Ian Ball & Jose-Antonio Espin-Sanchez, 2021, "Experimental Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2298, Aug.
• Stephanie De Mel & Kaivan Munshi & Soenje Reiche & Hamid Sabourian, 2021, "Herding with Heterogeneous Ability: An Application to Organ Transplantation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2308, Oct.
• Steven Poelhekke & Razvan Vlahu & Vadym Volosovych, 2021, "Corporate Acquisitions and Bank Relationships," Working Papers, DNB, number 726, Sep.
• Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Arijit Mukherjee, 2021, "Pioneer, Early Follower or Late Entrant: Entry Dynamics with Learning and Market Competition," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1132, Apr.
• Nobuyuki Hanaki & Takashi Hayashi & Michele Lombardi & Kazuhito Ogawa, 2021, "Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: an experiment," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1138, Aug.
• Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2021, "An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1152, Dec.
• Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2021, "An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1152r, Dec, revised Jun 2022.
• Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2021, "Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments," EconomiX Working Papers, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX, number 2021-37.
• Decaire, Paul H. & Wittry, Michael D., 2021, "Waiting on a Friend: Strategic Learning and Corporate Investment," Working Paper Series, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics, number 2021-15, Sep, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3923811.
• Copeland, Adam & Duffie, Darrell & Yang, Yilin (David), 2021, "Reserves Were Not So Ample after All," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3974, Jul.
• Barelli, Paulo & Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2021, "Large Auctions," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3984.
• Mehdi Arzandeh & Derek G. Brewin, 2021, "R&D Investments in Plant Breeding under Changing Intellectual Property Rights," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, volume 11, issue 6, pages 32-47.
• Gyoshev, Stanley B. & Kaplan, Todd R. & Szewczyk, Samuel H. & Tsetsekos, George P., 2021, "Why do investment banks buy put options from companies?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101718.
• Deshmukh, Sanjay & Goel, Anand M. & Howe, Keith M., 2021, "Do CEO beliefs affect corporate cash holdings?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101886.
• Liu, Guanchun & Hu, May & Cheng, Chen, 2021, "The information transfer effects of political connections on mitigating policy uncertainty: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101916.
• Al Guindy, Mohamed, 2021, "Corporate Twitter use and cost of equity capital," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 68, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101926.
• Li, Fengfei & Lin, Chen & Lin, Tse-Chun, 2021, "Salient anchor and analyst recommendation downgrade," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102033.
• Cirelli, Fernando & Espino, Emilio & Sánchez, Juan M., 2021, "Designing unemployment insurance for developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 148, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102565.
• Michelson, Hope & Fairbairn, Anna & Ellison, Brenna & Maertens, Annemie & Manyong, Victor, 2021, "Misperceived quality: Fertilizer in Tanzania," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 148, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102579.
• Bai, Chong-En & Chi, Wei & Liu, Tracy Xiao & Tang, Chao & Xu, Jian, 2021, "Boosting pension enrollment and household consumption by example: A field experiment on information provision," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102622.
• Takayama, Shino, 2021, "Price manipulation, dynamic informed trading, and the uniqueness of equilibrium in sequential trading," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104086.
• Buso, Marco & Moretto, Michele & Zormpas, Dimitrios, 2021, "Excess returns in Public-Private Partnerships: Do governments pay too much?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105586.
• Luo, Dan & Mao, Yipeng, 2021, "Fundamental volatility and informative trading volume in a rational expectations equilibrium," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105663.
• Zhou, Deqing & Zhen, Fang, 2021, "Risk aversion, informative noise trading, and long-lived information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 247-254, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2021.02.001.
• Li, Wenqi, 2021, "COVID-19 and asymmetric volatility spillovers across global stock markets," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 58, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2021.101474.
• He, Yunwen, 2021, "Using your regular contacts as collateral: The information value of call logs," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 58, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2021.101480.
• Buckle, Georgia E. & Füllbrunn, Sascha & Luhan, Wolfgang J., 2021, "Lying for others: The impact of agency on misreporting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109677.
• Lee, Kyounghun & Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl, 2021, "The role of large players in global games with strategic complements and substitutes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109688.
• Buchen, Clemens & Kragl, Jenny & Palermo, Alberto, 2021, "Specialist vs. Generalist: Efficiency in Multitasking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 199, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109699.
• Lee, Kyounghun & Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl, 2021, "Public information and global games with strategic complements and substitutes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 199, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109703.
• Kim, Bara & Yoo, Seung Han, 2021, "Population uncertainty and revealing contestants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 199, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109727.
• Rodivilov, Alexander, 2021, "A note on robust procurement contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 201, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109785.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 202, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109823.
• Akyol, Ethem, 2021, "Can resale harm the original seller in a second-price auction?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109845.
• Juarez, Ruben & Nitta, Kohei & Vargas, Miguel, 2021, "Coalitional efficient profit-sharing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109875.
• Arefeva, Alina & Meng, Delong, 2021, "Revealing information in auctions: The optimal auction versus the second-price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109895.
• Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2021, "Supervisory information and loss aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109908.
• Clark, Derek J. & Kundu, Tapas, 2021, "Partial information disclosure in a contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109915.
• Bindra, Parampreet Christopher & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Neururer, Daniel & Sutter, Matthias, 2021, "On the value of second opinions: A credence goods field experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109925.
• Valdez, Samuel, 2021, "Revisiting early structural findings of asymmetric information’s non-existence in health insurance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110016.
• Gong, Qiang & Yang, Huanxing, 2021, "Cheap talk about the relevance of multiple aspects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110018.
• Femminis, Gianluca & Piccirilli, Giulio, 2021, "Efficient information acquisition with heterogeneous agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110025.
• Pan, Lijun & Wang, Dazhong, 2021, "The broker-optimal bilateral trading mechanisms with linear contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110055.
• Li, Run, 2021, "Disclosure with unknown expertise," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110062.
• Zhang, Yuhua & Mu, Congming, 2021, "Optimal ownership of entrepreneurial firms with rational inattention," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110116.
• Mérel, Pierre & Ortiz-Bobea, Ariel & Paroissien, Emmanuel, 2021, "How big is the “lemons” problem? Historical evidence from French wines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103824.
• Deversi, Marvin & Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2021, "Spin doctors: An experiment on vague disclosure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103872.
• Liu, Hao & Zhang, Qun, 2021, "Firm age and realized idiosyncratic return volatility in China: The role of short-sales constraints," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101745.
• Sensoy, Ahmet & Uzun, Sevcan & Lucey, Brian M., 2021, "Commonality in FX liquidity: High-frequency evidence," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 39, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2020.101577.
• Frei, Christoph & Mitra, Joshua, 2021, "Optimal closing benchmarks," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2020.101674.
• Cabrera, Juan & Gousgounis, Eleni, 2021, "The dynamics of short sales constraints and market quality: An experimental approach," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2020.100549.
• Güçbilmez, Ufuk & Ó Briain, Tomás, 2021, "Bidding styles of institutional investors in IPO auctions," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2020.100579.
• Le, Nhan & Nguyen, Duc Duy & Sila, Vathunyoo, 2021, "Does shareholder litigation affect the corporate information environment?," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2020.100600.
• Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2021, "Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, pages 79-93, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006.
• Andreottola, Giovanni, 2021, "Signaling valence in primary elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, pages 1-32, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.008.
• Wang, Wenbin & Hu, Shanshan, 2021, "Moral hazard with limited liability: Random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, pages 374-386, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.002.
• Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu, 2021, "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, pages 102-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.006.
• Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei, 2021, "Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, pages 155-178, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.001.
• Meng, Delong, 2021, "On the value of repetition for communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, pages 227-246, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.009.
• Jain, Ritesh, 2021, "Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, pages 47-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.004.
• Duffy, John & Lafky, Jonathan, 2021, "Social conformity under evolving private preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 104-124, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.005.
• Castro-Pires, Henrique & Moreira, Humberto, 2021, "Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 73-103, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.010.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, Zongwei & Riis, Christian, 2021, "Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 1-14, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.001.
• Sheth, Jesal D., 2021, "Disclosure of information under competition: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 158-180, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.009.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2021, "Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 181-197, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.001.
• Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021, "How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 198-237, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.010.
• Xu, Haibo, 2021, "A model of gradual information disclosure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 238-269, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.002.
• Correia-da-Silva, João, 2021, "Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 310-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.005.
• Pereira, Ana Elisa, 2021, "Rollover risk and stress test credibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 370-399, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.006.
• Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2021, "Screening by mode of trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 400-420, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.010.
• Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2021, "Optimal delay in committees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 449-475, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.008.
• Shi, Fanqi, 2021, "Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 492-502, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.001.
• Jann, Ole & Schottmüller, Christoph, 2021, "Regime change games with an active defender," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 96-113, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.008.
• Dariel, Aurelie & Riedl, Arno & Siegenthaler, Simon, 2021, "Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 109-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.005.
• Kartal, Melis & Müller, Wieland & Tremewan, James, 2021, "Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 258-275, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.008.
• Felgenhauer, Mike, 2021, "Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 400-408, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.002.
• Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021, "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 425-442, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.003.
• Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021, "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 44-61, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.001.
• Gesche, Tobias, 2021, "De-biasing strategic communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 452-464, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.001.
• Sano, Ryuji, 2021, "Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 465-473, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.006.
• Koch, Simon & Weinschenk, Philipp, 2021, "Contract design with socially attentive preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 591-601, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.002.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Yeh, Edmund & Zhang, Jinkun, 2021, "Nonlinear pricing with finite information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 62-84, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.004.
• Frongillo, Rafael M. & Kash, Ian A., 2021, "General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 636-662, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.010.
• Moldovanu, Benny & Rosar, Frank, 2021, "Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 85-108, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.011.
• Jullien, Bruno & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2021, "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100880.
• Arato, Hiroki & Hori, Takeo & Nakamura, Tomoya, 2021, "Endogenous information acquisition and the partial announcement policy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100898.
• Jost, Peter-J. & Reik, Steffen & Ressi, Anna, 2021, "The information paradox in a monopolist’s credence goods market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102694.
• Garrett, Daniel & Gomes, Renato & Maestri, Lucas, 2021, "Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102735.
• Chen, Jiafeng & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2021, "Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102737.
• Martin, Simon & Shelegia, Sandro, 2021, "Underpromise and overdeliver? - Online product reviews and firm pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102775.
• Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme & Trégouët, Thomas, 2021, "Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102791.
• Chatterjee, Indradeb & Macdonald, Angus S. & Tapadar, Pradip & Thomas, R. Guy, 2021, "When is utilitarian welfare higher under insurance risk pooling?," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 101, issue PB, pages 289-301, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2021.08.006.
• Christensen, Bent Jesper & Parra-Alvarez, Juan Carlos & Serrano, Rafael, 2021, "Optimal control of investment, premium and deductible for a non-life insurance company," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 101, issue PB, pages 384-405, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2021.07.005.
• Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Onderstal, Sander & Parisi, Francesco, 2021, "Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.105981.
• McLeod, Alex, 2021, "Discovery, disclosure, and confidence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.105983.
• Xue, Hao & Zheng, Ronghuo, 2021, "Word-of-mouth communication, noise-driven volatility, and public disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 71, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101363.
• Dyer, Travis A., 2021, "The demand for public information by local and nonlocal investors: Evidence from investor-level data," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 72, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101417.
• Lunawat, Radhika & Shields, Timothy W. & Waymire, Gregory, 2021, "Financial reporting and moral sentiments," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 72, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101421.
• Minetti, Raoul & Mulabdic, Alen & Ruta, Michele & Zhu, Susan Chun, 2021, "Financial structures, banking regulations, and export dynamics," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106056.