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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification

Author

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  • Li, Yunan

    (Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong)

Abstract

A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget-constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare-maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two-stage scheme. First, agents report their budgets, receive cash transfers, and decide whether to enter a lottery over the good. Second, recipients of the good can sell it on a resale market but must pay a sales tax. Low-budget agents receive a higher cash transfer, pay a lower price to enter the lottery, and face a higher sales tax. They are also randomly inspected.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Yunan, 2021. "Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:3907
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2014. "Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(12), pages 3779-3813, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paweł Doligalski & Piotr Dworczak & Mohammad Akbarpour & Scott Duke Kominers*, 2025. "Optimal Redistribution via Income Taxation and Market Design," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 25/787, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    2. Pawel‚ Doligalski & Piotr Dworczak & Mohammad Akbarpour & Scott Duke Kominers, 2025. "Optimal redistribution via income taxation and market design," GRAPE Working Papers 103, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics.
    3. Mishra, Debasis & Paramahamsa, Kolagani, 2024. "Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    4. Debasis Mishra & Kolagani Paramahamsa, 2022. "Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent," Discussion Papers 22-02, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    5. Debasis Mishra & Kolagani Paramahamsa, 2022. "Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent," Papers 2202.10378, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    6. Geoffrey A. Chua & Gaoji Hu & Fang Liu, 2023. "Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 455-488, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; budget constraints; efficiency; costly verification;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods

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