Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2023

• Rense Corten & Judith Kas & Timm Teubner & Martijn Arets, 2023, "The role of contextual and contentual signals for online trust: Evidence from a crowd work experiment," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 33, issue 1, pages 1-17, December, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-023-00655-2.
• Xi Wu & Li Gan, 2023, "Multiple dimensions of private information in life insurance markets," Empirical Economics, Springer, volume 65, issue 5, pages 2145-2180, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00181-023-02424-8.
• Jesús Andrés Burbano-Gómez & Mónica María Sinisterra-Rodríguez, 2023, "Effects of informative advertising on the formation of market structures," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 50, issue 2, pages 445-486, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-022-00254-w.
• Kittiphod Charoontham & Thunyarat Amornpetchkul, 2023, "Compensation reform analysis on inflated credit rating attenuation," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 50, issue 3, pages 627-645, September, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-022-00215-3.
• Sanxi Li & Xinyu Li & Zhan Qu, 2023, "Does vertical integration increase product quality?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 1, pages 69-80, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00240-4.
• Xiangyu Shi, 2023, "Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 243-254, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00256-4.
• Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2023, "Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 255-275, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00257-3.
• Jinyang Chen & Chaoqun Wang, 2023, "“The reputation premium”: does hospital ranking improvement lead to a higher healthcare spending?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), volume 24, issue 5, pages 817-830, July, DOI: 10.1007/s10198-022-01511-4.
• Jyh-Bang Jou & Charlene Tan Lee, 2023, "Design of the contingent royalty rate as related to the type of investment," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-25, December, DOI: 10.1186/s40854-023-00450-0.
• Francesca Biagini & Andrea Mazzon & Ari-Pekka Perkkiö, 2023, "Optional projection under equivalent local martingale measures," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 27, issue 2, pages 435-465, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00503-3.
• Emma Hubert, 2023, "Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 27, issue 3, pages 605-661, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00506-0.
• David Bartolini & Agnese Sacchi & Domenico Scalera & Alberto Zazzaro, 2023, "Voters’ Distance, Information Bias and Politicians’ Salary," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), volume 9, issue 2, pages 637-664, July, DOI: 10.1007/s40797-022-00183-6.
• Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2023, "Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 74, issue 3, pages 439-444, July, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-022-00119-w.
• Diogo Geraldes & Franziska Heinicke & Stephanie Rosenkranz, 2023, "Lying in two dimensions," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 34-50, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-022-00121-3.
• Stefano Barbieri, 2023, "Complementarity and information in collective action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 1, pages 167-206, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01394-1.
• Jianjun Miao & Dongling Su, 2023, "Asset market equilibrium under rational inattention," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 1, pages 1-30, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01396-z.
• Boaz Zik, 2023, "Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 567-590, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01416-6.
• Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023, "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 743-780, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01422-8.
• Sander Heinsalu, 2023, "Greater search cost reduces prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 923-947, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01432-6.
• Mingshi Kang & Charles Z. Zheng, 2023, "Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 4, pages 1141-1180, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01442-4.
• Madhuparna Karmokar & Souvik Roy, 2023, "The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 1, pages 111-152, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01449-x.
• Rongzhu Ke & Xinyi Xu, 2023, "The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 2, pages 375-416, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01467-9.
• Qiang Gong & Jie Shuai & Huanxing Yang, 2023, "Informational correlation and selective disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 2, pages 645-683, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01473-x.
• Sarvesh Bandhu & Ratul Lahkar, 2023, "Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 2, pages 685-721, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01474-w.
• Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023, "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1051-1067, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01495-z.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2023, "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1329-1362, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01498-w.
• Federico Vaccari, 2023, "Influential news and policy-making," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1363-1418, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01499-9.
• Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023, "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 1, pages 33-61, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00809-0.
• Alejandro Francetich, 2023, "When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 363-399, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00821-4.
• Xin Feng, 2023, "Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 401-421, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00822-3.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2023, "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 423-450, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00823-2.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "All-pay matching contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 587-606, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00831-2.
• Zhonghao Shui, 2023, "Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 3, pages 925-951, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00845-4.
• Manuel Foerster, 2023, "Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 4, pages 1291-1316, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1.
• Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & James Temitope Dada & Nicholas Mbaya Odhiambo & Xuan Vinh Vo, 2023, "Modelling asymmetric structure in the finance-poverty nexus: empirical insights from an emerging market economy," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, volume 57, issue 1, pages 453-487, February, DOI: 10.1007/s11135-022-01363-3.
• Peter-J. Jost, 2023, "Auditing versus monitoring and the role of commitment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 28, issue 2, pages 463-496, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09647-z.
• Dane M. Christensen & Arthur Morris & Beverly R. Walther & Laura A. Wellman, 2023, "Political information flow and management guidance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 28, issue 3, pages 1466-1499, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-022-09671-7.
• Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer & Xu Tan, 2023, "A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 1, pages 1-43, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00279-y.
• Christian Basteck & Marco Mantovani, 2023, "Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 1, pages 187-220, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00283-2.
• Darong Dai & Guoqiang Tian, 2023, "Optimal interregional redistribution and local budget rules with multidimensional heterogeneity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 1, pages 79-124, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00291-w.
• Dmitry Sedov, 2023, "Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 3, pages 505-546, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00301-x.
• Steven R. Williams, 2023, "Trade of a common value good," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 4, pages 701-724, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6.
• Manitra A. Rakotoarisoa, 2023, "Optimal mechanism of transfer payments to cost-varying firms," SN Business & Economics, Springer, volume 3, issue 11, pages 1-23, November, DOI: 10.1007/s43546-023-00564-8.
• Mohamed Oudgou & Abdeslam Boudhar, 2023, "The bank–SME relationship and rationing risk reduction: an empirical study on survey data," SN Business & Economics, Springer, volume 3, issue 8, pages 1-39, August, DOI: 10.1007/s43546-023-00518-0.
• Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023, "The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2023-06, Apr.
• Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023, "Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2023-07, Feb.
• Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023, "Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2023-12, Oct.
• Tobias Brünner & René Levínský, 2023, "Price discovery and gains from trade in asset markets with insider trading," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 29, issue 3, pages 255-277, February, DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2022.2032241.
• Andreas G. B. Ziegler, 2023, "Persuading an audience: Testing information design in the laboratory," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 23-048/I, Aug.
• Fredj FHIMA & Ridha NOUIRA & Philippe ADAIR, 2023, "Financement des entreprises et prêts non perfor-mants en Tunisie," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, volume 58, pages 65-81.
• Michael Geruso & Timothy J. Layton & Grace McCormack & Mark Shepard, 2023, "The Two-Margin Problem in Insurance Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, volume 105, issue 2, pages 237-257, March, DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01070.
• Lefebvre, Perrin & Martimort, David, 2023, "Delegation, Capture and Endogenous Information Structures," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1418, Mar.
• Lefebvre, Perrin & Martimort, David, 2023, "Reform for Sale: a Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1419, Mar.
• Panova, Elena & Garrett, Daniel F., 2023, "Regulating investments when both costs and need are private," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1429, Apr, revised Aug 2025.
• Rey, Patrick & Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie, 2023, "Coordination in the Fight Against Collusion," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1441, Jun.
• De Donder, Philippe & Boyer, Martin & Fluet, Claude & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Leroux, Marie-Louise, 2023, "La mauvaise perception des risques de longévité et de dépendance ne suffit pas à expliquer la faiblesse du marché de l'assurance dépendance (au Canada)," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1479, Oct.
• Juan Diego Borrero Sánchez, 2023, "Analysis of tweets from food retailers operating in Spain and the UK: How usergenerated content on Twitter can help agrifood cooperatives build better relationships with their customers
  [Análisis de los Tweets de los minoristas de alimentación q," REVESCO: Revista de estudios cooperativos, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Escuela de Estudios Cooperativos, issue 143, pages 85557-85557, DOI: 10.5209/REVE.85557.
• Paweł Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2023, "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, volume 1, issue 2, pages 371-402, DOI: 10.1086/724511.
• Volker Nocke & Roland Strausz, 2023, "Collective Brand Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 131, issue 1, pages 1-58, DOI: 10.1086/720986.
• Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2023, "Informed Information Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 131, issue 11, pages 3186-3232, DOI: 10.1086/724843.
• Mariana Laverde & Elton Mykerezi & Aaron Sojourner & Aradhya Sood, 2023, "Gains from Reassignment: Evidence from A Two-Sided Teacher Market," Upjohn Working Papers, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number 23-392, Nov.
• Irina N. Tkachenko & Marina A. Meteleva, 2023, "Modelling a corporate network’s stakeholder value created amid CSR policy implementation," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, volume 14, issue 3, pages 44-58, July, DOI: 10.29141/2218-5003-2023-14-3-4.
• Jos Jansen, 2023, "Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Strong Intellectual Property Rights," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, number 2023-04, May.
• Dhruva Bhaskar & Andrew McClellan & Evan Sadler, 2023, "Regulation Design in Insurance Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 10, pages 2546-2580, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210710.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mengxi Zhang, 2023, "Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 10, pages 2581-2614, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221247.
• Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Yeşim Orhun & Collin Raymond, 2023, "Intrinsic Information Preferences and Skewness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 10, pages 2615-2644, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171474.
• David Delacrétaz & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym, 2023, "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 10, pages 2689-2717, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210096.
• Alexander Wolitzky, 2023, "Unobserved-Offers Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 1, pages 136-173, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211524.
• Paula Onuchic & Debraj Ray, 2023, "Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 1, pages 210-252, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211729.
• Silvia Saccardo & Marta Serra-Garcia, 2023, "Enabling or Limiting Cognitive Flexibility? Evidence of Demand for Moral Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 2, pages 396-429, February, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201333.
• Michael D. Bauer & Eric T. Swanson, 2023, "An Alternative Explanation for the "Fed Information Effect"," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 3, pages 664-700, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201220.
• Anil K Kashyap & Natalia Kovrijnykh & Jian Li & Anna Pavlova, 2023, "Is There Too Much Benchmarking in Asset Management?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 4, pages 1112-1141, April, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210476.
• Ben S. Bernanke, 2023, "Nobel Lecture: Banking, Credit, and Economic Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 5, pages 1143-1169, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.113.5.1143.
• Panle Jia Barwick & Yanyan Liu & Eleonora Patacchini & Qi Wu, 2023, "Information, Mobile Communication, and Referral Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 5, pages 1170-1207, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200187.
• Thomas Brzustowski & Alkis Georgiadis-Harris & Balázs Szentes, 2023, "Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 5, pages 1334-1359, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220357.
• Luciano Pomatto & Philipp Strack & Omer Tamuz, 2023, "The Cost of Information: The Case of Constant Marginal Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 5, pages 1360-1393, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190185.
• Giuseppe Lopomo & Nicola Persico & Alessandro T. Villa, 2023, "Optimal Procurement with Quality Concerns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 6, pages 1505-1529, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211437.
• Elisa Macchi, 2023, "Worth Your Weight: Experimental Evidence on the Benefits of Obesity in Low-Income Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 9, pages 2287-2322, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211879.
• Torben Fischer & Markus Frölich & Andreas Landmann, 2023, "Adverse Selection in Low-Income Health Insurance Markets: Evidence from an RCT in Pakistan," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 313-340, July, DOI: 10.1257/app.20200639.
• Ryan Chahrour & Robert Ulbricht, 2023, "Robust Predictions for DSGE Models with Incomplete Information," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 173-208, January, DOI: 10.1257/mac.20200053.
• Javier Turen, 2023, "State-Dependent Attention and Pricing Decisions," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 161-189, April, DOI: 10.1257/mac.20210038.
• Levent Altinoglu & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2023, "Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 35-64, April, DOI: 10.1257/mac.20210333.
• Dan Levin & James Peck, 2023, "Misbehavior in Common Value Auctions: Bidding Rings and Shills," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 171-200, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200447.
• René Kirkegaard, 2023, "Contest Design with Stochastic Performance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 201-238, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200422.
• Greg Kubitz, 2023, "Two-Stage Contests with Private Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 239-287, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200071.
• Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci & Nikrooz Nasr, 2023, "Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs, and Data Portability," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 30-73, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200309.
• Emil Temnyalov, 2023, "An Information Theory of Efficient Differential Treatment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 323-358, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200400.
• Caio Lorecchio & Daniel Monte, 2023, "Dynamic Information Design under Constrained Communication Rules," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 359-398, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200356.
• Yair Antler & Daniel Bird & Santiago Oliveros, 2023, "Sequential Learning," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 399-433, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200352.
• Robert Evans & Sönje Reiche, 2023, "When Is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 434-466, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200204.
• Daniel N. Hauser, 2023, "Censorship and Reputation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 497-528, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200266.
• Ilia Krasikov & Rohit Lamba & Thomas Mettral, 2023, "Implications of Unequal Discounting in Dynamic Contracting," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 638-692, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200427.
• Guillaume Roger & Benoît Julien, 2023, "Moral Hazard and Efficiency in a Frictional Market," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 693-730, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200378.
• Shota Ichihashi, 2023, "Dynamic Privacy Choices," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 1-40, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210100.
• Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2023, "The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 187-226, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210114.
• Aaron Kolb & Marilyn Pease & Daniel W. Sacks & Joshua Quick, 2023, "Blind Disclosure," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 41-79, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210182.
• Francisco Espinosa & Debraj Ray, 2023, "Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 493-535, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200472.
• T. Tony Ke & Christopher Li & Mikhail Safronov, 2023, "Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 536-567, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200192.
• Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2023, "Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Managerial Risk-Taking," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 568-598, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200325.
• Xiang Hui & Maryam Saeedi & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Steven Tadelis, 2023, "Raising the Bar: Certification Thresholds and Market Outcomes," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 599-626, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210179.
• Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2023, "Stable and Efficient Resource Allocation with Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 627-659, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210109.
• Murali Agastya & Oleksii Birulin, 2023, "Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 660-698, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210126.
• Anh Nguyen & Teck Yong Tan, 2023, "Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 699-726, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210112.
• Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2023, "Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 80-108, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210190.
• Bingchao Huangfu & Heng Liu, 2023, "Information Spillover in Multi-good Adverse Selection," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 118-165, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190287.
• Mogens Fosgerau & Rajiv Sethi & Jörgen Weibull, 2023, "Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 201-242, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210391.
• Ron Siegel & Bruno Strulovici, 2023, "Judicial Mechanism Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 243-270, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220100.
• Samuel Häfner & Curtis R. Taylor, 2023, "Working for References," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 33-77, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210299.
• Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Robert J. Gary-Bobo, 2023, "Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 387-425, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210392.
• Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu & Yuxuan Zhu, 2023, "Bid Caps in Noisy Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 426-473, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220046.
• Ran Weksler & Boaz Zik, 2023, "Disclosure in Markets for Ratings," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 501-526, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210214.
• Thomas Jungbauer & Michael Waldman, 2023, "Self-Reported Signaling," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 78-117, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210204.
• Iván Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2023, "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 4, pages 1-67, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220006.
• Fei Li & Jidong Zhou, 2023, "A Model of Sequential Crisis Management," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 4, pages 319-349, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220107.
• Giacomo De Giorgi & Andres Drenik & Enrique Seira, 2023, "The Extension of Credit with Nonexclusive Contracts and Sequential Banking Externalities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 233-271, February, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200220.
• Cher Hsuehhsiang Li & Basit Zafar, 2023, "Ask and You Shall Receive? Gender Differences in Regrades in College," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 359-394, May, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210053.
• Damien de Walque & Christine Valente, 2023, "Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 256-285, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210202.
• Joshua A. Blonz, 2023, "The Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 286-321, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210208.
• Ethan Kaplan & Fernando Saltiel & Sergio Urzúa, 2023, "Voting for Democracy: Chile's Plebiscito and the Electoral Participation of a Generation," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 438-464, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210338.
• Francesc Dilmé, 2023, "Robust Information Transmission," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 5, issue 1, pages 111-124, March, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210643.
• Emilio Esguerra & Leonhard Vollmer & Johannes Wimmer, 2023, "Influence Motives in Social Signaling: Evidence from COVID-19 Vaccinations in Germany," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 5, issue 2, pages 275-291, June, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20220163.
• Arthur Robson & Larry Samuelson & Jakub Steiner, 2023, "Decision Theory and Stochastic Growth," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 5, issue 3, pages 357-376, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20220456.
• Itai Arieli & Ronen Gradwohl & Rann Smorodinsky, 2023, "Herd Design," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 5, issue 4, pages 460-476, December, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20220412.
• Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden, 2023, "A Solomonic Solution to Blockchain Front-Running," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 248-252, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231029.
• Robert M. Townsend & Nicolas X. Zhang, 2023, "Technologies That Replace a "Central Planner"," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 257-262, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231031.
• Buso, Marco & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, , "Dynamic Regulation of Public Franchises with Imperfectly Correlated Demand Shocks," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 330499, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.330499.
• Levaggi, Rosella & Moretto, Michele & Pertile, Paolo, , "Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 338404, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.338404.
• Magdalena Judika Br. SIRINGORINGO & Jadongan SIJABATB, 2023, "The Influence of Information Asymmetry, Profitability and Company Size on Earnings Management in Companies in the Goods and Consumption Industry Sector Listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the 2016-2020 Period," CECCAR Business Review, Body of Expert and Licensed Accountants of Romania (CECCAR), volume 4, issue 1, pages 58-72, January, DOI: 10.37945/cbr.2023.01.07.
• Felix J. Bierbrauer & Pierre C. Boyer & Andreas Peichl & Daniel Weishaar, 2023, "The Political Economy of Joint Taxation," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 239, Jun.
• Loukas Balafoutas & Helena Fornwagner & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter & Maryna Tverdostup, 2023, "Diagnostic Uncertainty and Insurance Coverage in Credence Goods Markets," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 257, Oct.
• Loukas Balafoutas & Helena Fornwagner & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter & Maryna Tverdostup, 2023, "Serving Consumers in an Uncertain World: A Credence Goods Experiment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 258, Oct.
• Francesc Dilmé, 2023, "The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with Private Information," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 267, Dec.
• Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2023, "Variable Population Manipulations of Reallocation Rules in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 223, Mar.
• Manuel Foerster & Daniel Habermacher, 2023, "Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 229, Mar.
• Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar & Jorge Bruno & Renaud Foucart & Sonali SenGupta, 2023, "Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2303.10514, Mar, revised Dec 2024.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2023, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.07653, Apr.
• Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023, "The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.09381, Apr.
• Tatiana Daddario & Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023, "An Assignment Problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2305.01477, May.
• Gaetan Fournier & Alberto Grillo & Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2023, "Strategic flip-flopping in political competition," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2305.02834, May.
• Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen & Yimeng Zhang, 2023, "Coarse Information Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2305.18020, May, revised Jun 2025.
• Roweno J. R. K. Heijmans, 2023, "Unraveling Coordination Problems," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2307.08557, Jul, revised Aug 2023.
• Joshua S. Gans & Hanna Halaburda, 2023, ""Zero Cost'' Majority Attacks on Permissionless Blockchains," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2308.06568, Aug.
• Jan-Henrik Steg & Elshan Garashli & Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics, 2023, "Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2309.04193, Sep, revised Mar 2024.
• Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2023, "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2309.11595, Sep.
• Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin, 2023, "Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Recommendations," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2309.12122, Sep, revised Jun 2025.
• Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023, "Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2311.02889, Nov.
• Hans Gersbach & Akaki Mamageishvili & Fikri Pitsuwan, 2023, "Crowdsearch," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2311.08532, Nov.
• Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023, "Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2311.12242, Nov, revised Feb 2024.
• Yuliia Klius & Oleh Zamai, 2023, "Methods Of Valuation Of Items Of Financial Reporting Of Ukrainian Enterprises: Unification Of National And International Standards," Three Seas Economic Journal, Publishing house "Baltija Publishing", volume 4, issue 1, DOI: 10.30525/2661-5150/2023-1-4.
• Santiago Carbo-Valverde & Héctor Pérez Saiz & Hongyu Xiao, 2023, "Geographical and Cultural Proximity in Retail Banking," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 23-2, Jan, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2023-2.
• Thorsten Beck & Patrick Behr & Raquel de Freitas Oliveira, 2023, "Information Sharing, Access to Finance, Loan Contract Design, and the Labor Market," Working Papers Series, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department, number 580, May.
• Salomón García, 2023, "The amplification effects of adverse selection in mortgage credit suply," Working Papers, Banco de España, number 2316, Jun, DOI: https://doi.org/10.53479/30138.
• Carlo Gola & Valentina Cappa & Patrizio Fiorenza & Paolo Granata & Federica Laurino & Lorenzo Lesina & Francesco Lorizzo & Gabriele Marcelli, 2023, "The governance of blockchains and system based on distributed ledger technology," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 773, Jun.
• Carlo Gola & Patrizio Fiorenza & Federica Laurino & Lorenzo Lesina, 2023, "The use of logic circuits to classify blockchains," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 774, Jun.
• Altinok Ahmet & Mac Donald Diana E., 2023, "Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster Care," Working Papers, Banco de México, number 2023-19, Dec.
• Roland Strausz, 2023, "Correlation-Savvy Sellers," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 0016, May, DOI: 10.48462/opus4-4960.
• Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz, 2023, "The irrelevance of fee structures for certification," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 0017, May, DOI: 10.48462/opus4-4972.
• Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023, "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 0030, Dec, DOI: 10.48462/opus4-5207.
• David Lagziel & Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2023, "Second Opinions and the Humility Threshold," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2305.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "Elimination Games," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2312.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "All-Pay Matching Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2313.
• Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2023, "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2317.
• Ori Haimanko, 2023, "Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2318.
• Egemen Eren & Semyon Malamud & Haonan Zhou, 2023, "Signaling with debt currency choice," BIS Working Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 1067, Jan.
• Charles A.E. Goodhart & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos & Xuan Wang, 2023, "Support for small businesses amid COVID‐19," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, volume 90, issue 358, pages 612-652, April, DOI: 10.1111/ecca.12460.
• Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2023, "Cursed Consumers and the Effectiveness of Consumer Protection Policies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 71, issue 2, pages 407-440, June, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12332.
• Alex Smolin, 2023, "Disclosure and pricing of attributes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 54, issue 4, pages 570-597, December, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12451.
• Gabor Pinter & Semih Uslu, 2023, "Price formation in markets with trading delays," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England, number 1023, Jun.
• Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2023, "Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_256v3, Apr.
• Marco Reuter, 2023, "Revenue Maximization With Partially Verifiable Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_395, Feb.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mengxi Zhang, 2023, "Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random losses and Adverse Selection," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_399, Mar.
• Avi Lichtig & Ran Weksler, 2023, "Information Transmission in Voluntary Disclosure Games," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_405, Mar.
• Christoph Carnehl & Maximilian Schaefer & Andre Stenzel & Kevin Ducbao Tran, 2023, "Value for Money and Selection: How Pricing Affects Airbnb Ratings," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_411, Apr.
• Orhan Aygün & Günnur Ege Bilgin, 2023, "Placement With Assignment Guarantees and Semi-Flexible Capacities," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_417, Apr.
• Nina Bobkova & Helene Mass, 2023, "Two-Dimensional Information Acquisition in Social Learning," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_433, Jun.
• Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass, 2023, "Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_434, Jun.
• Christian Bayer & Moritz Kuhn, 2023, "Job Levels and Wages," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_437, Jul.
• Rosina Rodríguez Olivera, 2023, "Strategic Incentives and the Optimal Sale of Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_442, Jul.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mengxi Zhang, 2023, "Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_452, Aug.
• Claudia Herresthal & Tatiana Mayskaya & Arina Nikandrova, 2023, "Data Linkage Between Markets: Does Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm?," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_462, Sep.
• Susanne Goldluecke & Thomas Troeger, 2023, "The Multiple-Volunteers Principle for Assigning Unpleasant and Pleasant Tasks," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_464, Sep.
• Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2023, "Information Design in Cheap Talk," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_470, Oct.
• Francesc Dilmé, 2023, "The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with Private Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_479, Dec.
• Deniz Kattwinkel & Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser & Alexander Winter, 2023, "Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_485, Dec.
• Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser, 2023, "Simple Allocation with Correlated Types," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_486, Dec.
• Spiganti Alessandro, 2023, "Wealth Inequality and the Exploration of Novel Technologies," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 2, pages 753-790, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejm-2022-0073.
• Lorenzon Emmanuel, 2023, "Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 155-179, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0009.
• Esfahanian Homa & Moghaddasi Kelishomi Ali, 2023, "Redistributive Unemployment Benefit and Taxation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 327-343, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0049.
• Kosenko Andrew, 2023, "Constrained Persuasion with Private Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 345-370, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0017.
• Demougin Dominique & Upton Harvey, 2023, "Relative Income Concerns, Dismissal, and the Use of Pay-for-Performance," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 405-441, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0107.
• Suzuki Yutaka, 2023, "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 2, pages 537-575, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0130.
• Kim Jeong-Yoo & Xu Wei, 2023, "A Signaling Theory of the Online Consumer Review Policy," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, volume 22, issue 2, pages 53-84, August, DOI: 10.1515/rne-2023-0041.
• Pawel Doligalski & Piotr Dworczak & Joanna Krysta, 2023, "Incentive separability," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK, number 23/777, Dec.
• Claude Crampes & Thomas-Olivier Léautier, 2023, "Les certificats d’économie d’énergie entre économie et politique," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 74, issue 1, pages 51-80.
• Françoise Forges, 2023, "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 74, issue 4, pages 529-539.
• Lucie Ménager, 2023, "Common Knowledge in Game Theory," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 74, issue 4, pages 569-599.
• Philippe Trainar, 2023, "Le marché de l'assurance dépendance," Revue d'économie financière, Association d'économie financière, volume 0, issue 4, pages 151-165.
• M. Martin Boyer & Philippe de Donder & Claude Fluet & Marie-Louise Leroux & Pierre-Carl Michaud, 2023, "La mauvaise perception des risques de longévité et de dépendance ne suffit pas à expliquer la faiblesse du marché de l'assurance dépendance (au Canada)," Revue d'économie financière, Association d'économie financière, volume 0, issue 4, pages 185-201.