Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2023

• Daher, Wassim & Saleeby, Elias G., 2023, "Existence of Linear Equilibria in The Kyle Model with Partial Correlation and Two Risk Neutral Traders," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117813, Jun.
• Berliant, Marcus & Boyer, Pierre, 2023, "Politics and income taxes: progress and progressivity," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118099, Jul.
• Daher, Wassim & Karam, Fida & Ahmed, Naveed, 2023, "Insider Trading with Semi-Informed Traders and Information Sharing: The Stackelberg Game," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118138, Jun.
• Lodh, Rishab & Dey, Oindrila, 2023, "“Fake news alert!”: A game of misinformation and news consumption behavior," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118371, Aug.
• Yang, Nanyin & Palma, Marco & Drichoutis, Andreas C., 2023, "Humanization of Virtual Assistants and Delegation Choices," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 119275, Nov.
• Asano, Koji, 2023, "Liquidity Policies with Opacity," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 119531, Dec.
• Pham, Hien, 2023, "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120364, Apr, revised 06 Mar 2024.
• Pham, Hien, 2023, "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120462, Apr, revised 17 Mar 2024.
• Pham, Hien, 2023, "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120989, Apr, revised 06 Mar 2024.
• Hodler, Roland & Schaudt, Paul & Vesperoni, Alberto, 2023, "Mining for peace," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17807, Jan.
• Foarta, Dana & Ting, Michael, 2023, "Organizational Capacity and Project Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17817, Jan.
• Emons, Winand & Lenhard, Severin, 2023, "The Economics of Advice," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17840, Jan.
• Miklos-Thal, Jeanine & Goldfarb, Avi & Haviv, Avery & Tucker, Catherine, 2023, "Digital Hermits," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17865, Jan.
• Herresthal, Claudia & Mayskaya, Tatiana & Nikandrova, Arina, 2023, "Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17947, Mar.
• Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2023, "Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17951, Mar.
• Deb, Rahul & Pai, Mallesh & Said, Maher, 2023, "Indirect Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17955, Mar.
• Ichihashi, Shota & Smolin, Alex, 2023, "Data Provision to an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17963, Mar.
• Malenko, Nadya, 2023, "Information Flows, Organizational Structure, and Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18004, Mar.
• Sloof, Randolph & Beetsma, Roel & Steinweg, Alina, 2023, "Debt ceilings with fiscal intransparency and imperfect electoral accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18007, Mar.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Rovigatti, Gabriele & Rovigatti, Michele & Shakhgildyan, Ksenia, 2023, "Artificial Intelligence & Data Obfuscation: Algorithmic Competition in Digital Ad Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18009, Mar.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro & Wu, Nick, 2023, "Managed Campaigns and Data-Augmented Auctions for Digital Advertising," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18087, Apr.
• Alasalmi, Juho & Goldlücke, Susanne & Jordan, Michelle, 2023, "Hidden Overtime: Optimal Contracts with (Self-)Deceptive Effort Reports," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18105, Apr.
• Beck, Thorsten & Behr, Patrick & de Freitas Oliveira, Raquel, 2023, "Information Sharing, Access to Finance, Loan Contract Design, and the Labor Market," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18131, May.
• Bierbrauer, Felix & Boyer, Pierre & Peichl, Andreas & Weishaar, Daniel, 2023, "The taxation of couples," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18138, May.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18208, Jun.
• Ahnert, Toni & Hoffmann, Peter & Leonello, Agnese & Porcellacchia, Davide, 2023, "Central Bank Digital Currency and Financial Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18222, Jun.
• Grüner, Hans Peter, 2023, "Freedom - Why? A Mechanism Design Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18281, Jul.
• Agur, Itai & Ari, Anil & Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, 2023, "Bank Competition and Household Privacy in a Digital Payment Monopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18288, Jul.
• Auster, Sarah & pavoni, Nicola, 2023, "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18296, Jul.
• Deimen, Inga, 2023, "Information and Authority in Multi-Divisional Organizations," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18341, Aug.
• Janssen, Maarten & Roy, Santanu, 2023, "Information Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18391, Aug.
• Boudreau, Laura & Chassang, Sylvain & González-Torres, Ada & Heath, Rachel, 2023, "Monitoring Harassment in Organizations," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18423, Sep.
• Bonatti, Alessandro & Huang, Yunhao & Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, 2023, "A Theory of the Effects of Privacy," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18459, Sep.
• Cavatorta, Elisa & Guarino, Antonio & Huck, Steffen, 2023, "Social Learning with Partial and Aggregate Information: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18461, Sep.
• Ichihashi, Shota & Smolin, Alex, 2023, "Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Consumption," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18476, Sep.
• Benhima, Kenza & Bolliger, Elio, 2023, "Do Local Forecasters Have Better Information?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18496, Oct.
• Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Pitsuwan, Fikri, 2023, "Crowdsearch," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18529, Oct.
• Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe & Mattozzi, Andrea & Nicolò, Antonio, 2023, "The Rise of Referendums," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18652, Dec.
• Eilat, Ran & Eliaz, Kfir & Mu, Xiaosheng, 2023, "Privacy Preserving Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18662, Dec.
• Tarantino, Emanuele & Terstiege, Stefan & Vigier, Adrien, 2023, "Market Segmentation, Information Sale, and Information Foreclosure," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18691, Dec.
• Hervé Alexandre & Christian At & Catherine Refait-Alexandre, 2023, "Strategic Toeholds in Takeovers," Working Papers, CRESE, number 2023-10, Dec.
• Dumav, Martin & Khan, Urmee & Rigotti, Luca, 2023, "Optimal contracts when the players think different," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 38519, Oct.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2023, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2343R, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Nicholas Wu, 2023, "Managed Campaigns and Data-Augmented Auctions for Digital Advertising," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2359, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2023, "On the Alignment of Consumer Surplus and Total Surplus Under Competitive Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2373, Nov.
• Anna Bayona & Oana Peia & Razvan Vlahu, 2023, "Credit Ratings and Investments," Working Papers, DNB, number 776, May.
• Chia-Hui Chen & Kong-Pin Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2023, "Social Learning and Strategic Pricing with Rating Systems," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1203, Mar.
• Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2023, "Pecuniary Emulation and Invidious Distinction: Signaling under Behavioral Diversity," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1216, Oct.
• Olivier, Jacques, 2023, "Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde: Feedback and welfare when hedgers can acquire information," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1469, Jan, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4342867.
• Ali, Waqar, 2023, "The Differential Impact of Financial Reporting Complexity on Public and Private Debt Contracting: Evidence from ASU 2017-12," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1494, Nov, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4594229.
• Ahnert, Toni & Hoffmann, Peter & Leonello, Agnese & Porcellacchia, Davide, 2023, "Central Bank Digital Currency and financial stability," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank, number 2783, Feb.
• Foarta, Dana & Ting, Michael M., 2023, "Organizational Capacity and Project Dynamics," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 4069, Jan.
• Halaburda, Hanna & He, Zhiguo & Li, Jiasun, 2023, "An Economic Model of Consensus on Distributed Ledgers," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 4137, May.
• Lin, Jianhao & Mei, Ziwei & Chen, Liangyuan & Zhu, Chuanqi, 2023, "Is the People's Bank of China consistent in words and deeds?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2023.101919.
• Chen, Yuanyuan & Yuan, Meng & Zhang, Min, 2023, "Income inequality and educational expenditures on children: Evidence from the China Family Panel Studies," China Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2023.101932.
• Makridis, Christos A. & Fröwis, Michael & Sridhar, Kiran & Böhme, Rainer, 2023, "The rise of decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges: Evaluating the role of airdrops and governance tokens," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102358.
• Arca, Pasqualina & Atzeni, Gianfranco & Deidda, Luca, 2023, "The signaling role of trade credit: Evidence from a counterfactual analysis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102414.
• Boone, Audra & Fich, Eliezer & Griffin, Thomas, 2023, "Shareholder litigation risk and the information environment: Revisiting evidence from two natural experiments," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102444.
• Li, Conggang & Xu, Rong & Zhou, Yifan, 2023, "Star academicians: Gimmicks or game-changers?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102452.
• Lof, Matthijs & van Bommel, Jos, 2023, "Asymmetric information and the distribution of trading volume," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102464.
• Soldani, Emilia & Hildebrandt, Nicole & Nyarko, Yaw & Romagnoli, Giorgia, 2023, "Price information, inter-village networks, and “bargaining spillovers”: Experimental evidence from Ghana," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 164, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103100.
• Ur Rehman, Obeid, 2023, "Spousal communication and information sharing: Evidence from migrants and their spouses," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 165, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103148.
• Feng, Jingbing & Xu, Xian & Zou, Hong, 2023, "Risk communication clarity and insurance demand: The case of the COVID-19 pandemic," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 146, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104562.
• Arve, Malin & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2023, "Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104605.
• Guo, Mng, 2023, "Dampening effect and market efficiency," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 148, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104604.
• Lou, Youcheng & Yang, Yaqing, 2023, "Information linkages in a financial market with imperfect competition," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104643.
• Mattoussi, Wided & Mattoussi, Foued & Larnaout, Afrah, 2023, "Optimal subsidization for the adoption of new irrigation technologies," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, pages 1126-1141, DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2023.04.020.
• Yin, Xundong & Wang, Sophie Xuefei & Lu, Yuanzhu & Yan, Jianye, 2023, "Endogenous information acquisition and disclosure of private information in a duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106443.
• Sartzetakis, Eftichios & Xepapadeas, Anastasios & Yannacopoulos, Athanasios N., 2023, "Environmental regulation with preferences for social status," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2023.107834.
• Wu, Shanshan & Zhang, Jing & Elliott, Robert J.R., 2023, "Green securities policy and the environmental performance of firms: Assessing the impact of China's pre-IPO environmental inspection policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2023.107836.
• Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2023, "Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 222, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110932.
• Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Jain, Nidhi & Martinelli, Ćesar & Roy, Jaideep, 2023, "Responsive democracy and commercial media," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 222, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110961.
• Shinozaki, Hiroki, 2023, "Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: A positive result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 223, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.110989.
• Rong, Jianxin & Wang, Dazhong, 2023, "Contracting in hierarchical platforms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111079.
• Wu, Wenhao, 2023, "A geometric Blackwell’s order," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111082.
• Fajnzylber, Eduardo & Gabrielli, M. Florencia & Willington, Manuel, 2023, "Can transparency increase adverse selection? Evidence from an electronic platform for annuities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 228, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111135.
• Decker, Christian, 2023, "The order of move in a conversational war of attrition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 228, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111181.
• Hoffman, Ryan & Kambhampati, Ashwin & Kaplan, Scott, 2023, "Pay equality among heterogeneous agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 229, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111188.
• Femminis, Gianluca & Piccirilli, Giulio, 2023, "Optimal policy with dispersed information and uncertain monetary transmission," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 229, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111204.
• Bose, Abhigyan & Roy, Souvik, 2023, "Ordinal Bayesian incentive-compatible voting rules with correlated belief under betweenness property," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 229, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111223.
• Chaturvedi, Rakesh, 2023, "Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 230, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111236.
• Lattimer, Timothy R.B. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2023, "Refund bonuses and revenue equivalence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111265.
• De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pownall, Rachel & Press, Robert, 2023, "Surviving in the marketplace: The importance of network connectivity for art dealers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111312.
• Fan, Zhongjie & Tang, Dunzhe, 2023, "Financial fragility and information design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 232, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111356.
• Guo, Huichao & Lou, Youcheng, 2023, "The impact of relative wealth concerns on wealth gap and welfare in a noisy rational expectations economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111376.
• Demougin, Dominique & Upton, Harvey, 2023, "Individual versus collective bargaining under relative income concerns," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111380.
• Kyiu, Anthony & Tawiah, Bernard & Boamah, Evans Ofosu, 2023, "Employees’ reviews and stock price informativeness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111406.
• An, Yonghong & Hong, Shengjie & Zhang, Daiqiang, 2023, "A structural analysis of simple contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 236, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2023.05.003.
• Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2023, "Pioneer, early follower or late entrant: Entry dynamics with learning and market competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104360.
• Currarini, Sergio & Feri, Francesco & Hartig, Bjoern & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2023, "Transmission and use of information in network games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104443.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104511.
• Arozamena, Leandro & Ganuza, Juan-José & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2023, "Renegotiation, discrimination and favoritism in symmetric procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104566.
• Grodeck, Ben & Tausch, Franziska & Wang, Chengsi & Xiao, Erte, 2023, "To insure or not to insure? Promoting trust and cooperation with insurance advice in markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 160, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104586.
• Golman, Russell, 2023, "Acceptable discourse: Social norms of beliefs and opinions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 160, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104588.
• Ning, Shuying & Lin, Zhiyang, 2023, "Effect of accounting information manipulation on innovation: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2023.101058.
• Kim, Daehan & Ryu, Doojin & Webb, Robert I., 2023, "Determination of equilibrium transaction fees in the Bitcoin network: A rank-order contest," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 86, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102487.
• Sun, Zeyu & Yang, Ge & Bai, Haichen, 2023, "The spillover effect of customers' financial risk on suppliers' conservative reporting: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102576.
• Agudelo, Diego A. & Múnera, Daimer J., 2023, "Who are the vectors of contagion? Evidence from emerging markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102599.
• Huang, Huiqin & Wang, Chenglong & Yu, Wei & Zhu, Keying, 2023, "Does powerful executive holding a dual post as the board secretary reduce nonpunitive regulation?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102797.
• Wang, Jin & Li, Rui, 2023, "Asymmetric information in peer-to-peer lending: empirical evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 51, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2022.103452.
• Guettler, Andre & Hable, Patrick & Launhardt, Patrick & Miebs, Felix, 2023, "Aggregate insider trading in the S&P 500 and the predictability of international equity premia," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.103725.
• Liu, Xiang & Yang, Zhaojun, 2023, "Security token offerings versus loan guarantees for risk-averse entrepreneurs under asymmetric information," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 57, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.104171.
• Chung, Hanyong, 2023, "The differential effects of product market competition on individual analysts," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 58, issue PB, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.104455.
• Merl, Robert & Palan, Stefan & Schmidt, Dominik & Stöckl, Thomas, 2023, "Insider trading regulation and trader migration," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100839.
• Leshem, Shmuel & Tabbach, Avraham, 2023, "The option value of record-based sanctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 1-22, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.014.
• Garrett, Daniel F., 2023, "Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 161-170, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.007.
• Soraperra, Ivan & van der Weele, Joël & Villeval, Marie Claire & Shalvi, Shaul, 2023, "The social construction of ignorance: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 197-213, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.002.
• de Pinto, Marco & Goerke, Laszlo & Palermo, Alberto, 2023, "On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 22-41, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.012.
• Carroni, Elias & Mantovani, Andrea & Minniti, Antonio, 2023, "Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 238-253, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.010.
• Lee, Yong-Ju & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Chen, 2023, "Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 254-280, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.009.
• Hagen, Martin, 2023, "Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 281-298, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.002.
• Wasser, Cédric & Zhang, Mengxi, 2023, "Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 90-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.004.
• Ostrizek, Franz & Sartori, Elia, 2023, "Screening while controlling an externality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 26-55, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.011.
• McClellan, Andrew, 2023, "Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 173-180, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.008.
• Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori, 2023, "Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 341-347, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.004.
• Altınok, Ahmet, 2023, "Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 456-480, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.003.
• de Clippel, Geoffroy & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2023, "Continuous level-k mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 481-501, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.007.
• Aradhye, Aditya & Flesch, János & Staudigl, Mathias & Vermeulen, Dries, 2023, "Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 303-320, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.008.
• Bloch, Francis & Shabayek, Shaden, 2023, "Targeting in social networks with anonymized information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 380-402, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.010.
• Kandul, Serhiy & Lanz, Bruno & Reins, Evert, 2023, "Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 52-69, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.001.
• Geng, Sen & Guan, Menglong, 2023, "Trustworthy by design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 70-87, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.009.
• Whitmeyer, Mark, 2023, "Submission costs in risk-taking contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 101-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.014.
• Burdea, Valeria & Montero, Maria & Sefton, Martin, 2023, "Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 113-149, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.011.
• Lorecchio, Caio & Monte, Daniel, 2023, "Bad reputation with simple rating systems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 150-178, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.019.
• Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Hernández, Penélope & Neeman, Zvika & Solan, Eilon, 2023, "Markovian persuasion with two states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 292-314, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.001.
• Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele & Müller, Christoph, 2023, "An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 368-380, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.014.
• He, Simin & Zhu, Xun, 2023, "Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 454-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.017.
• Dugar, Subhasish & Shahriar, Quazi, 2023, "Lying for votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 46-72, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.015.
• Dilmé, Francesc, 2023, "Communication between unbiased agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 613-622, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.008.
• Min, Daehong, 2023, "Screening for experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 73-100, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.009.
• Jeong, Daeyoung & Kim, Semin, 2023, "Stable constitutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 794-811, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.013.
• Bisceglia, Michele & Piccolo, Salvatore & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2023, "M&A advisory and the merger review process," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102919.
• Wong, Tak-Yuen & Wong, Ho-Po Crystal, 2023, "Securities auctions with pre-project information management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102929.
• Bernard, Christophe & Mitraille, Sébastien, 2023, "Outsourcing horizontally differentiated tasks under asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102971.
• Gupta, Aastha, 2023, "Deceptive advertising, regulation and naive consumers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 91, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103026.
• Agarwal, Natasha & Chan, Jackie M.L. & Lodefalk, Magnus & Tang, Aili & Tano, Sofia & Wang, Zheng, 2023, "Mitigating information frictions in trade: Evidence from export credit guarantees," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103831.
• Bolatto, Stefano & Pignataro, Giuseppe, 2023, "Entering the supplier base through certified management standards," International Economics, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 4-17, DOI: 10.1016/j.inteco.2023.02.003.
• Chy, Mahfuz & Kyung, Hoyoun, 2023, "The effect of bond market transparency on bank loan contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101536.
• Amiraslani, Hami & Donovan, John & Phillips, Matthew A. & Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina, 2023, "Contracting in the Dark: The rise of public-side lenders in the syndicated loan market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 76, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101586.
• Aghamolla, Cyrus & Smith, Kevin, 2023, "Strategic complexity in disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 76, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101635.
• Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl & Park, Junghum, 2023, "A large creditor in contagious liquidity crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 146, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106706.
• Agnes Cheng, C.S. & Xie, Jing & Zhong, Yuxiang, 2023, "Common institutional blockholders and tail risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 148, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106723.
• Dorn, Daniel & Strobl, Günter, 2023, "Rational disposition effects: Theory and evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106858.
• Merl, Robert & Stöckl, Thomas & Palan, Stefan, 2023, "Insider trading regulation and shorting constraints. Evaluating the joint effects of two market interventions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106490.
• Cox, Caleb & Davis, Douglas & Korenok, Oleg & Lightle, John, 2023, "Stress tests and information disclosure: An experimental analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106691.
• El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Wei, Zuobao & Zhu, Yicheng, 2023, "Does public corruption affect analyst forecast quality?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106860.
• Li, Fengfei & Lin, Ji-Chai & Lin, Tse-Chun & Shang, Longfei, 2023, "Behavioral bias, distorted stock prices, and stock splits," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106939.
• Nguyen, Giang & Nguyen, My & Pham, Anh Viet & Pham, Man Duy (Marty), 2023, "Navigating investment decisions with social connectedness: Implications for venture capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106979.
• Kosenko, Andrew & Stiglitz, Joseph & Yun, Jungyoll, 2023, "Bilateral information disclosure in adverse selection markets with nonexclusive competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, pages 144-168, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.015.
• Adachi, Daisuke & Nakata, Hiroyuki & Sawada, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Kunio, 2023, "Adverse selection and moral hazard in corporate insurance markets: Evidence from the 2011 Thailand floods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, pages 376-386, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.11.027.
• Lorko, Matej & Servátka, Maroš & Zhang, Le, 2023, "Hidden inefficiency: Strategic inflation of project schedules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, pages 313-326, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.12.014.
• Joo, Hyungseok & Lee, Yoon-Jin & Yoon, Young-Ro, 2023, "Effects of information quality on signaling through sovereign debt issuance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, pages 279-304, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.11.021.
• Catonini, Emiliano & Stepanov, Sergey, 2023, "Reputation and information aggregation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, pages 156-173, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.02.002.
• Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco, 2023, "Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Bid Caps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, pages 141-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.002.
• Kakhbod, Ali & Loginova, Uliana, 2023, "When does introducing verifiable communication choices improve welfare?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 210, issue C, pages 139-162, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.03.031.
• Lambrecht, Marco & Oechssler, Joerg, 2023, "Do women shy away from risky skill games?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, pages 241-250, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.04.019.
• Sun, Rui & Guo, Junfei & Yu, Wensong, 2023, "Sponsor, institutional investor, and quotation behavior: Theory and evidence from China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, pages 411-428, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.04.010.
• Zhou, Junya, 2023, "Costly verification and commitment in persuasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, pages 1100-1142, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.06.005.
• Curti, Filippo & Kazinnik, Sophia, 2023, "Central bank communication and website characteristics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, pages 1216-1241, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.017.
• de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne & Ries, John, 2023, "When less is more: Information and the financing of innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 214, issue C, pages 346-369, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.038.
• Nica, Melania, 2023, "Reputation formation and reinforcement of biases in a post-truth world," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 215, issue C, pages 455-478, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.028.
• Madotto, Matteo & Severino, Federico, 2023, "Heterogeneous awareness in financial markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, pages 26-41, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.029.
• Possajennikov, Alex & Saran, Rene, 2023, "(In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, pages 42-61, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.003.
• Demougin, Dominique & Helm, Carsten, 2023, "Overwhelmed by routine tasks: A multitasking principal agent perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, pages 654-669, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.021.
• Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille & Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 2023, "Radical activism and self-regulation: An optimal campaign mechanism," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 118, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102789.
• Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023, "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105572.
• Kambhampati, Ashwin, 2023, "Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105585.
• Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023, "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105586.
• Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2023, "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105588.
• Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2023, "Mediated talk: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105593.
• Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023, "Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594.
• Gan, Tan & Hu, Ju & Weng, Xi, 2023, "Optimal contingent delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105597.
• Cetemen, Doruk & Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Urgun, Can, 2023, "Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105606.
• Mookherjee, Dilip & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2023, "Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105614.
• Ishiguro, Shingo & Yasuda, Yosuke, 2023, "Moral hazard and subjective evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105619.
• Tan, Teck Yong, 2023, "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105620.
• Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023, "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105621.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023, "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105624.
• Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2023, "Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105648.
• Rocheteau, Guillaume & Wang, Lu, 2023, "Endogenous liquidity and volatility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 210, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105652.
• Lichtig, Avi & Weksler, Ran, 2023, "Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 210, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105653.
• Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2023, "When (not) to publicize inspection results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 210, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105667.
• Pei, Harry, 2023, "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 210, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105668.
• Chen, Ying & Oliver, Atara, 2023, "When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105676.
• Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023, "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105678.
• Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2023, "Selecting a winner with external referees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687.
• Zeng, Yishu, 2023, "Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105690.
• Mayskaya, Tatiana & Nikandrova, Arina, 2023, "The dark side of transparency: When hiding in plain sight works," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105699.
• Biswas, Sonny, 2023, "Collateral and bank screening as complements: A spillover effect," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105703.
• Zhu, Shuguang, 2023, "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105705.
• Yang, Kai Hao & Zentefis, Alexander K., 2023, "Regulating oligopolistic competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105709.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023, "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105710.
• Lester, Benjamin & Shourideh, Ali & Venkateswaran, Venky & Zetlin-Jones, Ariel, 2023, "Market-making with search and information frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105714.
• Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2023, "Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105616.
• Lyu, Chen, 2023, "Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105722.
• Carmona, Guilherme & Laohakunakorn, Krittanai, 2023, "The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105731.
• Weng, Xi & Wu, Fan & Yin, Xundong, 2023, "Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105733.
• van Buggenum, Hugo & Rabinovich, Stanislav, 2023, "Co-essentiality of money and credit: A mechanism-design view," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105734.
• Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023, "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105738.
• Vaccari, Federico, 2023, "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105740.