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Public Information as a Source of Disagreement

Author

Listed:
  • Laurent Bouton

    (GU - Georgetown University [Washington], NBER - National Bureau of Economic Research [New York] - NBER - The National Bureau of Economic Research, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)

  • Aniol Llorente-Saguer

    (QMUL - Queen Mary University of London, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)

  • Antonin Macé

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Adam Meirowitz

    (Yale University [New Haven])

  • Shaoting Pi

    (ISU - Iowa State University)

  • Dimitrios Xefteris

    (University of Cyprus = Université de Chypre)

Abstract

This paper studies how Bayesian agents' beliefs about the value of a random variable respond to the disclosure of public information. We show that the release of public information can increase disagreement about the value of that variable. This occurs when the public information does not pertain directly to the value of the variable, but instead pertains to factors influencing its value. This result holds for a range of assumptions about the information structure including cases where the public announcements involve aggregating private information held by the agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Adam Meirowitz & Shaoting Pi & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2024. "Public Information as a Source of Disagreement," Working Papers halshs-04075483, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-04075483
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04075483v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public events; Agent voting; Information aggregation; Disagreement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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