Trading and Shareholder Democracy
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DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13289
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- Malenko, Nadya & Levit, Doron & Maug, Ernst, 2022. "Trading and shareholder democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 14039, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
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