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Nadya Malenko

Personal Details

First Name:Nadya
Middle Name:
Last Name:Malenko
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pma2402
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://www.nadyamalenko.com/

Affiliation

Ross School of Business
University of Michigan

Ann Arbor, Michigan (United States)
http://michiganross.umich.edu/



701 Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1231
RePEc:edi:bsumius (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Levit, Doron & Malenko, Nadya & Maug, Ernst, 2021. "The voting premium," CEPR Discussion Papers 15718, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Ewens, Michael & Malenko, Nadya, 2020. "Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle," SocArXiv t96yq, Center for Open Science.
  3. Corum, Adrian Aycan & Malenko, Andrey & Malenko, Nadya, 2020. "Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment," OSF Preprints 8n6xj, Center for Open Science.
  4. Levit, Doron & Malenko, Nadya & Maug, Ernst, 2019. "Trading and shareholder voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14039, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Malenko, Nadya & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2017. "Deadlock on the Board," CEPR Discussion Papers 12503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

  1. Andrey Malenko & Nadya Malenko, 2019. "Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(5), pages 2441-2490, October.
  2. Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, 2016. "The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(2), pages 775-808, April.
  3. Steven R. Grenadier & Andrey Malenko & Nadya Malenko, 2016. "Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2552-2581, September.
  4. Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, 2016. "The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(12), pages 3394-3427.
  5. Malenko, Andrey & Malenko, Nadya, 2015. "A theory of LBO activity based on repeated debt-equity conflicts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 607-627.
  6. Nadya Malenko, 2014. "Communication and Decision-Making in Corporate Boards," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(5), pages 1486-1532.
  7. Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, 2011. "Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1579-1614, October.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Ewens, Michael & Malenko, Nadya, 2020. "Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle," SocArXiv t96yq, Center for Open Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthew R. Denes & Sabrina T. Howell & Filippo Mezzanotti & Xinxin Wang & Ting Xu, 2020. "Investor Tax Credits and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 27751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  2. Corum, Adrian Aycan & Malenko, Andrey & Malenko, Nadya, 2020. "Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment," OSF Preprints 8n6xj, Center for Open Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin Bennett & René M. Stulz & Zexi Wang, 2020. "Does Joining the S&P 500 Index Hurt Firms?," NBER Working Papers 27593, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  3. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Malenko, Nadya & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2017. "Deadlock on the Board," CEPR Discussion Papers 12503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Ewens, Michael & Malenko, Nadya, 2020. "Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle," SocArXiv t96yq, Center for Open Science.
    2. Marius Guenzel & Ulrike Malmendier, 2020. "Behavioral Corporate Finance: The Life Cycle of a CEO Career," NBER Working Papers 27635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Articles

  1. Andrey Malenko & Nadya Malenko, 2019. "Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(5), pages 2441-2490, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Aggarwal, Reena & Dahiya, Sandeep & Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R., 2019. "The power of shareholder votes: Evidence from uncontested director elections," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 134-153.
    2. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2017. "Blockholder Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 11933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, 2016. "The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(12), pages 3394-3427.
    4. Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro, 2018. "Markets for Information: An Introduction," CEPR Discussion Papers 13148, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Paul M. Guest & Marco Nerino, 2019. "Do Corporate Governance Ratings Change Investor Expectations? Evidence from Announcements by Institutional Shareholder Services," Working Papers wp515, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    6. Levit, Doron & Malenko, Nadya & Maug, Ernst, 2019. "Trading and shareholder voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14039, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  2. Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, 2016. "The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(2), pages 775-808, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Albuquerque, Rui & Cabral, Luis & Guedes, Jose, 2016. "Relative Performance, Banker Compensation, and Systemic Risk," CEPR Discussion Papers 11693, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Weiwen Li & Ryan Krause & Xin Qin & Junsheng Zhang & Hang Zhu & Shanshan Lin & Yuehua Xu, 2018. "Under the microscope: An experimental look at board transparency and director monitoring behavior," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 1216-1236, April.
    3. Ivan Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2019. "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," 2019 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Dicks, David & Fulghieri, Paolo, 2015. "Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 10400, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Baghdadi, Ghasan A. & Nguyen, Lily H.G. & Podolski, Edward J., 2020. "Board co-option and default risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    6. Rui Albuquerque & Luis Brandão-Marques & Miguel A Ferreira & Pedro Matos, 2019. "International Corporate Governance Spillovers: Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(2), pages 738-770.
    7. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Viktar Fedaseyeu, 2018. "A Theory of Corporate Boards and Forced CEO Turnover," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4798-4817, October.
    8. Kutubi, Shawgat S. & Ahmed, Kamran & Khan, Hayat, 2018. "Bank performance and risk-taking — Does directors' busyness matter?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 184-199.
    9. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Malenko, Nadya & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2017. "Deadlock on the Board," CEPR Discussion Papers 12503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Alex Edmans & Doron Levit & Devin Reilly, 2014. "Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership," NBER Working Papers 20420, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Huili Chen & Ying Chen & Bin Lin & Yanchao Wang, 2019. "Can short selling improve internal control? An empirical study based on the difference‐in‐differences model," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(5), pages 1233-1259, March.
    12. William Mbanyele, 2020. "Do Busy Directors Impede or Spur Bank Performance and Bank Risks? Event Study Evidence From Brazil," SAGE Open, , vol. 10(2), pages 21582440209, June.
    13. John M. Barrios & Pietro A. Bianchi & Helena Isidro, 2020. "Random-Coefficients Logit Demand Estimation with Zero-Valued Market Shares," Working Papers 2020-20, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    14. Focke, Florens & Maug, Ernst & Niessen-Ruenzi, Alexandra, 2017. "The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 313-336.
    15. Alexander Ljungqvist & Konrad Raff, 2017. "Busy Directors: Strategic Interaction and Monitoring Synergies," NBER Working Papers 23889, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Lel, Ugur & Miller, Darius, 2019. "The labor market for directors and externalities in corporate governance: Evidence from the international labor market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1).
    17. Rui Albuquerque & Luis Cabral & Jose Guedes, 2018. "Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk," Working Papers 18-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    18. Sudipto Dasgupta & Thomas H. Noe, 2019. "Does Pay Activism Pay Off for Shareholders? Shareholder Democracy and Its Discontents," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1810-1832, April.
    19. Kryzanowski, Lawrence & Mohebshahedin, Mahmood, 2020. "Transparency and fund governance efficacy: The effect of the SEC'S disclosure rule on advisory contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    20. Xiao Wu, Dong & Yao, Xiao & Luan Guo, Jian, 2021. "Is Textual Tone Informative or Inflated for Firm’s Future Value? Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 513-525.
    21. Ye, Dezhu & Deng, Jie & Liu, Yi & Szewczyk, Samuel H. & Chen, Xiao, 2019. "Does board gender diversity increase dividend payouts? Analysis of global evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1-26.
    22. Matthieu Bouvard & Raphaël Levy, 2018. "Two-Sided Reputation in Certification Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4755-4774, October.
    23. Roman Lanis & Grant Richardson & Chelsea Liu & Ross McClure, 2019. "The Impact of Corporate Tax Avoidance on Board of Directors and CEO Reputation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 160(2), pages 463-498, December.
    24. George Drymiotes & Haijin Lin & Yonca Ertimur, 2020. "Shareholder Empowerment and Board of Directors Effectiveness," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 2649-2695, December.
    25. Miller, Darius, 2018. "Discussion of “Managing reputation: Evidence from biographies of corporate directors✰," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 470-475.

  3. Steven R. Grenadier & Andrey Malenko & Nadya Malenko, 2016. "Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2552-2581, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Henry, Emeric & Loseto, Marco & Ottaviani, Marco, 2018. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 13224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Chen, Shiqi & Lambrecht, Bart, 2019. "Financial Policies and Internal Governance with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 13888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Yingni Guo, 2016. "Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 1969-2008, August.
    4. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin, 2015. "Timing Information Flows," Discussion Papers 2015-16, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    6. Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2014. "Investment under Uncertainty with Financial Constraints," NBER Working Papers 20610, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Leitner, Yaron & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2019. "Regulating a model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(2), pages 251-268.
    8. Emeric Henry & Marco Ottaviani, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 911-955, March.
    9. Yaron Leitner & Bilge Yilmaz, 2016. "Regulating A Model," Working Papers 16-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    10. Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin, 2018. "When to Drop a Bombshell," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(4), pages 2139-2172.
    11. Gao, Yongling & Driouchi, Tarik & Bennett, David J., 2018. "Ambiguity aversion in buyer-seller relationships: A contingent-claims and social network explanation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 50-67.
    12. Migrow, Dimitri, 2018. "Designing Communication Hierarchies," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 44, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    13. Juan Escobar & Qiaoxi Zhang, 2019. "Delegating Learning," Documentos de Trabajo 347, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    14. Suzanne Bijkerk & Josse (J.) Delfgaauw & Vladimir (V.A.) Karamychev & Otto (O.H.) Swank, 2018. "Need to Know? On Information Systems in Firms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-091/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    15. Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2018. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," 2018 Meeting Papers 566, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Sebastian Gryglewicz & Barney Hartman-Glaser & Geoffery Zheng, 2020. "Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay for Performance: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1248-1277, March.
    17. Pablo Moran, 2017. "Information Revelation in Merger Waves," Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 174-233.

  4. Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, 2016. "The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(12), pages 3394-3427.

    Cited by:

    1. Jon Frost & Leonardo Gambacorta & Yi Huang & Hyun Song Shin & Pablo Zbinden, 2019. "BigTech and the changing structure of financial intermediation," BIS Working Papers 779, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Melisa Newham & Jo Seldeslachts & Albert Banal-Estañol, 2018. "Common ownership and market entry: Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry," Economics Working Papers 1612, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2017. "Blockholder Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 11933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Blake Rayfield & Omer Unsal, 2019. "Institutional Monitoring and Litigation Risk: Evidence from Employee Disputes," NFI Working Papers 2019-WP-02, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    5. Jiang, Wei & Li, Tao & Mei, Danqing, 2019. "Activist arbitrage in M&A acquirers," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 156-161.
    6. Abramova, Inna & Core, John & Sutherland, Andrew, 2019. "Institutional Investor Attention and Firm Disclosure," MPRA Paper 93665, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Yonca Ertimur & Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, 2018. "Understanding Uncontested Director Elections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(7), pages 3400-3420, July.
    8. Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2018. "The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A View from Accounting Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 12775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Erel, Isil & Stern, Lea Henny & Tan, Chenhao & Weisbach, Michael S., 2018. "Selecting Directors Using Machine Learning," Working Paper Series 2018-05, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    10. Choonsik Lee & Matthew E. Souther, 2020. "Managerial Reliance on the Retail Shareholder Vote: Evidence from Proxy Delivery Methods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(4), pages 1717-1736, April.
    11. Bolton, Patrick & Li, Tao & Ravina, Enrichetta & Rosenthal, Howard, 2020. "Investor ideology," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 320-352.
    12. Paul M. Guest & Marco Nerino, 2019. "Do Corporate Governance Ratings Change Investor Expectations? Evidence from Announcements by Institutional Shareholder Services," Working Papers wp515, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    13. Calluzzo, Paul & Kedia, Simi, 2019. "Mutual fund board connections and proxy voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(3), pages 669-688.
    14. Tao Li, 2018. "Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2951-2971, June.
    15. Christie Hayne & Marshall Vance, 2019. "Information Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter? Field Evidence on the Indirect and Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 969-1011, September.

  5. Malenko, Andrey & Malenko, Nadya, 2015. "A theory of LBO activity based on repeated debt-equity conflicts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 607-627.

    Cited by:

    1. Burkart, Mike & Dasgupta, Amil, 2015. "Activist funds, leverage, and procyclicality," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65095, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Tarsalewska, Monika, 2018. "Buyouts under the threat of preemption," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 39-58.
    3. K.S. Reddy & En Xie & Yuanyuan Huang, 2016. "Contractual buyout - a legitimate growth model in the enterprise development: foundations and implications," International Journal of Management and Enterprise Development, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 15(1), pages 1-23.
    4. Valentin Haddad & Erik Loualiche & Matthew Plosser, 2016. "Buyout Activity: The Impact of Aggregate Discount Rates," NBER Working Papers 22414, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Phalippou, Ludovic & Rauch, Christian & Umber, Marc, 2018. "Private equity portfolio company fees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 559-585.
    6. Chiarella, Carlo & Ostinelli, Diego, 2020. "Financial or strategic buyers: Who is at the gate?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 393-407.

  6. Nadya Malenko, 2014. "Communication and Decision-Making in Corporate Boards," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(5), pages 1486-1532.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Shiqi & Lambrecht, Bart, 2019. "Financial Policies and Internal Governance with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 13888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Souther, Matthew E., 2018. "The effects of internal board networks: Evidence from closed-end funds," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 266-290.
    3. Name-Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2019. "Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    4. Ryan Chahrour, 2012. "Public Communication and Information Acquisition," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 803, Boston College Department of Economics.
    5. Marius Guenzel & Ulrike Malmendier, 2020. "Behavioral Corporate Finance: The Life Cycle of a CEO Career," NBER Working Papers 27635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Baghdadi, Ghasan A. & Nguyen, Lily H.G. & Podolski, Edward J., 2020. "Board co-option and default risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    7. Srinidhi, Bin & Sun, Ye & Zhang, Hao & Chen, Shiqiang, 2020. "How do female directors improve board governance? A mechanism based on norm changes," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1).
    8. Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam & Weisbach, Michael S., 2013. "What do boards really do? Evidence from minutes of board meetings☆☆Miriam Schwartz-Ziv is from Harvard University and Northeastern University, e-mail: miriam.schwartz@mail.huji.ac.il. Michael S. Weisb," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 349-366.
    9. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Viktar Fedaseyeu, 2018. "A Theory of Corporate Boards and Forced CEO Turnover," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4798-4817, October.
    10. Fehrler, Sebastian & Hughes, Niall, 2015. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation : Theory and Experiment," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1088, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    11. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Malenko, Nadya & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2017. "Deadlock on the Board," CEPR Discussion Papers 12503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Alejandro Montecinos‐Pearce & Pablo Rodrigo & Ignacio J. Duran, 2020. "When is escalation of commitment unstoppable in group settings? An iterative economic modeling approach to unveil the dark side of group decision‐making," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(8), pages 1387-1402, December.
    13. Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam & Weisbach, Michael S., 2011. "What Do Boards Really Do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings," Working Paper Series 2011-19, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    14. Otto (O.H.) Swank & Bauke (B.) Visser, 2018. "Committees as Active Audiences: Reputation Concerns and Information Acquisition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-068/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 01 May 2019.
    15. Isaka, Naoto, 2017. "When are uninformed boards preferable?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA), pages 191-211.
    16. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Viktar Fedaseyeu, 2012. "A Theory of Corporate Boards and Forced CEO Turnover," Working Papers 444, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    17. Ravanel, M., 2013. "Voting in committee: firm value vs. back scratching," Working papers 459, Banque de France.
    18. Zhu, Jigao & Ye, Kangtao & Tucker, Jennifer Wu & Chan, Kam (Johnny) C., 2016. "Board hierarchy, independent directors, and firm value: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 262-279.
    19. Laura Sabani, 2019. "The IMF and the World Bank: The Role of Competition and Domain Dissent in Communication and Decision Making," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 48(1), February.

  7. Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, 2011. "Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1579-1614, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Marco Becht & Julian Franks & Jeremy Grant & Hannes F. Wagner, 2017. "Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(9), pages 2933-2971.
    2. Chen, Shiqi & Lambrecht, Bart, 2019. "Financial Policies and Internal Governance with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 13888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Daniel M. Isaacs, 2020. "When Government Contractors May or May Not Spend Money On Political Speech," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 91-102, January.
    4. Jennifer Goodman & Céline Louche & Katinka Cranenburgh & Daniel Arenas, 2014. "Social Shareholder Engagement: The Dynamics of Voice and Exit," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 125(2), pages 193-210, December.
    5. Aggarwal, Reena & Dahiya, Sandeep & Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R., 2019. "The power of shareholder votes: Evidence from uncontested director elections," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 134-153.
    6. Christopher S. Armstrong & Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, 2013. "The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 909-950, December.
    7. Vincent C. Ma & John S. Liu, 2016. "Exploring the research fronts and main paths of literature: a case study of shareholder activism research," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 109(1), pages 33-52, October.
    8. Ignacio Esponda Jr. & Emanuel Vespa Jr., 2014. "Hypothetical Thinking and Information Extraction in the Laboratory," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 180-202, November.
    9. Ferri, Fabrizio & Oesch, David, 2013. "Management Influence on Investors: Evidence from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay," Working Papers on Finance 1329, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    10. Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, 2016. "The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(12), pages 3394-3427.
    11. Dressler, Efrat, 2020. "Voice and power: Do institutional shareholders make use of their voting power?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    12. Yonca Ertimur & Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, 2018. "Understanding Uncontested Director Elections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(7), pages 3400-3420, July.
    13. Gerry Tsoukalas & Brett Hemenway Falk, 2020. "Token-Weighted Crowdsourcing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(9), pages 3843-3859, September.
    14. Appel, Ian R. & Gormley, Todd A. & Keim, Donald B., 2016. "Passive investors, not passive owners," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 111-141.
    15. Levit, Doron & Malenko, Nadya & Maug, Ernst, 2019. "Trading and shareholder voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14039, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  2. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
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  4. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (4) 2018-01-22 2019-09-02 2019-10-14 2020-03-09
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2018-01-22 2019-09-02 2019-10-14
  3. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2020-03-09 2020-10-05
  4. NEP-ENT: Entrepreneurship (2) 2020-03-09 2020-10-05
  5. NEP-SBM: Small Business Management (2) 2020-03-09 2020-10-05
  6. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2019-10-14
  7. NEP-MST: Market Microstructure (1) 2019-10-14

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IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.