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Soft Shareholder Activism

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  • Doron Levit

Abstract

This paper studies communications between investors and firms as a form of corporate governance. Activist investors cannot force their ideas on companies; they must persuade the board or other shareholders that implementing these ideas is beneficial to the firm. I show that the threat of voice (i.e., launching a public campaign) facilitates communication, whereas the option to exit facilitates communication if and only if the proposal is risky relative to the status quo or voice is ineffective as a governance mechanism. The analysis identifies factors that contribute to successful dialogues between investors and firms.ReceivedMay 31, 2017; editorial decision September 4, 2018 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.

Suggested Citation

  • Doron Levit, 2019. "Soft Shareholder Activism," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(7), pages 2775-2808.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:32:y:2019:i:7:p:2775-2808.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhy119
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dasgupta, Amil & Fos, Vyacheslav & Sautner, Zacharias, 2021. "Institutional investors and corporate governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Han, Han & Wang, Zhibin & Zhao, Xueqing, 2023. "Minority shareholder activism, threat of exit and pay-performance sensitivity," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    3. Cvijanović, Dragana & Dasgupta, Amil & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2022. "The Wall Street stampede: Exit as governance with interacting blockholders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 433-455.
    4. Michele Fioretti, 2022. "Caring or Pretending to Care? Social Impact, Firms' Objectives, and Welfare (former title: Social Responsibility and Firm's Objectives)," SciencePo Working papers hal-03393065, HAL.
    5. Jochen Hartmann, 2022. "Impact of public demands on the performance of hedge fund activist engagements," Working Papers Dissertations 99, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    6. Patrick Dennis & Kristopher Gerardi & Carola Schenone, 2022. "Common Ownership Does Not Have Anticompetitive Effects in the Airline Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(5), pages 2765-2798, October.
    7. Wu, Wenxin & Zhang, Xuezhi & Zhou, Zixun, 2022. "Institutional investors' corporate site visits and pay-performance sensitivity," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    8. Wang, Xiaoqiong & Zhen, Hongxian & Zhu, Feifei, 2023. "Voting with their feet: Controlling shareholders' share pledging and other major shareholders' strategic response," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    9. Corum, Adrian Aycan, 2021. "Fighting Fire with Fire: Optimality of Value Destruction to Mitigate Short-Termism," OSF Preprints xhwmg, Center for Open Science.
    10. Jochen Hartmann & Matthias Pelster & Soenke Sievers, 2022. "Shareholder activism around the globe: Hedge funds vs. other professional investors," Working Papers Dissertations 98, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    11. Aguilera, Ruth & Bermejo, Vicente & Capapé, Javier & Cuñat, Vicente, 2021. "The systemic governance influence of universal owners: evidence from an expectation document," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118899, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Corum, Adrian Aycan & Malenko, Andrey & Malenko, Nadya, 2020. "Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment," OSF Preprints 8n6xj, Center for Open Science.
    13. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Adam Meirowitz & Shaoting Pi & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022. "Public Information as a Source of Disagreement Among Shareholders," NBER Working Papers 30757, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Hartmann, Jochen, 2023. "Impact of public demands on the performance of hedge fund activist engagements," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    15. Yinju Nie & Ming Jia, 2021. "The power of crowds: can minority shareholder activism promote management earnings forecast accuracy," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(5), pages 6333-6385, December.
    16. Yu‐Luen Ma & Yayuan Ren, 2021. "Insurer risk and performance before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis: The role of monitoring institutional ownership," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(2), pages 351-380, June.
    17. Farizo, Joseph D., 2022. "(Black)Rock the vote: Index funds and opposition to management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    18. Barros, Victor & Verga Matos, Pedro & Miranda Sarmento, Joaquim & Rino Vieira, Pedro, 2021. "Do activist shareholders influence a manager’s decisions on a firm’s dividend policy: A mixed-method study," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 387-397.

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