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Monitoring Harassment in Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Laura Boudreau

    (Columbia University)

  • Sylvain Chassang

    (Princeton University)

  • Ada González-Torre

    (Ben Gurion University)

  • Rachel Heath

    (University of Washington)

Abstract

We evaluate secure survey methods designed for the ongoing monitoring of harassment in organizations. To do so, we partner with a large Bangladeshi garment manufacturer and experiment with different designs of phone-based worker surveys. “Hard†garbling (HG) responses to sensitive questions, i.e., automatically recording a random subset as complaints, increases reporting of physical harassment by 290%, sexual harassment by 271%, and threatening behavior by 45%, from reporting rates of 1.5%, 1.8%, and 9.9%, respectively, under the status quo of direct elicitation. Rapport-building and removing team identifiers from responses do not significantly increase reporting. We show that garbled reports can be used to consistently estimate policy-relevant statistics of harassment, including: How prevalent is it? What share of managers is responsible for the misbehavior? and, How isolated are its victims? In our data, harassment is widespread, the problem is not restricted to a minority of managers, and victims are often isolated within teams.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura Boudreau & Sylvain Chassang & Ada González-Torre & Rachel Heath, 2023. "Monitoring Harassment in Organizations," Working Papers 311, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    • Handle: RePEc:pri:cepsud:311
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    File URL: https://www.sylvainchassang.org/assets/papers/sensitive_stats.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mehmet Bac, 2009. "An economic rationale for firing whistleblowers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 233-256, June.
    2. Sandeep Kapur, 2009. "An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower Policy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 157-182, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cai, Xiqian & Chen, Shuai & Cheng, Zhengquan, 2024. "The #MeToo Movement and Judges' Gender Gap in Decisions," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1453, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    2. Nugent, Jeffrey B., 2023. "A new institutional perspective on business associations: Filling a gap between firms and states in the dynamic analysis of Richard Day," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 49-59.
    3. Cai, Xiqian & Chen, Shuai & Cheng, Zhengquan, 2024. "The #Metoo Movement and Judges' Gender Gap in Decisions," IZA Discussion Papers 17115, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Harassment; whistleblowing; garbling; secure survey design; gender; garments; Bangladesh;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C42 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Survey Methods
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J70 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - General
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions
    • J83 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Workers' Rights
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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