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Everyone Likes to Be Liked: Experimental Evidence from Matching Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Opitz, Timm

    (MPI-IC Munich and LMU Munich)

  • Schwaiger, Christoph

    (LMU Munich)

Abstract

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with them. Through a pre-registered and theory-guided laboratory experiment, we provide evidence that such reciprocal preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference-based motives. Participants expect partners who want to be matched with them to be more cooperative, and are more altruistic themselves. This leads to higher cooperation and larger profits when participants can consider each other's preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Opitz, Timm & Schwaiger, Christoph, 2023. "Everyone Likes to Be Liked: Experimental Evidence from Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 366, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:366
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greiner, Ben & Ockenfels, Axel & Werner, Peter, 2011. "Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 236-238, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lawrence Choo & Senran Lin & Liangfo Zhao, 2025. "General Training and Worker Motivation: Experimental Evidence on Discretionary Effort," Papers 2503.20560, arXiv.org.
    2. Moscariello, Paola, 2024. "Information avoidance in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 339-355.
    3. Müge Süer & Michel Tolksdorf & Vincent Meisner & Sokol Tominaj, 2025. "Confidence and Information in Strategy-Proof School Choice," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 546, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Timm Opitz & Christoph Schwaiger, 2023. "Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 388, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    5. Timm Opitz, 2024. "Interpersonal Preferences and Team Performance: The Role of Liking in Complex Problem Solving," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 492, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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