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Wage Transparency and Performance: A Real-Effort Experiment

  • Ben Greiner
  • Axel Ockenfels
  • Peter Werner

Without transparency about peer wages in a real effort experiment, a change of wages does not affect performance. With transparency, however, higher paid workers tend to work more accurately, and lower paid workers shirk more under piece rates.

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File URL: http://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/stawi-ockenfels/pdf/wp_series_download/wp0048.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Cologne, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 48.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2010
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Handle: RePEc:kls:series:0048
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  1. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
  2. Gächter, Simon & Thöni, Christian, 2010. "Social Comparison and Performance: Experimental Evidence on the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis," IZA Discussion Papers 4687, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Fernanda Rivas, 2009. "Wage dispersion and workers` effort," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 788-794.
  4. John A. List & Imran Rasul, 2010. "Field Experiments in Labor Economics," NBER Working Papers 16062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2008. "In Search of Workers' Real Effort Reciprocity - A Field and a Laboratory Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 238, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. Bellemare, Charles & Shearer, Bruce, 2009. "Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-level experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 233-244, September.
  7. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, 2007. "What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 153-174, Spring.
  8. Andrew E. Clark & David Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2010. "Effort and Comparison Income: Experimental and Survey Evidence," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(3), pages 407-426, April.
  9. Ockenfels, Axel & Sliwka, Dirk & Werner, Peter, 2010. "Bonus Payments and Reference Point Violations," IZA Discussion Papers 4795, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Ernst Fehr & Lorenz Goette & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "A behavioral account of the labor market: the role of fairness concerns," IEW - Working Papers 394, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  11. Uri Gneezy & John A List, 2006. "Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1365-1384, 09.
  12. Burchett, Richard & Willoughby, John, 2004. "Work productivity when knowledge of different reward systems varies: Report from an economic experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 591-600, October.
  13. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
  14. Robert H. Frank, 1984. "Interdependent Preferences and the Competitive Wage Structure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 510-520, Winter.
  15. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  16. Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Frank, Robert H, 1984. "Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 549-71, September.
  18. repec:feb:artefa:0109 is not listed on IDEAS
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