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Reference dependence and the role of information frictions

Author

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  • Guido, Andrea
  • Martínez-Marquina, Alejandro
  • Rholes, Ryan

Abstract

We introduce positive and negative endowment shocks and information frictions into an experimental labor market and study how firms share these with workers. Workers evaluate wages consistently with a reference wage, demanding higher (lower) wages but exerting the same effort when a positive (negative) shock is common knowledge. Their wage expectations adjust instantaneously to new information but sluggishly and asymmetrically when unaware of the shock. Firms form accurate beliefs about how shocks and information reshape effort responses and act on their beliefs, almost optimally in all scenarios. Our results suggest a limited role for other-regarding preferences and can be rationalized by a selfish firm best responding to a worker evaluating wages according to a reference wage.

Suggested Citation

  • Guido, Andrea & Martínez-Marquina, Alejandro & Rholes, Ryan, 2025. "Reference dependence and the role of information frictions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 237(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:237:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125002884
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107169
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Marco Fongoni & Daniel Schaefer & Carl Singleton, 2025. "Why Wages Don’t Fall in Jobs with Incomplete Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(8), pages 6319-6339, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

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