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What is considered deception in experimental economics?

Author

Listed:
  • Gary Charness

    (University of California, Santa Barbara)

  • Anya Samek

    (University of California)

  • Jeroen Ven

    (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

In experimental economics there is a norm against using deception. But precisely what constitutes deception is unclear. While there is a consensus view that providing false information is not permitted, there are also “gray areas” with respect to practices that omit information or are misleading without an explicit lie being told. In this paper, we report the results of a large survey among experimental economists and students concerning various specific gray areas. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity across respondent choices. The data indicate a perception that costs and benefits matter, so that such practices might in fact be appropriate when the topic is important and there is no other way to gather data. Compared to researchers, students have different attitudes about some of the methods in the specific scenarios that we ask about. Few students express awareness of the no-deception policy at their schools. We also briefly discuss some potential alternatives to “gray-area” deception, primarily based on suggestions offered by respondents.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Charness & Anya Samek & Jeroen Ven, 2022. "What is considered deception in experimental economics?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 385-412, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-021-09726-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09726-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experimental methodology; Deception; Attitudes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B49 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Other
    • C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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