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Much Ado About Deception

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  • Davide Barrera
  • Brent Simpson

Abstract

Social scientists have intensely debated the use of deception in experimental research, and conflicting norms governing the use of deception are now firmly entrenched along disciplinary lines. Deception is typically allowed in sociology and social psychology but proscribed in economics. Notably, disagreements about the use of deception are generally not based on ethical considerations but on pragmatic grounds: the anti-deception camp argues that deceiving participants leads to invalid results, while the other side argues that deception has little negative impact and, under certain conditions, can even enhance validity. These divergent norms governing the use of deception are important because they stifle interdisciplinary research and discovery, create hostilities between disciplines and researchers, and can negatively impact the careers of scientists who may be sanctioned for following the norms of their home discipline. We present two experimental studies aimed at addressing the issue empirically. Study 1 addresses the effects of direct exposure to deception, while Study 2 addresses the effects of indirect exposure to deception. Results from both studies suggest that deception does not significantly affect the validity of experimental results.

Suggested Citation

  • Davide Barrera & Brent Simpson, 2012. "Much Ado About Deception," Sociological Methods & Research, , vol. 41(3), pages 383-413, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:somere:v:41:y:2012:i:3:p:383-413
    DOI: 10.1177/0049124112452526
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