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Signal-jamming in the Frequency Domain

Author

Listed:
  • Bart Taub

Abstract

I examine strategic behaviour for a duopoly in a noisy environment. Firms attempt to learn the value of the rival’s privately observed demand shocks via a noisy signal of price, and at the same time firms attempt to obfuscate that signal by producing excess output on the publicly observable signals, that is, they signal jam. In a dynamic setting firms also distort the intertemporal structure of output keyed to the publicly observable demand shock process in order to disguise their private shocks. The net outcome is to radically increase the persistence of output over its full-information value.

Suggested Citation

  • Bart Taub, 2023. "Signal-jamming in the Frequency Domain," Working Papers 2023_02, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    • Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2023_02
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    File URL: https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/Media_910031_smxx.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Caminal, Ramon, 1990. "A Dynamic Duopoly Model with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 315-333, March.
    2. Foster, F Douglas & Viswanathan, S, 1996. "Strategic Trading When Agents Forecast the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1437-1478, September.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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