Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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• Aless & ro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, undated, "The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department, number db8edf1dce2468924aca9e501.
• Ichiro Obara, undated, "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics, number 374.
• Ichiro Obara, undated, "Endogenous Monitoring," UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics, number 398.
• Mathevet, Laurent, undated, "A contraction principle for finite global games," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, number 1243.
• A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1994, "Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp1994_9407.
• A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1999, "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp1999_9911.
• Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni & Christopher Sleet, undated, "Contractive Dual Methods for Incentive Problems," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2012-E26.
• Christopher Sleet & Sevin Yeltekin, undated, "Credibility and Endogenous Societal Discounting," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2006-E38.
• Archishman Chakraborty & Alessandro Citanna, undated, "Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 225.
• Laurence Ales & Pricila Maziero, undated, "Non-exclusive Dynamic Contracts, Competition, and the Limits of Insurance," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2010-E59.
• FORGES, Françoise, 1992, "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero sum," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1012, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80009-8.
• Forges, F., 1995, "Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1165, Jan.
• Hamilton , J. H. & Thisse, J.- F., 1997, "Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1266, Jan, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499142.
• HEIFETZ, Aviad & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles M., 1998, "Partial revelation with rational expectations," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1324, Jan, DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2391.
• POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles M. & SECCIA, Giulio, 2000, "A role for monetary policy when prices reveal information: an example," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1479, Jan, DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2686.
• FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico, 2001, "A note on the incentive compatible core," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1523, Jan, DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2759.
• FORGES, Françoise & HEIFETZ , Aviad & MINELLI, Enrico, 2001, "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1555, Jan, DOI: 10.1007/PL00004188.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 2001, "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1596, Jan, DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00081.
• HINDRIKS, Jean & KEEN, Michael & MUTHOO, Abhinay, 2002, "Corruption, extortion and evasion," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1671, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00030-4.
• BOADWAY, Robin & MARCHAND, Maurice & SATO, Motohiro, 2004, "An optimal contract approach to hospital financing," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1692, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2003.08.001.
• GAUTIER, Axel, 2004, "Regulation under financial constraints," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1815, Jan, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8292.2004.00266.x.
• DAM, Kaniska & PEREZ-CASTRILLO, David, 2006, "The principal-agent matching market," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1903, Jan.
• d’ASPREMONT, CLaude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2005, "Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1974, Jan.
• GAUTIER, Axel & PAOLINI, Dimitri, 2007, "Delegation and information revelation," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2018, Jan, DOI: 10.1628/093245607783243007.
• DOCQUIER, Frédéric & FAYE, Ousmane & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2009, "Is migration a good substitute for education subsidies?," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2022, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.12.007.
• MARTIN, Alberto & VERGOTE, Wouter, 2009, "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2037, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.03.009.
• GAUTIER, Axel & MITRA, Manipushpak, 2009, "Regulation of an open access essential facility," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2053, Jan, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00638.x.
• AURIOL, Emmanuelle & PICARD, Pierre M., 2009, "Government outsourcing: public contracting with private monopoly," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2174, Jan, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02291.x.
• GOERTZ, Johanna M.M. & MANIQUET, François, 2011, "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2326, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.001.
• BRECHET, Thierry & PICARD, Pierre M., 2012, "The economics of airport noise: How to manage markets for noise licenses," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2427, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.trd.2011.09.004.
• GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & RESENDE, Joana, 2012, "Differentiated credence goods and price competition," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2461, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2012.09.001.
• Evan M. Calford & Gregory DeAngelo, 2020, "Ambiguity & Enforcement," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics, number 1322, Dec.
• Anja Prummer, undated, "Discrimination in Promotion," Working Papers, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, number 905.
• Filipe Campante & Francisco H. G. Ferreira, undated, "Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy," Working Paper, Harvard University OpenScholar, number 248211.
• Avinatan Hassidim & Deborah Marciano & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, undated, "The Mechanism is Truthful, Why aren?t You?," Working Paper, Harvard University OpenScholar, number 501161.
• Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, undated, "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master?s Match," Working Paper, Harvard University OpenScholar, number 501371.
• Emmanuel Farhi & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, undated, "Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and Transparency," Working Paper, Harvard University OpenScholar, number 78856.
• Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022, "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 660, Dec.
• Bruce M. Owen, undated, ""To Promote the General Welfare": Addressing Political Corruption in America," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, number 15-027.
• Øivind Schøyen, 0, "What limits the efficacy of coercion?," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), volume 0, issue , pages 1-52, DOI: 10.1007/s11698-020-00207-0.
• Caroline D. Thomas, undated, "Career Concerns and Policy Intransigence - A Dynamic Signalling Model," Department of Economics Working Papers, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, number 161228, revised Dec 2016.
• Kolotilin, Anton, 2018, "Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Azar, Pablo D. & Micali, Silvio, 2018, "Computational principal agent problems," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Ke, Rongzhu & Ryan, Christopher Thomas, 2018, "A general solution method for moral hazard problems," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 3, September.
• Noda, Shunya, 2019, "Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 1, January.
• Liu, Heng, 2018, "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars A., 2018, "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 3, September.
• Frankel, Alex & Kartik, Navin, 2018, "What kind of central bank competence?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Battaglini, Marco & Lamba, Rohit, 2019, "Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 4, November.
• Waki, Yuichiro & Dennis, Richard & Fujiwara, Ippei, 2018, "The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 3, September.
• Deb, Joyee & Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2019, "Enforcing social norms: Trust-building and community enforcement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 4, November.
• Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas, 2020, "Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 2, May.
• Eguia, Jon X. & Nicolo, Antonio, 2019, "Information and targeted spending," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 2, May.
• Tsoy, Anton, 2018, "Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Duncan, Alfred J. M. & Nolan, Charles, 2019, "Disputes, debt and equity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 3, July.
• Meyer, Margaret & Moreno de Barreda, Inés & Nafziger, Julia, 2019, "Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 4, November.
• Loertscher, Simon & Wasser, Cédric, 2019, "Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 3, July.
• Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2019, "On competitive nonlinear pricing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 1, January.
• Germano, Fabrizio & Weinstein, Jonathan & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2020, "Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Carroll, Gabriel, 2018, "On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 3, September.
• Heumann, Tibor, 2020, "Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Bardhi, Arjada & Guo, Yingni, 2018, "Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 3, September.
• Galperti, Simone, 2019, "A theory of personal budgeting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 1, January.
• Koessler, Frederic & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2019, "Selling with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 2, May.
• Deb, Rahul & Stewart, Colin, 2018, "Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 3, September.
• Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2020, "Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Foerster, Manuel, 2019, "Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 1, January.
• Erlanson, Albin & Kleiner, Andreas, 2020, "Costly verification in collective decisions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 3, July.
• Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny & Shi, Xianwen, 2019, "Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 2, May.
• Baisa, Brian, 2020, "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Sadakane, Hitoshi, 2023, "Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 1, January.
• Tsakas, Elias, 2020, "Robust scoring rules," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 3, July.
• Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020, "Delegating performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 2, May.
• Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2020, "Performance-maximizing large contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020, "Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 4, November.
• Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 2020, "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 4, November.
• Pomatto, Luciano, 2022, "Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 4, November.
• Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2023, "Termination as an incentive device," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 1, January.
• Schottmüller, Christoph, 2023, "Optimal information structures in bilateral trade," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 1, January.
• Rosato, Antonio, 2023, "Loss aversion in sequential auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2022, "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 4, November.
• Zhang, Mengxi, 2024, "Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Mackenzie, Andrew & Trudeau, Christian, 2023, "On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Kaya, Ayça, 2023, "Paying with information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2024, "Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Chen, Yu & Doyle, Matthew & Gonzalez, Francisco M., 2024, "Wages as signals of worker mobility," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Sun, Yiman, 2024, "A dynamic model of censorship," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Zhang, Wenzhang, 2022, "Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 4, November.
• Bernheim, B. Douglas & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L., 2023, "Pervasive signaling," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 1, January.
• Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Smorodinsky, Rann & Yamashita, Takuro, 2023, "Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 1, January.
• Amador, Manuel & Bagwell, Kyle, 2022, "Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 4, November.
• Chen, Yi, 2022, "Dynamic delegation with a persistent state," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 4, November.
• Hendricks, Ken & Wiseman, Thomas, 2022, "How to sell in a sequential auction market," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 4, November.
• Makris, Miltiadis & Renou, Ludovic, 2023, "Information design in multi-stage games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 4, November.
• Kirpalani, Rishabh & Madsen, Erik, 2023, "Strategic investment evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Margaria, Chiara, 2025, "Queueing to learn," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 2, May.
• Ortner, Juan, 2023, "Bargaining with evolving private information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Feng, Tangren & Niemeyer, Axel & Wu, Qinggong, 2023, "The limits of ex post implementation without transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Carroll, Gabriel & Bolte, Lukas, 2023, "Robust contracting under double moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 4, November.
• Chen, Yiqiu & Möller, Markus, 2024, "Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 2, May.
• Onuchic, Paula & Ray, Debraj, 2023, "Conveying value via categories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 4, November.
• Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2024, "Contracting over persistent information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 2, May.
• Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2023, "Equilibrium existence in games with ties," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Nora, Vladyslav & Winter, Eyal, 2024, "Exploiting social influence in networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Hopenhayn, Hugo & Saeedi, Maryam, 2023, "Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 4, November.
• Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2023, "Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Auster, Sarah & Pavoni, Nicola, 2024, "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023, "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 1, January.
• Huang, Xuesong, 2024, "Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Daske, Thomas & March, Christoph, 2024, "Efficient incentives with social preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 3, July.
• Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2023, "Bad apples in symmetric repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 4, November.
• Deng, Shanglyu & Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2024, "Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 2, May.
• Lehrer, Ehud & Shaiderman, Dimitry, 2026, "Markovian persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 21, issue 1, January.
• Lang, Xu & Mishra, Debasis, 2024, "Symmetric reduced form voting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 2, May.
• Rappoport, Daniel, 2025, "Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 4, November.
• Laiho, Tuomas & Murto, Pauli & Salmi, Julia, 2025, "Gradual learning from incremental actions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 1, January.
• Ekici, Özgün, 2024, "Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 2, May.
• Spiritus, Kevin & Lehmann, Etienne & Renes, Sander & Zoutman, Floris T., 2025, "Optimal taxation with multiple incomes and types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 2, May.
• Barelli, Paulo & Govindan, Srihari, 2024, "Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 2, May.
• Möller, Markus, 2026, "Transparent matching mechanisms," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 21, issue 1, January.
• Kambhampati, Ashwin, 2024, "Robust performance evaluation of independent agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 3, July.
• Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2024, "Optimal sequential contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Silva, Francisco, 2024, "Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 3, July.
• Rosenthal, Maxwell, 0, "Simple incentives and diverse beliefs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Kim, Jaehong & Li, Mengling & Xu, Menghan, 2025, "Priority search with outside options," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 3, July.
• Jehiel, Philippe & Mierendorff, Konrad, 2024, "Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 4, November.
• Dilme, Francesc, 2025, "Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 1, January.
• Deb, Joyee & Kuvalekar, Aditya V. & Lipnowski, Elliot, 2025, "Fostering collaboration," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 4, November.
• Galperti, Simone & Perego, Jacopo, 2025, "Games with information constraints: seeds and spillovers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 2, May.
• Dworczak, Piotr & Kolotilin, Anton, 2024, "The persuasion duality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 4, November.
• Xie, Haitian & Zhu, Ying & Shishkin, Denis, 2025, "On the limitations of data-based price discrimination," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 1, January.
• Gavan, Malachy J. & Penta, Antonio, 2025, "Safe implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 4, November.
• Kolotilin, Anton & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2024, "Distributions of posterior quantiles via matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 4, November.
• Smolin, Alex & Yamashita, Takuro, 0, "Information design in smooth games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Lang, Matthias & Wasser, Cédric, 0, "Benefits and challenges of ambiguous product information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Curello, Gregorio & Sinander, Ludvig, 2025, "Screening for breakthroughs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 4, November.
• Ball, Ian & Kattwinkel, Deniz, 2025, "Probabilistic verification in mechanism design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 4, November.
• Vellodi, Nikhil, 0, "Ratings design and barriers to entry," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Ball, Ian & Pekkarinen, Teemu, 0, "Optimal auction design with contingent payments and costly verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Niemeyer, Axel & Preusser, Justus, 0, "Optimal allocation with peer information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Evans, Robert & Park, In-Uck, 0, "Selling information for bilateral trade," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Mäkimattila, Mikael & Shang, Yucheng & Shirakawa, Ryo, 0, "The design and price of certification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Ho, Samuel, 0, "Efficiency of stable matchings with two-sided incomplete information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Koessler, Frederic & Skreta, Vasiliki, 0, "Informed communication equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Jovanovic, Boyan & Ma, Sai, 0, "Learning and assortative matching with private histories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Jonneke Bolhaar & Maarten Lindeboom & Bas van der Klaauw, 0, "A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 08-084/3, 00.
• Kevin Spiritus & Etienne Lehmann & Sander Renes, undated, "Optimal Taxation with Multiple Incomes and Types," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 22-000/IVI.
• Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020, "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number CIRJE-F-1145, Mar.

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• Cesar Tamayo, 2017, "Bankruptcy Choice with Endogenous Financial Constraints," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 26, pages 225-242, October, DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2017.06.004.
• Giacomo Candian & Mikhail Dmitriev, 2020, "Risk Aversion, Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risk, and the Financial Accelerator," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 37, pages 299-322, July, DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2020.03.003.
• Michal Szkup, 2022, "Preventing Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Global Games Approach," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 43, pages 22-55, January, DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2020.12.002.
• Zhao Han & Xiaohan Ma & Ruoyun Mao, 2023, "The Role of Dispersed Information in Inflation and Inflation Expectations," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 48, pages 72-106, April, DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2022.04.001.
• James Peck & Abolfazi Setayesh, 2023, "Bank Runs and the Optimality of Limited Banking," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 47, pages 100-110, January, DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2022.01.003.