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Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • HAMILTON , J. H.
  • THISSE, J.- F.

Abstract

A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consumer locations is analyzed. A continuum of consumers purchase a variable amount of a product from one of two firms located at the endpoints of the market. At the Nash equilibrium in quantity-outlay schedules, consumers buy the same quantities as they would from the same firm if it were a monopolist facing the same informational asymmetries, but they receive greater surplus. Hence, no efficiency gains result from competition. If consumers have the option to reveal their locations and have the firms deliver the goods, all consumers choose to reveal their locations in equilibrium. Thus, the inefficiencies from information asymmetries may not arise because firms can deliver the good to consumers. In contrast, with a monopoly seller, consumers have no incentives to reveal their locations.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Hamilton , J. H. & Thisse, J.- F., 1997. "Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1266, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1266
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02499142
    Note: In : Economic Design, 2, 379-397, 1997
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    Cited by:

    1. Sílvia Jorge & Cesaltina Pires, 2004. "Delivered versus Mill Nonlinear Pricing in Free Entry Markets," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 22, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro.
    2. Aguirre, Inaki & Paz Espinosa, Maria, 2004. "Product differentiation with consumer arbitrage," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 219-239, February.
    3. Pires, Cesaltina Pacheco & Sarkar, Soumodip, 2000. "Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 429-456, July.
    4. Valletti, Tommaso M., 2000. "Price discrimination and price dispersion in a duopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 351-374, December.
    5. Valletti, Tommaso M., 2002. "Location choice and price discrimination in a duopoly," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 339-358, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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