Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions
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- Georges Dionne & Pascal St-Amour & Désiré Vencatachellum, 2009. "Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1269-1295.
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- Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche 1233, CIRPEE.
- Février, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent & Visser, Michael, 2012.
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- FEVRIER Ph. & LINNEMER L. & VISSER M., 2009. "Testing for asymmetric information in the viager market," Working Papers ERMES 0909, ERMES, University Paris 2.
- Philippe FEVRIER & Laurent LINNEMER & Michael VISSER, 2010. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Viager Market," Working Papers 2010-01, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
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- repec:bla:jrinsu:v:84:y:2017:i:4:p:1103-1126 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yamamoto, Shinichi & Yoneyama, Takau & Kwon, W. Jean, 2012. "An Experimental Study On Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard," Hitotsubashi Journal of commerce and management, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 46(1), pages 51-64, January.
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- Georges Dionnne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Jean Pinquet, 2012. "A Review of Recent Theoretical and Empirical Analyses of Asymmetric Information in Road Safety and Automobile Insurance," Cahiers de recherche 1204, CIRPEE.
- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
- Ciprian Matis & Eugenia Matis, 2013. "Asymmetric Information In Insurance Field: Some General Considerations," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 1(15), pages 1-17.
- Koptyug, Nikita, 2016. "Asymmetric Information in Auctions: Are Resellers Better Appraisers?," Working Paper Series 1110, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsInformation Asymmetry; Adverse Selection; English Auction; Private Value; Slavery; Mauritius.;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- N37 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Africa; Oceania
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