Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Georges DIONNE & Pascal ST-AMOUR & Desire VENCATACHELLUM, 2008. "Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 08-40, Swiss Finance Institute.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Février, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent & Visser, Michael, 2012.
"Testing for asymmetric information in the viager market,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 104-123.
- FEVRIER Ph. & LINNEMER L. & VISSER M., 2009. "Testing for asymmetric information in the viager market," Working Papers ERMES 0909, ERMES, University Paris 2.
- Laurent Linnemer & Philippe Février & Michael Visser, 2012. "Testing for asymmetric information in the viager market," Post-Print hal-01629755, HAL.
- Philippe FEVRIER & Laurent LINNEMER & Michael VISSER, 2010. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Viager Market," Working Papers 2010-01, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Alois Geyer & Daniela Kremslehner & Alexander Muermann, 2020. "Asymmetric Information in Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Driving Behavior," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(4), pages 969-995, December.
- Georges Dionne & Mélissa La Haye & Anne-Sophie Bergerès, 2015.
"Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(3), pages 819-852, August.
- Georges Dionne & Mélissa La Haye & Anne‐Sophie Bergerès, 2015. "Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 819-852, August.
- Georges Dionne & Mélissa La Haye & Anne-Sophie Bergères, 2010. "Does Asymmetric Information Affect the Premium in Mergers and Acquisitions?," Cahiers de recherche 1015, CIRPEE.
- Xiaoqi Zhang & Yi Chen & Yi Yao, 2021. "Dynamic information asymmetry in micro health insurance: implications for sustainability," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(3), pages 468-507, July.
- David Rowell & Son Nghiem & Luke B Connelly, 2017. "Two Tests for Ex Ante Moral Hazard in a Market for Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(4), pages 1103-1126, December.
- Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013.
"A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance,"
Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
- Georges Dionnne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Jean Pinquet, 2012. "A Review of Recent Theoretical and Empirical Analyses of Asymmetric Information in Road Safety and Automobile Insurance," Cahiers de recherche 1204, CIRPEE.
- Ciprian MatiÅŸ & Eugenia MatiÅŸ, 2013. "Asymmetric Information In Insurance Field: Some General Considerations," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 1(15), pages 1-17.
- Carole Botton & Julien Fouquau, 2014. "L'Expertise De L'Evaluation : Une Construction Sociale," Post-Print hal-01899544, HAL.
- Jedidi, Helmi & Dionne, Georges, 2019. "Testing for information asymmetry in the mortgage servicing market," Working Papers 19-1, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, revised 28 Oct 2019.
- Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche 1233, CIRPEE.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
- Carole Botton & Julien Fouquau, 2012. "Adjugé, Vendu...Assuré," Post-Print hal-00937902, HAL.
- Yamamoto, Shinichi & Yoneyama, Takau & Kwon, W. Jean, 2012. "An Experimental Study On Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard," Hitotsubashi Journal of commerce and management, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 46(1), pages 51-64, October.
- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
- Koptyug, Nikita, 2016. "Asymmetric Information in Auctions: Are Resellers Better Appraisers?," Working Paper Series 1110, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- N37 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Africa; Oceania
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:76:y:2009:i:4:p:1269-1295. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press or Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.