IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvrp/2022.html

Is migration a good substitute for education subsidies?

Author

Listed:
  • DOCQUIER, Frédéric
  • FAYE, Ousmane
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

Assuming a given educational policy, the recent brain drain literature reveals that skilled migration can boost the average level of schooling in developing countries. This paper introduces educational subsidies determined by governments concerned by the number of skilled workers remaining in the country. The theoretical analysis shows that developing countries can benefit from skilled emigration when educational subsidies entail high .fiscal distortions. However when taxes are not too distortionary, it is desirable to impede emigration and subsidize education. The authors investigate the empirical relationship between educational subsidies and migration prospects, obtaining a negative relationship for 105 countries. Based on this result, the analysis revisits the country specific effects of skilled migration upon human capital. The findings show that the endogeneity of public subsidies reduces the number of winners and increases the magnitude of the losses.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • DOCQUIER, Frédéric & FAYE, Ousmane & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2009. "Is migration a good substitute for education subsidies?," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2022
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.12.007
    Note: In : Journal of Development Economics, 86, 263-276, 2008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2022. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.