A Monopolistic Credit Rating Agency
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References listed on IDEAS
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" Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies,"
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kirstein, Roland, 2002.
"The new Basle Accord, internal ratings, and the incentives of banks,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 393-412, May.
- Kirstein, Roland, 2000. "The New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the Incentives of Banks," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2000-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay, 2006. "Existence of Unsolicited Ratings," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer;Japanese Association of Financial Economics and Engineering, vol. 13(3), pages 207-233, September.
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- Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay, 2004. "Moral Hazard with Rating Agency: An Incentive Contracting Approach," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 5(2), pages 313-333, November.
- Gu, Yiquan, 2008. "Imperfect Certification," Ruhr Economic Papers 78, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
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More about this item
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-01-21 (All new papers)
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