Pricing under noisy signaling
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More about this item
KeywordsPricing; Signaling; Asymmetric information; Dividends; Initial public offerings; Capital structure; D82; D49; G12; G35; G32; M30;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Other
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- M30 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - General
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